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Introduction 
URBAN DESIGN AND THE NEW METROPOLITAN FORM 
American society and particularly its urban component under­
went dramatic economic change in the sixty years after 1877. By 
the turn of the century, the completion of the railroad network had 
helped to create ever-larger regional, national, and international 
markets and to promote the emergence of a system of metropoli­
tan centers that served as the financial and managerial headquarters 
of that expanding commerce. The subsequent concentration of 
capital, the rise of national corporations, and the development of 
the urban market meant that the expansion of industrial produc­
tion would also occur within a metropolitan context during this 
period. By 1937, as the newly published federal study Our Cities: 
Their Role in the National Economy made clear, the national system 
of metropolitan centers had become the dominant element within 
American society.1 Not only had American cities grown in popu­
lation and in number, but the larger cities experienced both physi­
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cal expansion and internal reorganization. By the end of the cen­
tury, a new metropolitan form had supplanted the physically 
constricted walking city of the mid-nineteenth century (named for 
its easiest, cheapest, and most common mode of transportation) 
and its heterogeneous jumble of commercial, industrial, and resi­
dential districts.2 
The economic and physical changes associated with the new 
metropolitan form were only one part of a more profound trans­
formation of American society during that sixty-year period. Al­
though the new metropolitan form incorporated the political, 
social, and intellectual as well as the economic aspects of the trans­
formation, contemporary observers tended to focus only on the 
outward physical aspects of metropolitan development. Early in 
the period the expansion of manufacturing crowded the urban 
core; by the turn of the century, giant new industrial enterprises 
increasingly located on the urban periphery along the metropoli­
tan corridors of rail and water transportation. Combined with the 
exodus of the middle class to residential suburbs, the suburbaniza­
tion of industry generated more rapid growth at the urban periph­
ery than at the core, a characteristic that was the most salient as­
pect of the new metropolitan form. At the same time the central 
business district, relieved of both manufacturing and residential 
functions, became the commercial showcase and financial com­
mand center of the corporate economy. In a ring of speculative 
real estate surrounding the central business district, the urban poor 
squeezed into tenement neighborhoods that were more segregated 
and in some cases more densely populated than those of a genera­
tion before.3 
The most visible symbol of the transformation of American so­
ciety, the metropolis also served to disguise that transformation 
and to give it an apparent physical implacability and inevitability, 
which placed it beyond criticism and control. A major purpose of 
this study is to unravel the mystery of the new metropolitan 
form.4 A variety of factors, from the availability and location of 
natural resources and the ups and downs of regional, national, and 
world markets to technological innovation and the development 
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of scientific knowledge and professional expertise, shaped metro­
politan development. Although some of those factors were be­
yond human control, this study argues that the new metropolitan 
form and the social order it embodied were primarily the result of 
conscious, political decisions. Reflecting the conviction that hu­
man design plays a decisive role in urban development, the central 
thesis of this work is that the American city was in important ways 
"planned" before the rise of professional city planning. 
In describing the great cities of the Gilded Age, Alan Trachten­
berg has made a similar point. 
Cities did not expand and change mindlessly, by mere entropy. 
If they lacked democratic planning, they submitted to corporate 
planning—which is to say, to the overlapping, planned evolu­
tion of many private competitive enterprises. The visible forms 
make this clear: the power of organized wealth, answerable only 
to the limits of the possible. 
That sort of corporate planning remained a major factor in urban 
development even after the rise of professional planning. Address­
ing a group of professional planners in 1926, Charles Beard quoted 
President Coolidge's remarks to the leaders of the automobile in­
dustry. Among "the problems with which you gentlemen are 
dealing," Coolidge had told the assembled capitalists, are the 
"physical configuration of our cities" and "the elementals of social 
organization." Beard reminded the professional planners that the 
actions of transportation corporations and "speculation in traction 
stocks and bonds" had long been among "the prime factors in the 
dynamics of planning" and that such powerful agencies must still 
be taken into account.5 
But corporate planning has always been answerable to more 
than simply the limits of the possible. The private market deci­
sions of millions of individuals have provided at least a limited 
check upon corporate power. More importantly, a variety of in­
dividuals and social groups (less powerful or less conscious of their 
power than the great corporations but still influential) shaped met­
ropolitan development through various forms of mass action, the 
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articulation of new ideas, and the creation of new institutions. 
Many of those individuals and groups developed public visions of 
the urban future in an effort to challenge and to transform the 
private city of corporate and individual decision-making. Thus a 
public debate about what the city could and ought to be, as well 
as the private pursuit of wealth, shaped the new metropolitan 
form.6 
REPUBLICANS AND REALISTS 
In writing an intellectual and political history of the new met­
ropolitan form that attempts to make sense of the complex moti­
vations and often chaotic activities of both individuals and social 
groups, I have isolated two distinct traditions in urban thought 
and urban reform. In the Gilded Age a republican and idealistic 
vision of the urban future imagined an urban commonwealth free 
of class conflict, populated by virtuous republicans, and shaped by 
Christian ethics. That vision, which began to emerge in the 1840s 
and 1850s based upon traditional republican and free labor values, 
is represented in this study chiefly by Frederick Law Olmsted and 
Henry George.7 In calling for a balance between the city and the 
country, a balance that would mediate urban artifice, structure, 
and organization with rural nature, spontaneity, and community, 
the republicans hoped to inject the urban order with the civic and 
political equality, economic opportunity, and, perhaps most im­
portantly, the social harmony they associated with the free labor 
republic.8 
Only one of several approaches to the city in the Gilded Age, 
and one that was by no means completely successful, the republi­
can tradition was the most dynamic in calling for active reform 
measures. Challenging the dominant laissez-faire and social Dar­
winist view, which accepted the urban status quo as a filtering 
mechanism in which the competent and energetic rose and the lazy 
and improvident sank, the republicans generated a popular demand 
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for a more just and humane urban order. While the republicans 
achieved only limited success, their attack upon complacency and 
their invigoration of public debate helped to open the way for a 
variety of reform initiatives in the Progressive Era, including some 
based upon assumptions very different from their own.9 
Although the republican vision was to receive its most powerful 
expression in the intellectual and political career of Henry George 
and would bequeath an important legacy to the twentieth century, 
the economic depression and social upheavals of the 1870s had al­
ready begun to erode the confidence and the influence of the re­
publicans. The economic and social consequences of the depres­
sion tended to undermine the belief that urban development could 
be accommodated to republican and free labor values. In the wake 
of the depression, the mechanized factory and corporate capitalism 
crowded out the small" workshop and the artisan mode of produc­
tion; and an increasingly bitter conflict between capital and labor 
reshaped social and political allegiances. In that new economic and 
social context, the republicans, whose economic and social ideals 
celebrated the small independent craftsman and the harmony of 
the producing classes (which included both capital and labor), 
were unable to develop an effective political strategy to implement 
their ideas.10 
The economic and social transformation that began during the 
depression of the 1870s sparked the development of the new met­
ropolitan form and generated new initiatives in urban thought and 
urban reform. Beginning in the wake of the depression, reaching 
maturity in the 1920s, and paralleling metropolitan development, 
a new realistic and pragmatic tradition emerged.11 The realists, a 
group that included corporate leaders, good-government reform­
ers, city and social planners, and urban academics, and whose 
most important theorist was the sociologist Robert E. Park, were 
less interested in imagining alternatives to the increasingly hierar­
chical, corporate, and artificial character of metropolitan America. 
Embracing the new developments in the name of progress, the 
realists accepted the metropolis on its own terms, viewing its un-
republican political order and class conflicts as problems to be 
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managed rather than resolved. Notwithstanding their desire to 
make the metropolis more efficient, rational, and just, an overrid­
ing concern with stabilizing and legitimating the metropolitan or­
der weakened the realists' ability to challenge powerful interests 
and to tackle politically controversial problems. While the repub­
licans failed to build a viable political coalition for change, the 
realists generally saw no need for one. Thus, neither republicans 
nor realists succeeded in reconciling the private city of individual 
and corporate decision-making with their public vision of the ur­
ban future. 
CITY BUILDING AND URBAN PLANNING 
Treating urban thought and urban reform in terms of compet­
ing republican and realistic traditions fosters a certain artificiality. 
Few if any of the theorists and reformers examined in this book fit 
perfectly into either category. The most complex figures, Frederic 
Howe and Robert Park for example, at times drew on both tradi­
tions. Neither do the categories of republican and realistic fully 
comprehend the variety of urban thought and urban reform in the 
period; there were undoubtedly other ways of looking at the city. 
An analysis of urban thought and urban reform in light of those 
categories does, however, illuminate certain aspects of the intellec­
tual, social, political, and economic transformation of American 
society between 1877 and 1937. 
While certain elements of the republican tradition survived into 
the twentieth century, what I describe as the city building debate 
was unique to the Gilded Age.12 In the Gilded Age the industrial 
city was still seen as alien to the American experience and threat­
ening to the cultural values of republican and free labor America; 
consequently, the republicans were eager, indeed anxious, to imag­
ine alternatives and to transform the city. But they were relatively 
unprepared to do so, not only because of their limited understand­
ing of the political implications of the changing economic and so­
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cial structure of metropolitan America, but also because they had 
only a limited faith and interest in public planning. 
The city building debate reflected the belief that human choice 
shaped urban development and that city building should remain 
an essentially individual process in which the average citizen had a 
crucial and largely private role to play. Its most innovative element 
was the suggestion that a small but profoundly important public 
role in urban development could have a dramatic and beneficent 
effect on urban life (as with George's single tax and the public 
ownership of urban utilities or Olmsted's parks, boulevards, and 
more flexible street layouts). And yet for all their innovation the 
republicans only slowly and partially dismantled the individualis­
tic and laissez-faire assumptions that precluded a passionate em­
brace of public planning. 
While taking a significantly broader view of the role of public 
planning in urban development, the realists, whose influence grew 
during and after the Progressive Era, doubted whether republican 
and free labor values could be preserved in metropolitan America. 
That doubt was linked to their belief that the city was a natural phe­
nomenon that was beyond human control to a significant degree; 
realistic planners insisted on working with rather than against in­
evitable urban trends. Realists thus tended to see planning as more 
of a managerial and less of a political undertaking, a conviction 
further reinforced by their embrace of the expert and their view of 
the limited role the average citizen could play in planning. Thus, 
urban planning became an expert activity carried on through pub­
lic agencies with a minimum of popular participation and reflected 
a tendency to minimize the role of human design in urban devel­
opment. Ironically, the more the realists embraced public plan­
ning, the less they believed in its capacity to reshape significantly 
the urban future. 
To be sure, the tendency to minimize the potential for change 
reflected in part a recognition of enormous investments in the built 
environment that had been made between 1877 and 1937. Increas­
ingly, the built environment became a serious obstacle to change.13 
Moreover, certain elements of that environment, especially the 
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complex corridors of rail transportation, heralded the rise of the 
expert builder and systems engineer whose scientific knowledge 
presumably placed them above the capricious world of human 
choice.14 But the growing influence of the realistic perspective also 
had its origins in a changing intellectual environment. 
Henry George had only a limited faith in public planning, but 
he still believed that the city could be changed in fundamental 
ways because he recognized the political choices that shaped it. 
About George's great work, Progress and Poverty, labor editor John 
Swinton wrote: 
[It] came to the weary and heavy laden as the talisman of a lost 
hope. All their lives long they had been taught that poverty was 
a 'dispensation of Providence' needful to keep them humble and 
teach them patience, but if cheerfully borne, it would somehow 
contribute to their happiness in the dim beyond. 'Progress and 
Poverty' reversed all this, teaching that poverty is an artificial 
condition of man's invention, the result of unjust social condi­
tions which compel one to toil that another may eat. . . . Work­
ingmen and women, learning all this, conceived the thought 'if 
this be truth, then existence even here in this world may be 
something more than continued striving to supply the most ur­
gent physical demands,' and immediately they commenced to 
wrestle with their chains. 
In the same way George insisted that, if the public made a different 
set of political choices, both the shape and the character of the 
metropolis could be dramatically changed for the better.15 
As befit someone who came to intellectual maturity in the Pro­
gressive Era, Robert Park had a greater faith in public planning 
than did George. But Park doubted the capacity of planning to 
alter existing urban trends precisely because he minimized the role 
of political choice in urban development. He believed that a set of 
natural factors beyond conscious human control outweighed those 
of human design. Defining the city as "a state of mind, a body of 
customs and traditions, and of the organized attitudes and senti­
ments that inhere in these customs and are transmitted with this 
tradition," Park surely recognized the city as the product of hu­
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man nature. But the main thrust of his thinking went in a different 
direction. Rooted in the habits and customs of its inhabitants, the 
city possessed a moral organization; it was, however, "the struc­
ture of the city which first impresses us by its visible vastness and 
complexity," Park wrote. That structure, itself a product of hu­
man nature, nevertheless imposed itself on its inhabitants "as a 
crude external fact, and forms them, in turn, in accordance with 
the design and interests which it incorporates." For that reason, 
Park argued, "there is a limit to the arbitrary modifications which 
it is possible to make" in the physical and social organization of 
the city.16 
Park's concept of urban development could lead to an accep­
tance of such phenomena as slums and ghettos as the inevitable 
results of impersonal urban processes. Park, described the me­
tropolis as "a great sifting and sorting mechanism, which, infal­
libly selects out of the population as a whole the individuals best 
suited to live in a particular region and a particular milieu."17 At 
times Park came close to blaming the poor for their poverty. In 
the city, he wrote, 
the poor, the vicious, and the delinquent, crushed together in 
an unhealthful and contagious intimacy, breed in and in, soul 
and body, so that it has often occurred to me that those long 
genealogies of the Jukes and the tribes of Ishmael would not 
show such a persistent and distressing uniformity of vice, crime, 
and poverty unless they were peculiarly fit for the environment 
in which they are condemned to exist. 
We must accept then these "moral regions" and the more or 
less eccentric and exceptional people who inhabit them, in a 
sense, at least, as part of the natural, if not the normal, life of a 
city. 
Certainly, Park's considerable sympathy for and understanding of 
the urban poor and outcast and his celebration of the diversity of 
urban life enriched American urban thought. But his view of the 
city as the result of natural forces beyond conscious human control 
encouraged an element of fatalism in the emerging discipline of 
urban planning.18 
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Park's colleague Harvey Zorbaugh expressed more bluntly the 
fatalistic element in the urban planning perspective. Speaking to a 
group that included members of the Regional Plan Association of 
New York, Zorbaugh argued that "the city is found to be not an 
artifact but a natural phenomenon." Quoting Elihu Root, Zor­
baugh agreed that it "'is not the result of political decrees or con­
trol.'" The city, he explained, '"is a growth responding to forces 
not at all political. . .  . It is a growth like that of a crystal respond­
ing to forces inherent in the atoms that make it up.'"1 9 Park and 
his students added to our understanding of the nature of the city, 
but at the same time they contributed to a pessimistic attitude 
about the possibilities of change. 
The realistic perspective did not go unchallenged, and an un­
derstanding of the role of political and economic power in urban 
development survived into the twentieth century. In his address to 
professional planners cited above, Charles Beard warned that un­
less they exposed "to public gaze" the "various economic interests 
that . . . gain more money . .  . by forcing anti-social develop­
ment," they would simply place a veneer of public accountability 
and disinterested professionalism on the plans of the great capital-
ists.20 In contrast, Robert Park opened his most important address 
to professional planners with a reference to the ecology of plant 
communities, thereby obscuring the unique capacity of human 
communities to shape consciously their own environment.21 It was 
Park's view of the city as largely a result of natural urban processes 
and the realistic tradition that he would champion that would 
prove most influential in the twentieth century and that shaped the 
professional discipline of urban planning. 
SCOPE AND PERSPECTIVE 
This work began as a Ph.D. dissertation on "the origins of city 
planning," but it has evolved into something both more and less 
than that. I began the study by examining the proceedings of the 
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national conferences on city planning between 1909 and 1934, but 
that material seemed to leave so much unsaid about the American 
city and the demand for city planning. I therefore resolved, with 
great ambition and too little humility, to recapture the economic, 
social, cultural, intellectual, and political context out of which 
professional planning emerged. Increasingly the urban context, 
rather than the city planning profession itself, became the focus of 
the study. Without pretending to be a complete or exhaustive 
study of the planning profession, the present study combines an 
analysis of the professionalization of planning with an argument 
about the development of urban thought and urban reform during 
a sixty-year period. 
Although the scope of the study is national, most of the exam­
ples that make up the larger picture are taken from three cities: 
New York, Chicago, and Cincinnati. The planners themselves led 
me to New York and Chicago, for it was in the two largest met­
ropolitan areas of the nation that so much of the history of plan­
ning unfolded. Although Cincinnati was a leader in the city plan­
ning movement and the first major city to give official recognition 
to a master plan, its inclusion in this study was, at least in part, 
more arbitrary—the result of my employment in that city for the 
past seven years. But the choice was also both fortuitous and in 
some ways inevitable. Cincinnati has been blessed not only with a 
fascinating history but with a gifted group of historians, especially 
Steven J. Ross and Zane L. Miller. Their work on Cincinnati in 
the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, respectively, has shaped 
my own understanding of the evolution of urban America during 
that period. 
As a graduate student I had read Miller's Boss Cox's Cincinnati 
just as I was beginning work on the dissertation. While not specifi­
cally about planning, Boss Cox's Cincinnati, with its emphasis on 
the spatial dynamics of urban politics, including the machine-
reform conflict and its analysis of the three-dimensional aspects of 
city building from the location of factories and residences to the 
provision of public utilities, shaped my view of what rightly be­
longed in a history of city planning. I read Ross's Workers on the 
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Edge at a similar point in the writing of the present work. His 
analysis of the influence that republican ideals had on the American 
working class and more specifically his provocative treatment of 
Henry George and the United Labor party were crucial in helping 
me rework some of the earlier and weaker parts of the dissertation. 
More generally, his suggestion that if Cincinnati's "workers had 
united and voted along class lines in local elections, they could 
have dramatically altered the character of Cincinnati's develop­
ment" reinforced my own conviction about the role of political 
choice in urban development.22 In short the history of Cincinnati 
has played a more pervasive and profound role in the develop­
ment of this work than the scattered references to that city might 
suggest. 
Afinal word about perspective. Much of the history of city plan­
ning has been written from the perspective of the planners them­
selves. As Robert Fishman argues most planning historians have 
assumed that planning has been a progressive force in urban affairs, 
no more or less than the rational application of modern science, 
technology, and professional expertise to the design of the urban 
environment. As a result such history, Fishman writes, "systemat­
ically underrates the contributions that non-professionals have 
made to urban form and vitality; and, consciously or uncon­
sciously, planning history supports the elitist notion that city plan­
ning is for experts, not citizens." A counter tradition has devel­
oped around such writers as Jane Jacobs and Richard Sennett, 
whom Fishman describes as the anti-planners. The anti-planners 
have come close to rejecting planning outright, Fishman argues, 
in insisting that the city "must have order, but that order must be 
truly social, built up out of the plans of thousands of individ-
uals."23 In radically different ways (the one questioning the com­
petence of the citizen, the other questioning the value of planning), 
each perspective has obscured the potential for a democratic form 
of planning. 
My own perspective, like Fishman's, stands somewhere be­
tween the two. The city is the greatest illustration of the potential 
that freedom gives to the individual, but also of the much greater 
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potential of average and unexceptional humans acting in coopera­
tion. City dwellers, George recognized, "may supply themselves 
with greater certainty, and in much greater variety and abundance, 
than the savage; but it is by the cooperation of thousands. Even 
the water they drink, and the artificial light they use, are brought 
to them by elaborate machinery, requiring the constant labor and 
watchfulness of many men."24 The complexity and cooperative 
character of urban life, George understood, demanded an in­
creased application of social intelligence. As a form of cooperation 
and an application of social intelligence, planning is an essential 
and crucial urban activity. Its definition and practice are too im­
portant to be left to the exclusive control of experts and profes­
sionals. This work is written with the conviction that the devel­
opment of a democratic form of planning is both one of most 
difficult tasks we face as a society and an essential precondition to 
the creation of a more humane and just urban environment. I hope 
to suggest that two closely related assumptions, about the incompe­
tence of the average citizen in the face of complex urban problems 
and about the inevitability of certain forms of urban development, 
stand to this day as the most serious obstacles to accomplishing 
that task. 
13 

An Urban Republic: 
Frederick Olmsted, Henry George, 
and the City Building Debate 
Although significant industrial 
development had begun in the United States by the 1850s, the 
large industrial city was still alien to the experience of most ante­
bellum Americans and appeared to threaten the values of the re-
public.1 In the political crisis of the 1850s, the Republican party 
gave expression to a free labor ideology that idealized the small-
town and rural society of the Northern states. An amalgam of 
protestant, republican, and artisan values, the free labor ideology 
celebrated a wide distribution of property, economic indepen­
dence, social mobility, political egalitarianism, and a virtuous and 
competent citizenry. Although artisans in New York and other 
large cities had contributed to the development of the free labor 
ideology, the Republican party represented small-town and rural 
Americans who feared the extremes of wealth and poverty and the 
attendant political corruption associated with large cities.2 Yet Re­
publican economists such as Henry Carey argued that if industri­
alization were carried out on a small-town and rural basis, it would 
preserve and complement the free labor republic. Thus the Repub­
15 
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lican party agreed to promote industrialization or at least to re­
move obstacles to it.3 
In the forty years after 1850, the industrial city became the 
dominant element within the republic. Despite the hopes of many 
Americans, rapid urbanization was central to industrialization dur­
ing that period. The spatial concentration of economic activities, 
economies of scale, the urban market, and the import-replacing 
function all made the city the most important generator of indus­
trial development.4 The centralizing effects of both the railroad 
network and commercial capital helped to create a set of dominant 
metropolitan areas by the end of the century.5 Urban industrializa­
tion created considerable economic opportunity and social mo­
bility, but it also accelerated the concentration of economic power 
in corporations and the expansion of the class of economically de­
pendent wage earners, which threatened republican institutions. 
As the great railroad corporations ran roughshod over the 
democratic process following the Civil War, many Americans 
feared for the integrity of the republic. "I confess that the only fear 
I have in regard to republican institutions is whether, in our day, 
any adequate remedy will be found for this incoming flood of the 
power of incorporated wealth," the abolitionist turned labor re­
former Wendell Phillips said. Alarmed by the Republican party's 
subservience to corporate interests, Phillips turned to the labor 
movement. "The labor movement is my only hope for democ-
racy."6 Conversely, conservatives lamented that the labor vote had 
become a crucial element of the nation's politics and cited the ap­
peals to working-class interests on the part of demagogic politi­
cians and labor agitators as the most serious threat to the republic.7 
By the 1890s a series of industrial depressions, a rising level of 
labor militancy, an influx of immigrant laborers, and the prolifera­
tion of corrupt political machines had made urban industrialization 
the central problem facing the republic. 
In the Progressive Era reformers would begin to fashion a new 
set of realistic values, but Gilded Age Americans debated the fu­
ture of their urban civilization with reference to the values and 
commitments of the free labor republic.8 In particular both Frede­
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rick Law Olmsted and Henry George employed the cultural re­
sources of free labor and republican America to imagine an alter­
native course for urbanization that would lead to the development 
of an urban commonwealth.9 While accepting urbanization and 
embracing its possibilities, they sought to create an urban land­
scape that was not, in George's words, "utterly divorced from all 
the genial influences of nature." Hoping to balance the advantages 
of the city with those of the country, Olmsted and George sought 
to inject the urban order with the political equality, economic op­
portunity, and social harmony they associated with small-town 
and rural America.10 
Although the debate over the future of America's urban civili­
zation would move in different directions and reflect different as­
sumptions in the twentieth century, it was Olmsted, George, and 
their Gilded Age contemporaries who brought the debate to the 
forefront of the public agenda. Much of what Olmsted and George 
argued would be lost to the coming generation, but they were the 
first to wrestle with a set of issues that would confront twentieth-
century urban reformers. Their concern with the spatial order and 
its relation to social control and social justice, their interest in the 
environmental basis of behavior and the interrelationship among 
the city's parts, as well as their call for an expansion of govern­
mental functions and a greater involvement of middle-class profes­
sionals in public service anticipated key elements of the twentieth-
century debate.11 
CITY AND COUNTRY 
The scion of a venerable New England family stretching back 
to 1636, tutored by a succession of Protestant ministers, Frederick 
Law Olmsted was raised in the shadow of the Puritan "city on a 
hill." During his childhood he developed both a deep love of na­
ture and an admiration for the New England way of life.12 As a 
young man he embarked on a series of practical agricultural ven­
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tures, but his interest in rural life ultimately reflected the concerns 
of the urban romantic. With his friend Andrew Jackson Downing, 
Olmsted shared a belief in the beneficent influence of nature and a 
commitment to republicanism. From contemporary theologians 
and reformers, he acquired a liberal protestant faith in the perfect­
ibility of human nature. Olmsted's celebrated accounts of the 
shortcomings of the slave South sharpened his commitment to the 
free labor and republican values of the North. Although he could 
not entirely dismiss the Cavalier critique of the excessive commer­
cialism of the Yankee North and the "rowdyism" and "ruffian­
ism" of its mudsill class, Olmsted rejected the aristocratic out­
look. Describing himself as a "Socialist Democrat," Olmsted 
charged the government with a greater responsibility for educat­
ing and elevating the lower classes.13 
Olmsted's urban park designs reflected all of those convictions. 
The urban park would provide a rural retreat for city dwellers, 
encourage their natural instincts for sympathy, admiration, and 
respect, help to perfect the Christian community, and promote a 
sense of civic equality. "It is republican in its very idea and ten­
dency," Downing had said in support of a municipal appropriation 
for New York's Central Park, "and raises up the man of the work­
ing men to the same level of enjoyment with the man of leisure 
and accomplishment."14 Municipal parks, Olmsted agreed, af­
forded the "opportunity for people to come together for the single 
purpose of enjoyment, unembarrassed by the limitations with 
which they are surrounded at home, or in the pursuit of their daily 
avocations." Such opportunities would help overcome the class 
divisions within the city. To the great urban parks "a body of 
Christians" would come, he explained, "with an evident glee in 
the prospect of coming together, all classes largely represented, 
with a common purpose . . . disposing to jealousy and spiritual or 
intellectual pride toward none, each individual adding by his mere 
presence to the pleasure of all others, all helping to the greater 
happiness of each." The urban park, Olmsted implied, would help 
to recreate the Christian commonwealth of Puritan New England 
within the cities of the free labor republic.15 
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Notwithstanding his admiration for the New England way of 
life, Olmsted was not antiurban. He eagerly accepted the challenge 
of developing an intelligent and humane urban culture in America. 
A student of the history of urban development, Olmsted acknowl­
edged the many advantages of urbanization even as he criticized 
the shortcomings of the American city.16 He understood that ad­
vances in communication, transportation, and exchange through­
out the world would continue to increase both the number and the 
size of cities.17 But in the future, he insisted, metropolitan devel­
opment would have to be planned with reference to the needs 
"not of ordinary commerce only, but of humanity, religion, art, 
science, and scholarship." Faithful to that admonition, Olmsted's 
philosophy of parks grew from his study of urbanization and his 
critique of the American city.18 
Sharply critical of the grid street system that had been imposed 
upon New York, Olmsted hoped to prevent its extension and rec­
ommended a more flexible and imaginative layout of streets. The 
grid facilitated the sale of real estate, but it frustrated other human 
activities. The standardized twenty-five by one-hundred foot lot 
allowed for the construction of the magnificent mansions of the 
wealthy, but it crowded the poor into dark, airless tenements. In 
"the middle parts of all these deep narrow cubes there must be a 
large amount of ill-ventilated space," he protested. The standard­
ized lot was also incompatible for modest single-family dwellings 
for it ensured that the "ground rent would be in too large propor­
tion to that of the betterments." Thus the grid not only con­
demned the poor to unsatisfactory living conditions, but it ig­
nored the needs of the great middle ranks of clerks and mechanics, 
the backbone of the republican city.19 
Overcrowding and congestion had long been central problems 
in metropolitan development. Citing the close connection be­
tween death rates and congestion, Olmsted argued that the im­
provement of urban living conditions was historically "due to 
the abandonment of the old-fashioned compact way of building 
towns, and the gradual adoption of a custom of laying them out 
with much larger spaces open to sun-light and fresh air." In the 
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great commercial cities during the past century, the families of 
businessmen had demanded "as much of the luxuries of free air, 
space, and abundant vegetation as, without loss of town privi­
leges, they can be enabled to secure." The effort to balance the 
advantages of city living with those of rural life had become even 
more important in the cities of the industrial era.20 
Thus Olmsted's philosophy of parks addressed the particular 
problems of life in the industrial metropolis. Industrialization had 
accelerated the division of the metropolis between fast-paced, im­
personal, and competitive business districts and fashionable resi­
dential areas where the fortunate found refuge from the noise, pol­
lution, congestion, and other disagreeable aspects of industrial 
production. The urban park would serve as a middle ground, both 
clarifying the functional segregation and serving its own distinc­
tive functions. The character of industrial production, Olmsted 
explained, had made "tranquilizing recreation more essential to 
continued health and strength than until lately it generally has 
been."21 That was particularly a problem for the working class, 
which lacked access to a suburban or rural environment. Allevi­
ating the stress of the competitive city of work, the park would 
also provide a focus for communal activities and social interaction 
between the classes. 
Olmsted's philosophy of parks complemented his view of resi­
dential suburbs, which were designed to serve more complex 
functions than the twentieth century haven of domestic privacy. 
On the busy streets of the working city, Olmsted wrote, "to 
merely avoid collision with those we meet and pass upon the side­
walks, we have constantly to watch, to foresee, to guard against 
their movement." Consequently, "our minds are thus brought 
into close dealings with other minds without any friendly flowing 
toward them, but rather a drawing from them." For the fortunate 
classes Olmsted's suburbs afforded not only a domestic retreat 
from such tensions but a community setting where social interac­
tion could take a positive form. The most scenic vistas, he wrote, 
should "be possessed by each family in common with others, at 
some little distance from the house, so as to afford inducement 
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and occasion for going more out from it, and for realizing and 
keeping up acquaintances by the eye at least, with the commu­
nity." It was just as important, Olmsted argued, for the suburb 
to provide opportunities for "the harmonious association and co­
operation of men in a community" as to provide privacy. Unfor­
tunately, the lower classes, trapped in the crowded tenement dis­
tricts, lacked those opportunities.22 
While Olmsted designed urban park systems in the 1860s and 
1870s Henry George, another and less fortunate son of the ante­
bellum middle class, brooded over the character of urban America. 
The son of a struggling middle-class Philadelphia family, George 
shared Olmsted's faith in a beneficent natural order and his Chris­
tian ethics. For all its detailed exposition of political economy the 
ultimate force of George's greatest work, Progress and Poverty, was 
moral. "Political economy and social science cannot teach any les­
sons," he argued, that Christ had not already taught. Combining 
his view of nature with his religious faith in a manner reminiscent 
of his political hero, Thomas Jefferson, he insisted that the "laws 
of nature are the decrees of the Creator." George hoped to release 
the instinctual capacities of all humans for sympathy, admiration 
and respect and to create "the city of God on earth."23 
But George added to those convictions a commitment to artisan 
republicanism, inherited from his Jacksonian father and hardened 
both in the working-class Southwark District of Philadelphia 
where he grew up and in more than a decade's hard struggle on 
the Pacific frontier. During the depression of the 1870s, the jux­
taposition of abject poverty and fabulous wealth on the Pacific 
frontier and in Eastern cities had fired George's imagination and 
left him with "haunting visions of higher possibilities."24 He de­
veloped those visions in Progress and Poverty, which was perhaps 
more widely read than any other book in the nineteenth century 
save the Bible.25 His analysis of the enigma of poverty amidst 
progress combined an artisan's view of political economy with a 
passion for social justice in order to outline an alternative vision of 
urban development.26 
The young George saw a great deal of the bitter side of Ameri­
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ca's Pacific frontier as a sailor, prospector, printer, and newspa­
perman. Yet he retained a love for the land and dreamed of a pas­
toral Utopia. "Sometimes I feel sick of the fierce struggle of our 
high civilized life," he wrote his sister in 1861, "and think I would 
like to get away from cities and business, with their jostlings and 
strainings and cares altogether, and find some place on one of the 
hillsides, . . . where I could gather those I love, and live content 
with what Nature and our own resources would furnish; but, alas, 
money is wanted even for that." Conjoined with his republi­
can ethics and increasingly tempered by the logic of the political 
economist, that pastoral image would remain at the center of 
George's response to urban America.27 
Following Jefferson and anticipating Frederick Jackson Turner, 
George explained in Progress and Poverty that the availability of 
land had shaped American development. 
The general intelligence, the general comfort, the active inven­
tion, the power of adaptation and assimilation, the free indepen­
dent spirit, the energy and hopefulness that have marked our 
people, are not causes, but results—they have sprung from un­
fenced land. This public domain has been the transmuting force 
which has turned the thriftless, unambitious European peasant 
into the self-reliant Western farmer; it has given a consciousness 
of freedom even to the dweller in crowded cities, and has been 
the well-spring of hope even to those who have never thought 
of taking refuge upon it. . .  . In America, whatever his condi­
tion, there has always been the consciousness that the public do­
main lay behind him; and the knowledge of this fact . . . has 
penetrated our whole national life, giving to it generosity and 
independence, elasticity and ambition. 
Like Turner fifteen years later, George also recognized that the 
"great fact which has been potent is ceasing to be" and that "the 
republic has entered upon a new era."28 But unlike Turner George 
resolved that the availability of land and its natural opportunities 
must remain a central feature of the urban republic. The single tax, 
a confiscatory tax on the rental value of land excluding improve­
ments, was George's solution to the problem of maintaining equal 
access to the land in the post-frontier, urban republic. By chang­
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ing a single element in the political economy, George believed, the 
single tax would redirect the development of urban industrializa­
tion and preserve the republican commonwealth.29 
The political philosophy that supported the single tax also owed 
a great deal to the Jeffersonian tradition. Jefferson's statement of 
natural rights, George argued, had helped to ensure America's re­
publican experiment and its economic progress. But mere political 
equality could not "prevent the tendency to inequality involved in 
the private ownership of land," he warned. The republic might 
yet be preserved, George argued, if Jefferson's statement of the 
natural law was amended. "Nature acknowledges no ownership 
or control in man save as the result of exertion," he insisted; the 
natural law "broadly and clearly" asserted "the equal right of all 
men to the use and enjoyment of nature." If the monopoly of land 
could be broken and equal access to natural opportunities thereby 
secured, he concluded, then the "inequalities that continued to ex­
ist would be those of nature, not the artificial inequalities produced 
by the denial of natural law."30 
Despite his Jeffersonian predilections George embraced the pos­
sibilities of the great city. The concentration of population was a 
stimulus to progress, George believed, and he described the single 
tax as "the secret which would transform the little village into the 
great city." Like Olmsted, George imagined a landscape and a so­
cial order that would balance the advantages of urban life with 
those of rural life: 
The destruction of speculative land values would tend to diffuse 
population where it is too dense and to concentrate it where it is 
too sparse; to substitute for the tenement house, homes sur­
rounded by gardens, and to fully settle agricultural districts be­
fore people were driven far from neighbors to look for land. The 
people of the cities would thus get more of the pure air and sun­
shine of the country, the people of the country more of the 
economies and social life of the city. 
George would combine the advantages of the country and the city 
and preserve respect for the rural way of life in a rapidly urbaniz­
ing society.31 
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LOOKING BACKWARD, LOOKING FORWARD 
Both Olmsted and George struggled to square their vision of 
the urban future with certain aspects of their cultural inheritance. 
Olmsted had relatively little difficulty in abandoning the tradi­
tional American commitment to laissez-faire. In the 1850s he was 
already arguing that "government should have in view the en­
couragement of a democratic condition of society as well as of 
government." His difficulty was in identifying the politically vir­
tuous agents for the reforms he proposed.32 Olmsted's political 
ideals were those of the traditional middle class of independent 
property owners, but his reform program was eventually inherited 
and reshaped by a new middle class of salaried professionals who 
did not always share his ideals.33 
Looking backward Olmsted recalled a time when the traditional 
middle class maintained its influence by virtue of personal example 
and the spontaneous workings of the natural order. Counteracting 
the influence of the promiscuous street culture of the working-
class neighborhood, the milieu of the political boss and the labor 
agitator, his parks would help to preserve the influence of the tra­
ditional middle class in the segregated city. "By their example, and 
by quiet persuasion in ordinary social intercourse, they direct the 
action of many men of greater energy and practical ability, but of 
less mature taste than themselves," he wrote of the leaders of that 
class.34 Looking forward he recognized that more artificial means 
of social control would be necessary in the growing cities, a rec­
ognition that pushed him toward a reliance on the new middle class 
and their professional techniques. Fortunately, Olmsted wrote, 
"modern science has beyond all question determined many of the 
causes of the special evils by which men are afflicted in towns, and 
placed means in our hands for guarding against them."35 Land­
scape architecture was one such means. Not only the presence of 
the respectable classes but the professionally designed landscape, 
he argued, "exercises a distinctly harmonizing and refining influ­
ence upon the most unfortunate and most lawless classes of the 
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city," instilling in them the middle-class virtues of "courtesy, 
self-control, and temperance" and weakening their "dangerous 
inclinations."36 
During the Civil War, as executive secretary of the Sanitary 
Commission, Olmsted had championed the cause of the scientifi­
cally educated expert and excoriated both the incompetent volun­
teer and the corrupt politician.37 In the postwar period, increas­
ingly jealous of the prerogatives of the professional landscape 
architect, Olmsted insisted that park planning be placed in the 
hands of professionally trained members of the middle class.38 The 
incompetence and untrustworthiness of the average politician and 
the abundant opportunities for graft in the planning of parks, 
Olmsted argued, meant that "the ordinary organizations for mu­
nicipal business are unsuitable agencies for the purpose." He ad­
vised that the acquisition of park land be "taken up efficiently by 
a small body of select men."39 
The administration of the park also demanded the efforts of 
trained professionals. Even before Central Park opened he had 
worried about the "riotous and licentious habits" of park-goers at 
other facilities. He avoided the rugged and picturesque in Central 
Park so as to minimize "opportunities and temptations to shabbi­
ness, disorder, indecorum, and indecency." He hoped the pastoral 
scene would afford "tranquillity and rest to the mind." But the 
riotous and licentious nevertheless appeared in Central Park. Dis­
gusted by the Tweed machine's lax administration of the park and 
its use as a patronage mill, Olmsted demanded that control of the 
park be given over to an appointed board of park experts and 
prominent citizens which would operate like the "board of direc­
tors of a commercial corporation."40 
In calling for a greater role for professionals and businessmen in 
public affairs, the forward-looking Olmsted anticipated the form 
much of the twentieth-century planning took; his experimentation 
with environmental reform anticipated something of its content.41 
In 1870 Olmsted argued that "the further progress of civilization 
is to depend mainly upon the influences by which men's minds and 
characters will be effected while living in large towns."42 He thus 
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anticipated the belief of many urban progressives that the key to 
individual regeneration and social progress lay in the design of 
physical and social environments, what Paul Boyer has described 
as "positive environmentalism." In an argument that would be 
repeated in Daniel Burnham's Plan of Chicago, Olmsted observed: 
When there has been a demolition of and rebuilding on a new 
ground plan of some part [of the city] which had previously been 
noted for the frequency of certain crimes, the prevalence of cer­
tain diseases, and the shortness of life among its inhabitants . . . , 
a marked improvement in all these respects has immediately fol­
lowed, and has been maintained not alone in the dark parts, but 
in the city as a whole. 
Thus in his philosophy and design of urban parks, Olmsted re­
vealed a tension between his faith in the spontaneous workings 
of the natural order and the personal example of the traditional 
middle class and his growing reliance on the more artificial and 
scientific means of social control at the disposal of the new middle 
class.43 
George experienced a similar difficulty in squaring the dictates 
of his cultural inheritance with the solutions he proposed to new 
problems. George struggled to justify the single tax, which to his 
opponents smacked of socialism, by means of his own Jeffersonian 
conviction that the proper role of government was simply to pro­
tect natural rights and the natural law. The "unjust and unequal 
distribution of wealth," he argued, transgressed the natural law, 
halted progress, and created other evils that would "not cure 
themselves." Such "evils are not imposed by natural laws," he 
insisted, "they spring solely from social mal-adjustments which 
ignore natural laws." Once the natural laws had been reinstated, 
George insisted, progress would resume with minimal govern­
mental interference.44 
Raised on the credo of limited government, yet addressing the 
problems of a complex urban society, George developed a pro­
foundly ambivalent attitude toward the role of government in 
promoting social progress. He valued economy and simplicity in 
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government, reinforced by his view of the deplorable state of 
boss-ridden machine politics. Among "the grave political difficul­
ties" threatening the republic, he argued, was the tendency of "the 
proletarians of the cities" to favor large government expenditures 
as a way of "furnishing employment" or "putting money in cir­
culation." Of course the single tax involved a rather dramatic in­
tervention of government in the political economy, but George 
was quick to point out as one of its benefits "the great simplicity 
which would become possible in government." Tax collection 
would be streamlined, litigation concerning ownership of land 
ended, crime, pauperism, and other social ills arising from poverty 
eliminated, along with the governmental functions poverty made 
45 necessary.
It was George's fear that the republican ideal of economic inde­
pendence for the small producer was rapidly disappearing in urban 
America that drove him to the struggle with his laissez-faire pro­
clivities, which he never fully abandoned. He would also be forced 
to wrestle with his belief in the harmony of the producing classes 
(capital and labor) within the free labor economy, a belief he prob­
ably took intact to his grave. Anxious to preserve unfettered op­
portunity for the small producer, George insisted that there was 
no fundamental conflict between labor and capital. The real con­
flict was between the producers and the land monopoly. The un­
earned increment taken in rent, a sum that reflected the social value 
of land and that grew with the community, was the true cause of 
poverty. Confiscate rent, he explained, and not only would wages 
and profits increase, but opportunities for the small producer 
would also multiply.46 
Looking backward George clung to his Jeffersonian vision of a 
natural order protected by limited government and his artisan's 
view of the harmony of the producing classes. Looking forward 
he recognized that his vision of an urban commonwealth of co­
operating small producers demanded a more active role for gov­
ernment. In the last sections of Progress and Poverty, he carefully 
dismantled the social-Darwinist view of progress and William 
Graham Sumner's defense of laissez-faire. Attacking the belief in 
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heredity as the basis of individual progress, he insisted that the fate 
of a child "depends entirely on the social environment in which it 
is placed." He made a similar argument in relation to social prog­
ress. Citing the decline of every previous great civilization, he ar­
gued "that the obstacles which finally bring progress to a halt are 
raised by the course of progress." Only through the development 
and judicious application of social intelligence would our urban 
civilization overcome the obstacles to its own progress.47 
Four years later in Social Problems (1883), George further under­
mined his opponents' arguments. In the development of the spe­
cies, he argued, greater intelligence had necessarily accompanied 
greater complexity; the same held true for the progress of civiliza­
tion. For uncounted generations the human species had evolved no 
further, while human civilization had grown infinitely more com­
plex. "Where the development of species ends," George argued, 
"social development commences." The progress of civilization 
was due not to the evolution of the species but to the accumulation 
of social intelligence and its application to the problems of an in­
creasingly complex society. To insist upon a social-Darwinist or 
laissez-faire approach to social development was to ignore the laws 
of natural development and risk catastrophe.48 Thus George, like 
Olmsted, abandoned the laissez-faire element of his cultural in­
heritance and paved the way for a new era of reform. 
Guardians of the cultural resources inherited from the free labor 
republic, including the Utopian and perfectionist elements of prot­
estantism, a romantic faith in a beneficent natural order, and the 
republican tradition in both its Jeffersonian and artisan forms, 
Olmsted and George might be seen as the last figures in a tradition 
stretching back to Jefferson, Paine, or even Winthrop. But they 
also grappled with the central problems of the emerging urban 
society. The basic contradiction between means and ends in their 
work, between the desire to recreate the natural order and release 
instinctual human emotions and the use of a manipulative social 
intelligence to achieve those ends, testifies to their struggle with 
received wisdom and new conditions.49 Their confrontation with 
the new metropolitan order, which was emerging in the 1880s 
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and 1890s, was consequently full of both irony and enduring 
significance. 
LABOR AND THE REPUBLICAN CITY 
In the 1880s the greatest support of George's ideals came from 
an unexpected source, the urban working class. In Progress and Pov­
erty George had called for a greater role for middle-class profes­
sionals in public service, hoping to promote a spirit of altruism in 
the middle class and to bring "to the management of public affairs 
and the administration of common funds, the skill, the attention, 
the fidelity, and integrity that can now only be secured for private 
interests."50 He had also expressed a pessimistic view of the po­
litical virtue of the urban masses. "Tortured by want and embruted 
by poverty," the masses were "ready to sell their votes to the high­
est bidder or follow the lead of the most blatant demagogue."51 In 
1880 after George had left California for New York in the hope of 
popularizing the single tax, he still believed that "successful [re­
form] efforts can come from the class above, not below."52 Indeed, 
George had considerable influence among middle-class reformers, 
from the British Fabians and the town planner Ebenezer Howard 
to Benjamin Marsh, organizer of the first American city planning 
conference, and many other American progressives.53 But in his 
own lifetime his greatest political influence ironically came at the 
head of a working-class political party, the United Labor party 
(ULP), organized in New York during 1886-87. 
One of the purposes of Progress and Poverty, begun immediately 
after the railroad strikes of 1877, was to defuse the growing labor-
capital conflict and to point to the overriding problem of the mo­
nopoly in land. Never a whole-hearted supporter of trade unions 
or strikes, George believed that "the good that can be accom­
plished by them is extremely limited."54 Yet the United Labor 
party, as Samuel Gompers recalled, "was in inception a trade 
union movement."55 Although George told one group of potential 
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supporters that they "must accept me as the candidate of organized 
labor," he never fully resigned himself to the true nature of the 
movement he led.56 Throughout his association with the ULP 
George insisted that it was not a class-based party and that class 
appeals had no place in American politics. In 1888, after having 
contributed to the ULP's rapid demise by orchestrating a purge of 
the socialists within it, George returned to the Democratic party 
of Grover Cleveland, hardly fertile ground for the radical mea­
sures he proposed. 
Notwithstanding George's unease, the United Labor party was 
the most striking example of a class-based party in nineteenth-
century America. In the wake of the May Day strikes of 1886 and 
the Haymarket explosion, labor organizations across the nation 
called for the creation of a new labor party. In New York, further 
inflamed by the Theiss trial in which several union negotiators 
had been convicted of extortion, the movement coalesced around 
George's mayoral candidacy. By all accounts the George-Hewitt 
campaign (Hewitt was the Democratic candidate and the Repub­
lican party's candidate was Theodore Roosevelt) was the most un­
usual and dramatic in nineteenth-century New York.57 George's 
campaign mobilized the efforts of thousands of participants, the 
majority of them from the working class. The campaign itself con­
sisted of a series of mass meetings, many of them in the open air. 
Huge crowds of working people gathered on street corners to hear 
George and his labor associates speak. The effort culminated in a 
great parade in Union Square. Despite a drenching rain a crowd 
of trade unionists, single-taxers, and members of the Knights of 
Labor, by some estimates sixty thousand strong, participated in an 
astonishing display of discipline and solidarity.58 
George agreed to lead that remarkable movement for a variety 
of reasons. Unlike the professional city planners who followed in 
his wake, George saw his task as an essentially political one. He 
knew that his single tax threatened very powerful interests and 
that it could only be enacted, as Lewis Mumford later wrote, 
"through the initiative of the community as a whole, with an en­
lightened and militant working class as the spearhead."59 When a 
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delegation from the city's Central Labor Council asked him to run 
for mayor he hesitated, but he eventually accepted the challenge 
because he believed that a campaign centered on the single tax 
would "do more to popularize its discussion than years of writ-
ing."60 Disturbed by what he saw as an increasing tendency to 
regard "the masses as born but for the service of their rulers," 
George had argued that we "cannot safely leave politics to politi­
cians, or political economy to college professors. The people them­
selves must think, because the people alone must act."61 Notwith­
standing his skepticism about the political virtue of the masses, 
George believed the effort to create an urban republic must be a 
democratic one that engaged the energies and abilities of the av­
erage citizen. 
George's popularity owed a great deal to his ability to express 
his radical proposals in the American language of republicanism. 
Single-taxers claimed to be virtuous citizens protecting the integ­
rity of the republic, rather than socialists demanding the national­
ization of land and other class legislation.62 Adding labor's right to 
"natural opportunities for employment" to Jefferson's list of in­
alienable rights, George insisted that single-taxers were "Demo­
crats and believe that political power should emanate from the 
people, and that in all matters that do not invade the inalienable 
rights of man the majority should rule."63 "I am called a Socialist," 
George said during the campaign. "I am really an individualist. I 
believe that every individual man ought to have an individual wife, 
and is entitled to an individual home."64 Thus George cast his pro­
posals in terms of traditional American values. 
Notwithstanding his protestations George seemed a dangerous 
radical to his opponents. His candidacy temporarily united both 
machine and reform politicians in condemnation of what they 
insisted was the politics of class. The mainstream press vilified 
George as a "revolutionist" and an "Apostle of anarchy and de­
struction." Rumors circulated that even the Republicans had tried 
to swing their voters to Hewitt in a last-ditch effort to defeat 
George. Against such odds what George insisted was a movement 
of "the masses against the classes" still polled more than sixty­
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eight thousand votes to Hewitt's ninety thousand (Roosevelt polled 
sixty thousand). Many believed George had been counted out il­
legally but the total was, nevertheless, impressive and, to his op­
ponents, alarming. In the following year as the ULP endeavored 
to build a national party, machine and reform forces united across 
party lines to soundly defeat the fledgling movement in New York 
and other cities. In the face of such antagonism and a successful 
effort of the major parties to recruit their most effective leaders, 
the ULP, beset by its own internal conflicts, collapsed in 1888.65 
In many ways George made a rather strange "revolutionist." 
No less than Hewitt he paid homage to the founding fathers and 
their constitution. "So far as we propose to treat social questions, 
it is solely through and by that system," he pledged.66 Nor was he 
in any conventional sense a socialist. The single tax was a product 
of George's encounter with the agrarianism and land reform pro­
posals of earlier labor activists and his experiences on the Pacific 
frontier, where manufacturing was relatively undeveloped and 
simple access to land could mean economic independence for the 
farmer or miner. "Nothing like general and protracted congestion 
of capital and labor could take place were this natural vent open," 
George argued in support of free access to land. "Nor is it true 
that we could not all become farmers. That is the one thing that 
we might all become," he added.67 Subscribing to the conven­
tional theory of the frontier as a safety valve for industrial discon­
tent, George ignored the considerable capital required to set up 
even a self-sufficient farm and minimized the much larger problem 
of the concentration of industrial capital. 
Labor historians as well as many of George's contemporaries 
have overemphasized George's ignorance of the enormous changes 
taking place within industry, but it is probably fair to say that 
he had no remedy for them. He acknowledged that the concentra­
tion of capital had made it easier "to intercept what would natu­
rally go to labor." Yet the single tax did not directly address such 
late-nineteenth-century developments as the transformation of the 
workplace, the breaking up of traditional crafts, the growing power 
of the industrial corporation, and the trend towards monopoly. 
32 
AN URBAN REPUBLIC 
Indeed, George continued to discount the growing conflict be­
tween labor and capital and its impact on the great city and to 
insist that the land monopolist was the one and true villain. He 
disappointed his trade union supporters by refusing to include ba­
sic demands on hours and wages and other labor planks in his 
platform.68 He still believed that the individual, with the help of 
the single tax, could secure his own independence. 
THE CITY BUILDING IDEAL 
It was the commitment to individualism and his suspicion of 
socialism that prevented George from developing a comprehen­
sive program of city planning and urban reform. The socialists 
within the ULP wanted to add to its platform a plank calling for 
the nationalization of all the means of production. Although the 
single tax in effect nationalized an important element of the means 
of production and George also favored public ownership of urban 
utilities, he resolutely opposed stronger measures. George saw so­
cialism as coercive and destructive of individual initiative and 
feared it would "frighten away the country votes."69 Even though 
he came to recognize the impact of corporate ownership and ma­
chine industry on the artisan, he clung to the ideal of the indepen­
dent, small producer all the more as he saw the ideal vanishing.70 
With his artisan's background George viewed the role of plan­
ning in the urban future in a way similar to his European con­
temporary, the Austrian planner Camillo Sitte. Sitte criticized the 
bureaucratic prescriptions of the emerging European planning pro­
fession in his City Building (1889). As Carl Schorske has argued, 
Sitte stressed actual "making" over abstract design. The city must 
not be ua merely mechanical bureaucratic product," Sitte wrote, 
but "a piece of great genuine folk art." Whereas Sitte looked to 
the aesthetic sensibilities of the modern artist to replace the role of 
the practicing artisan in urban design, George continued to place 
his faith in the artisan.71 
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In Progress and Poverty George had championed an active and 
decisive role for the average citizen in city building. "To increase 
the comforts, and leisure, and independence of the masses is to 
increase their intelligence," he wrote in a passage that echoed the 
artisans' defense of the eight-hour day, "it is to bring the brain to 
the aid of the hand; it is to engage in the common work of life the 
faculty which measures the animalcule and traces the orbits of the 
stars!" Man, George believed, "is the constructive animal; he 
builds, he improves, he invents, and puts together, and the greater 
the thing he does, the greater the thing he wants to do." Nothing 
illustrated this better than housing: "The beaver builds a dam, and 
the bird a nest, and the bee a cell; but while beavers' dams, and 
birds' nest, and bees' cells are always constructed on the same 
model, the house of the man passes from the rude hut of leaves 
and branches to the magnificent mansion replete with modern 
conveniences." It was those energies that George hope to bring to 
city building, and it was that ideal that provided the underlying 
logic for George's leadership of an artisan-dominated movement.72 
At the heart of George's city building ideal was not only a com­
mitment to a society of small producers but a fascination with ur­
ban homesteading and owner-built housing. The single tax would 
promote urban homesteading, he argued, because "the builder of 
a city homestead would not have to lay out as much for a small lot 
as for the house he puts upon it." Describing his vision of the 
urban future, George quoted the prophet Isaiah: "And they shall 
build houses and inhabit them; and they shall plant vineyards and 
eat the fruit of them. They shall not build and another inhabit; 
they shall not plant and another eat."73 In New York, with its 
overwhelming majority of tenants, George continued to empha­
size the issue of homeownership. Although he said little about the 
owner-built house, perhaps for fear of alienating members of the 
building trades who were the single largest contingent in his con­
stituency, George continued to hold out the prospect of home-
ownership for working-class families. 
Though clearly there were Utopian elements in George's thought, 
it is not impossible to imagine the realization of even his most 
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apparently implausible idea, the city of owner-built housing. The 
American invention of balloon-frame construction in the 1830s, 
complemented by technological improvements in sawmilling and 
nail-making, had already significantly lowered construction costs 
and brought homeownership within reach of many working-class 
families. Historians Olivier Zunz and James Barrett have found 
high rates of homeownership in working-class neighborhoods in 
late-nineteenth-century Detroit and Chicago. Kenneth Jackson has 
argued (and Zunz has documented for Detroit) that urban workers 
commonly built their own dwellings.74 Such workers realized the 
hope of the Knights of Labor, with which both George and the 
ULP were closely associated, that working people "be enabled 
to reap the advantages conferred by the labor-saving machinery 
which their brains have created."75 Moreover, the publication of 
house plans in magazines and pattern books proliferated in the 
period. "There never was a time when so many books and maga­
zines written for the purpose of bringing the subject of architec-
ture—its history, its theory, its practice—down to the level of 
popular understanding were produced as in this time of ours," 
wrote one contemporary art critic.76 
The political program of the ULP, if implemented, could have 
reinforced and complemented those developments. The single tax 
was specifically designed to stabilize realty values and to make 
cheap land available at the urban periphery.77 In his mayoral cam­
paign George also advocated a free, municipally owned and oper­
ated rapid transit system that would have allowed workers to live 
on the periphery without sacrificing wages or excessive time. 
Combined with the demands for higher wages and an eight-hour 
day (providing "eight hours for what we will") voiced by George's 
labor associates—although resisted by George himself—such poli­
cies might have created just the pattern of homeownership that he 
envisioned. 
Ultimately, nothing of the sort occurred, in part because of de­
velopments in urban America that George imperfectly understood. 
As Steven Ross has argued, George stood with many American 
workers on the edge of an industrializing society. George believed 
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that class lines were not yet rigidly fixed and that the individual 
might still secure independence through initiative, hard work, and 
a limited set of government policies designed to protect and pro­
mote the commonwealth. But by the end of the 1880s, a signifi­
cant element of the labor movement had abandoned the hope that 
self-reliant and independent laborers could control industrial de­
velopment and preserve the republican commonwealth.78 
Labor's new strategy owed more to the emerging realistic and 
pragmatic tradition than to George's republican ideals. For labor 
leaders such as Samuel Gompers, the ULP campaigns had proved 
the futility of political action and Utopian dreams. Under Gompers's 
guidance the American Federation of Labor (AF of L) acted on the 
premise that America had irrevocably passed over a divide into an 
industrial capitalist system where the working class would have to 
defend its specific class interests within that system. Labor radicals 
who remained politically minded were drawn to scientific social­
ism and other revolutionary creeds that also accepted the inevi­
tability, at least in the short run, of industrial capitalist develop­
ment and that had little sympathy for or connection to republican 
ideals.79 
George's own weaknesses as a leader were also partly respon­
sible for the collapse of the movement he had done so much to 
create. He refused to make any accommodation to either the radi­
calism of the socialists, whom he purged from the ULP, or the 
more pragmatic strategy of the AF of L.80 But it was not simply 
that he resisted all efforts to broaden the platform of the ULP to 
include either traditional or radical labor planks. George had also 
refused to place the single tax in the mainstream of labor activism 
stretching back to the agrarianism and land reform proposals of 
the National Reform Association in the 1840s. Despite the pres­
ence of veterans of that earlier movement in the ULP, George 
claimed the single tax as his own original contribution to the 
analysis of social problems. Laying claim to proprietorship of a 
unique piece of social technology and jealously guarding its pu­
rity, George made his own concessions to the notions of social 
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engineering and expert planning that would characterize the real­
istic tradition.81 
Perhaps the greatest irony in George's relationship with the 
ULP was the fate of the single tax at the hands of the socialists. In 
1888, after George's withdrawal from the party and disappointing 
results in the elections of 1887, the ULP met in Cincinnati to map 
its future strategy. While a group of moderates created a new 
Union Labor party, which dropped the single tax in hopes of win­
ning the support of the urban middle class and farmers, a group 
of socialists and other radicals took over what was left of the old 
ULP. Edward McGlynn, once a close associate of George, ex­
plained that the ULP had rejected George but not the single tax. 
During an unsuccessful effort to merge the two parties, moderates 
complained that the single tax would merely increase taxes on land 
and hence make it more difficult for working-class families to 
achieve their most cherished goal of homeownership. Others won­
dered whether manufacturers, willing and able to pay a higher tax 
for a desirable location, could outbid working-class families for 
the land on which their houses sat and thus displace them. For the 
moderates homeownership represented a crucial measure of inde­
pendence that was still within reach of the working class and that 
the single tax threatened. These were concerns that George could 
understand, since they reflected his own values and assumptions 
and he had tried to address them.82 
It was the socialists who offered the more realistic and prag­
matic argument in defense, ironically, of the single tax. They did 
not deny the threat to homeownership. Instead they argued that 
in the industrial capitalist system, the possibility of homeowner-
ship for the individual worker was much less important than pro­
viding adequate housing for the mass for workers now living in 
unhealthy and decrepit tenements.83 For the socialists homeown­
ership was a chimera, or worse, an unaffordable affectation that 
divided the working class between homeowners and tenants and 
distracted attention from more important issues. The single tax, 
on the other hand, would force speculators to build on vacant land 
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and also to provide needed revenues for the construction of public 
housing. While George had seen the single tax as a republican 
measure that would reestablish a harmony of interests among 
small, independent producers, the ULP radicals saw it as a prag­
matic measure that would protect the specific interests of the 
working class in an antagonistic society.84 George's legacy would 
continue to influence the development of urban America, but not 
always in ways he could have imagined. 
THE SINGLE T A  X AND MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM 
Notwithstanding George's commitment to traditional values, 
an extremely radical principle was at the center of his thought, 
which explains the socialists' interest in his ideas. That was the 
principle that land values were a social product that should be used 
for the benefit of the community. The "immense values created 
by the growth of population might . .  . be drawn upon to make 
New York the most beautiful and healthful of cities," George 
wrote to the trade unionists who asked him to run for mayor.85 
George's platform declared that 
the enormous value which the presence of a million and a half of 
people gives to the land of this city belongs properly to the 
whole community; that it should not go to the enrichment of 
individuals and corporations, but should be taken in taxation 
and applied to the improvement and beautifying of the city, to 
the promotion of the health, comfort, education, and recreation 
of its people, and to the providing of means of transit commen­
surate with the needs of a great metropolis. 
In formally accepting the nomination at Cooper Union, George 
argued that those issues constituted "the heart of the labor ques­
tion." While his socialist associates would question the exclusive 
emphasis on land values, even the most radical recognized it as a 
step in the right direction.86 
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George readily admitted that the single tax did not provide "the 
solution of all social problems" and that "much will remain to 
do."87 But even if the single tax could not accomplish all that 
George predicted, it did represent the foundation for a socialist 
program of urban reform and city planning. It also provided a 
precedent for the nationalization of other forms of property, a step 
that George and his associates were already contemplating. In 1883 
George had argued that "all businesses that involve monopoly are 
within the necessary province of government regulation, and busi­
nesses that are in their nature complete monopolies become prop­
erly functions of the state."88 The municipal ownership of urban 
utilities, natural monopolies whose profitability grew with the 
community, was a logical corollary of George's critique of the land 
monopoly. The ULP would also call for the nationalization of all 
forms of communication, transportation, and natural monopolies 
(gas, oil, minerals).89 
Those arguments reflected new developments in George's 
thought since he had written Progress and Poverty. The pace, com­
plexity, and the interdependence of life in New York, in contrast 
to the relatively simple life on the Pacific frontier, had sharpened 
George's sense of the need for social intelligence and cooperation 
and a greater public role in urban development. "Social progress 
always requires greater intelligence in the management of public 
affairs," he argued in 1883, "but this the more as progress is rapid 
and change quicker."90 He saw rapid urbanization threatening to 
overwhelm the natural order. Referring to the twelve thousand 
head of cattle butchered weekly in the city, George lamented "the 
elements of fertility, which, instead of being returned to the soil 
from which they came, are swept out through the sewers of our 
great cities."91 The awesome power and vitality of the great city 
demanded intelligent public control. 
Thus in New York during the 1880s, George's vision of the ur­
ban future took on something of the character of municipal so­
cialism. Although he continued to believe that the republic might 
safely dispense with army, navy, and diplomatic corps, he argued 
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that in an urban society "the functions which government must 
assume steadily increase." The "truth in socialism," he wrote, 
was that the government must assume the cooperative functions 
"which cannot be done, or cannot be so well done, by individual 
actions."92 In Progress and Poverty George had suggested that the 
single tax would enable government to establish 
public baths, museums, libraries, gardens, lecture rooms, music 
and dancing halls, theaters, universities, technical schools, shoot­
ing galleries, play grounds, gymnasiums, etc. Heat, light, and 
motive power, as well as water, might be conducted through our 
streets at public expense; our roads be lined with fruit trees; dis­
coverers and inventors rewarded, scientific investigations sup­
ported; and in a thousand ways the public revenues made to fos­
ter efforts for the public benefit. 
Four years later he argued more emphatically that the municipal 
ownership and operation of public utilities was absolutely essential 
to ensuring "a natural distribution of population, which would 
give every one breathing space and neighborhood."93 The cre­
ation of the urban republic required a strong dose of municipal 
socialism. 
Anxious to redirect American politics and industrial develop­
ment, George had argued that "a fitting and hopeful place . .  . to 
begin is in our municipalities." George and his ULP associates 
had believed that "a large vote would permanently introduce into 
American politics the questions to which his life had been de-
voted."94 Indeed they did build an influential if short-lived coali­
tion of trade unionists and reform-minded professionals who en­
visioned a new urban republic and bequeathed to the nascent city 
planning movement a popular demand for a more just and demo­
cratic city. The coalition also outlined and popularized a practical 
if limited program of municipal socialism that anticipated and in­
spired the more effective coalitions headed by Hazen Pingree, 
Tom Johnson, Frederic Howe, Brand Whitlock, Herbert Bigelow, 
and others. Those social reformers followed George's lead in mo­
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bilizing the voting power of the urban masses, encouraging their 
active participation in municipal affairs, and attempting to redis­
tribute economic and political power in their cities.95 
THE WHITE CITY 
In the summer of 1892 a very different conception of America's 
urban future from that suggested by either George or Olmsted 
began to take shape along Chicago's lakeshore. Initially authorized 
by an act of Congress in celebration of the four hundredth anni­
versary of the discovery of America, the World's Columbian Ex­
position provided the opportunity to create a model city of four 
hundred buildings covering nearly seven hundred acres. Con­
structed by a private corporation chartered by the Illinois state 
legislature, the White City, as the exposition came to be called, re­
flected the combined efforts of business leaders, the cultural elite, 
and public officials.96 The prominent Chicago architect Daniel H. 
Burnham served as director of works and coordinated the activi­
ties of local businessmen, a committee of prestigious architects, 
and a public commission of appointed officials. 
Thus the White City heralded not only a new attitude to urban 
development but also the emergence of a new political order. 
Underlying both was a deep skepticism about the competence of 
the average citizen to deal with public affairs. For Henry Adams 
that was the clearest message of the exposition. If the new urban-
industrial society "were to be run at all, it must be run by capital 
and by capitalistic methods," he wrote in juxtaposing the exposi­
tion and the Populist revolt, "for nothing could surpass the non­
sensity of trying to run so complex and so concentrated a machine 
by Southern and Western farmers in grotesque alliance with city 
day-laborers."97 Like Turner's thesis (delivered at the meeting 
of the American Historical Association held at the exposition), 
which suggested that the frontier experience would survive as a set 
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of disembodied national characteristics, the White City, with its 
plaster-like classical facades covering steel frame buildings, de­
picted an America where free labor and republican values would 
survive as outward forms for a corporate and hierarchical order. 
Underneath the classical and republican imagery lay the dominant 
reality of the marketplace, the city as a showcase for the material 
culture of the capitalist order. 
Olmsted's participation in the planning of the exposition was a 
great irony. In 1870 Olmsted had expressed concern about the com­
petitive pressures and the "conditions of corruption and of irrita­
tion, physical and mental" that held sway in the commercial dis­
tricts of the city. He insisted that parks should provide "the great­
est possible contrast with the streets and shops" of the working city-
Twenty years later he lent his talents to the design of an exposition 
the primary purpose of which was the sale of industrial goods. 
"The underlying motive of the whole exhibition, under a sham 
pretense of patriotism is business," protested Edward Bellamy, 
"advertising with a view to individual money-making."98 
Olmsted's participation is difficult to explain fully. Perhaps he 
valued it as an indication of the high regard to which he had 
brought landscape architecture. In his report on the exposition to 
the American Institute of Architects, Olmsted was concerned to 
vindicate the profession and to differentiate it from mere garden­
ing." Despite some hesitation, the public commission overseeing 
the exposition had accepted Olmsted's recommended site in Jack­
son Park. They accepted it, Olmsted reported, "because they could 
not be led to believe that we should have given this advice without 
having, as experts, sound reasons for doing it. The result was due 
to respect for professional judgment. Comparing this experience 
with some in my earlier professional life, I can but think that it 
manifests an advance in civilization." In light of his earlier clashes 
with venal and shortsighted municipal politicians, Olmsted was 
pleased with the deference to his professional expertise.100 But the 
exposition planners made a very selective use of Olmsted's ideas. 
The planners' refusal to provide one grand entrance at the Court 
of Honor especially bewildered Olmsted. In bemused explanation 
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he wrote, "I can only answer that our failure took the form of a 
failure of prolonged negotiations with the Illinois Central Rail­
way." His insistence on open spaces and grand perspectives had 
also been frustrated by the cluttering of the grounds with too 
many pavilions and concession stands. Not even his woody island, 
which Burnham had agreed "should be free from conspicuous 
buildings and . . . should have a generally secluded, natural, sylvan 
aspect," was spared. The introduction of a Japanese temple as 
well as garden and horticultural exhibits, Olmsted regretted, had 
"much injured the island for the purpose which in our primary 
design it was intended to serve."101 Consequently, the visitors 
to the exposition, he complained to Burnham, wore the same 
"businesslike, common, dull, anxious and care-worn" expressions 
found elsewhere in the city.102 
Ultimately, Olmsted's confusion stemmed from his unwilling­
ness to acknowledge the role the exposition was designed to play 
in the metropolis of the Midwest. His interest in community had 
only limited applicability in a city in which the quest for the dollar 
ranked second to none. Chicago, wrote William T. Stead in 1894, 
"knows only one common bond. Its members come here to make 
money."103 Neither could his republican ideal of the park as a ve­
hicle for the harmonious mixing of classes be transferred intact to 
what had become a cockpit of industrial strife. One of the more 
turbulent centers of urban industrialism, Chicago had been the site 
of a general strike and pitched battles between workers and federal 
troops during the railroad strikes of 1877, the Hay market explo­
sion in 1886, and, in the year after the exposition opened, the Pull­
man strike, to name only the prominent disturbances. 
The planning of the White City did provide a challenging arena 
in which to test the forward-looking Olmsted's interest in envi­
ronmental reform as a means to social control. Indeed, the explo­
sion of violence and disorder during the Pullman strike the follow­
ing year made more remarkable the order and discipline that had 
prevailed within the exposition. Wrote William Rainsford, "Order 
reigned everywhere, no boisterousness, no unseemly merriment. 
It seemed as though the beauty of the place brought gentleness, 
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happiness, and self-respect to its visitors." The "restraint and 
discipline were remarkable," added another visitor who echoed 
Olmsted's interest in social control and emphasized the particular 
effect upon "these obscure and anonymous myriads of unknown 
laborers."104 Burnham himself noted that the White City had 
made an impression upon the "highly educated . . . but still more 
perhaps upon the masses."105 The White City offered striking sup­
port for Olmsted's faith in the transforming power of the environ­
ment, but it embodied a more manipulative conception of the role 
of landscape in the urban environment than the natural and spon­
taneous workings of Olmsted's ideal park. 
Burnham's monumental, neoclassical architecture, and its domi­
nance of Olmsted's landscapes, announced a new approach to the 
urban landscape. The influx of foreign-born workers, growing la­
bor militancy, powerful and corrupt political machines, poverty 
and destitution, congestion and pollution, David Schuyler argues 
in reference to Burnham's triumph over Olmsted, "demanded not 
a nostalgic pastoralism or the silent influence of natural scenery 
but a new civic order and different urban form that would refine 
and civilize residents of the tumultuous cities."106 Shorn of its re­
publican commitments and placed in that new context, Olmsted's 
landscaping came to more closely resemble the English tradition 
of landscape architecture. Since its development in the eighteenth 
century, English landscape architecture had helped disguise dis­
ruptive social and economic change behind a pleasing prospect. As 
agricultural improvers enclosed, drained, and cleared land and 
thereby closed off opportunities for the middle ranks of indepen­
dent cottagers, they remade the physical, social, and economic 
shape of rural England. Landscape architecture celebrated the new 
wealth that the capitalist revolution in agriculture had made pos­
sible and served as something of an antidote to the attendant social 
tensions, suggesting that the appreciation of natural beauty had not 
died and that the improvers remained in harmony with the land.107 
In late-nineteenth-century America where the growth of cor­
porate capitalism squeezed out the small producer and threatened 
republican ideals, the White City served a similar purpose. The 
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White City, the architect Henry Van Brunt wrote, offered "evi­
dences that the finer instincts of humanity have not suffered com­
plete eclipse in this grosser prosperity, and that, in this headlong 
race, art has not been left entirely behind." For the urban working 
classes, Henry Demarest Lloyd suggested, the beauty of the White 
City would lighten "the prosaic drudgery of their lives." Ideally, 
the dazzling vision of the exposition would vindicate the new ur­
ban order or, at least, discourage and deflect criticism.108 A part of 
the history of the separation of production and consumption, the 
White City and the new urban landscape it symbolized disguised 
the disagreeable aspects of industrial production by celebrating its 
material benefits. That strategy became a central part of the real­
istic effort to stabilize and legitimize the new urban order. 
No MEAN CITY 
The triumph of new realism, however, would never be com­
plete. Even among admirers of the White City, alternative visions 
survived. Henry Demarest Lloyd, who like George criticized 
wasteful and chaotic patterns of city building, saw in the exposi­
tion the benefits of cooperative planning.109 An admirer of the En­
glish Fabians, Lloyd picked up where George had left off as he 
struggled to create an alliance of urban workers and middle-class 
reformers with liberal or socialist sympathies and to turn munici­
pal government into a staging area for a new urban republic. "The 
city hall represents the institution ready made for any purpose of 
the common good for which the common people choose to use 
it," Lloyd announced.110 Like George's, Lloyd's vision of a future 
urban republic combined the best aspects of urban and rural life. 
But it also included the new element of municipal socialism, im­
plicit in George's thought but not fully developed. Municipal so­
cialism would become an important element in the thought and 
practice of those who continued to seek an alternative pattern of 
urban development. 
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In "No Mean City," Lloyd's Utopian fable written in 1894, Chi­
cagoans rose up in opposition to the dismantling of the White 
City. A coalition of artisans, architects, and business leaders pooled 
their talents and resources to save the White City. Indeed, the 
smoke and filth that threatened to envelop the urban oasis con­
vinced them to try to remake all of Chicago in its image. Despite 
their best efforts a stark contrast between the White City and the 
dreariness of greater Chicago remained. "All who could emi­
grated to the country," Lloyd wrote, causing a "revolution in all 
means of rapid transit" bringing the city closer to the country. 
Impressed by the benefits of public transportation, Chicagoans 
awoke to the central role municipal socialism might play in the 
transformation of their city. After visiting the great cities of Eu­
rope, Chicago reformers resolved that if "the government of Paris 
could own and operate telephones, so could Chicago. If Glasgow 
could have public baths and laundries, so could Chicago. If Lon­
don and Birmingham could buy land and build model blocks of 
model homes for the workingmen, so could Chicago." Indeed, 
Chicago became "a department store," Lloyd wrote in reverting 
to the commercial logic of the exposition, "of all the reforms 
which had been found to be practicable in any other city."111 
Municipal socialism transformed not only the public life of the 
metropolis but the social ethics of its citizens. Urban life lost its 
brutal character and took on a gracious quality as an increasing 
array of public utilities were provided cheaply and efficiently. 
"With every new perfection in the equipment of city life," how­
ever, "the army of the unemployed increased." But Chicagoans 
were no longer willing to see their fellow citizens suffer. More­
over, they recognized that the new cooperative political economy 
had "proved that every man with modern means can produce many 
times more than he can consume." Thus the unemployed were 
relocated in the countryside where they lived in self-sustaining 
cooperatives.112 
No Mean City, a new metropolitan order that combined mu­
nicipal socialism and rural cooperation, preserved the best of in­
dustrial Chicago and the rural countryside while eliminating the 
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worst. Both farmers beset by isolation and outmoded methods 
and city dwellers subjected to ugliness, cutthroat competition, and 
unemployment flocked to No Mean City. "Here in the same place 
was country for the city people, and city for the country people," 
Lloyd explained. Infused with a new work ethic, No Mean City 
was garlanded with abundant orchards and truck gardens. One 
hundred years after the great fire, the old inner city was destroyed 
and transformed into a people's park, the river and lakeshore "re­
stored by the landscape architects to their original purity and 
beauty."113 Lloyd's Utopia synthesized and extended the efforts of 
Olmsted and George to balance the city and the country, reinvigo­
rate protestant ethics, and preserve the republican commonwealth. 
Notwithstanding Lloyd's debts to the republicans, his thought 
contained new elements. The province of Lloyd's expert planners 
went beyond what Olmsted had claimed. "Every feature of the 
experiment was planned by experts," Lloyd added in a nod to the 
coming age, "from the selection of the site to the division of 
the employment."114 Moreover, his embrace of municipal social­
ism was forthright where George's was at best grudging; his com­
mitment to and faith in public planning were also considerably 
greater. In one sense Lloyd merely updated their ideas and in do­
ing so helped the republican vision survive into the twentieth cen­
tury. But in another sense the new elements in Lloyd's thought, 
his embrace of the expert, his faith in public planning, and espe­
cially his fascination with the White City, were concessions to and 
harbingers of a new realistic approach to the urban future that was 
beginning to emerge. Whereas the republican tradition had em­
ployed inherited ideals in fashioning a creative response to social 
change, the realistic tradition developed in reaction to the pro­
found social transformation that began in the 1870s. It was not the 
city of the imagination that guided the realists, but the actual city 
of their experience. The effort to understand the realistic tradition 
thus must begin with an examination of the emergence of the new 
metropolitan form in the thirty years after 1877. 
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The Political Economy of Suburbanization 
and the Politics of Space 
In the last half of the nineteenth 
century the United States began a long period of urban develop­
ment, which by the 1930s had created a national system of met­
ropolitan areas.1 That period of rapid urbanization and suburban­
ization witnessed the growth of new and larger cities, the internal 
reorganization of existing cities, and the emergence of a new met­
ropolitan form. In his pioneering statistical study, The Growth of 
Cities in the Nineteenth Century (1899), Adna Weber discovered that 
throughout the world urban populations were growing more rap­
idly at the city's periphery than at its center. The process of sub­
urbanization, Weber suggested, was a key element in the creation 
of a new metropolitan form. 
In contrasting metropolitan development in America to that oc­
curring in the rest of the world, Weber pointed to the unusually 
low population density of American cities. Commenting on the 
phenomenon, Weber wrote: 
It has sometimes been urged that this is largely the result of the 
development of the electric street railway in America, but the 
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causal connection is not apparent. . .  . It should rather be said 
that the American penchant for dwelling in cottage homes in­
stead of business blocks after the fashion of Europe is the cause, 
and the trolley car the effect. 
Weber recognized that suburbanization was not an inevitable re­
sponse to technological developments or impersonal urban pro-
cesses.2 Nor was it a process that "conformed to biological laws," 
as Weber's contemporary, the urban economist Richard Hurd, as-
serted.3 A product of human choice and design, suburbanization 
was a political process. Social conflicts, cultural values, ideological 
struggles, and the distribution of economic and political power 
shaped the process of suburbanization and the new metropolitan 
form it helped to create. 
Kenneth Jackson has built upon Weber's insight in tracing the 
American penchant for suburban residences to such factors as the 
cult of domesticity, the relative abundance of wealth, the availabil­
ity and status-conferring character of real estate, the agrarian ideal, 
and the fear of un-Americanized immigrants.4 Although the sub­
urban exodus had begun before the Civil War, it accelerated in the 
last quarter of the century in response to the impact of rapid indus­
trialization. As industrial expansion undermined the stability and 
viability of the walking city of antebellum America, the middle 
class fled the noise, pollution, poverty, disease, and disorder asso­
ciated with industrial production. With the middle class moving 
out of and immigrant laborers pouring into the inner city, the ur­
ban menace appeared greater and more unmanageable. Each new 
outbreak of disease, crime, and labor violence sped the flight; even 
in the grim depression of 1893-97 street-railway construction 
flourished as the exodus continued.5 
What has not been fully recognized is that residential suburban­
ization was only one part of a larger reorganization of the physical 
and social structure of urban America in the industrial era. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, the functional segregation of the 
city had created commercial, financial, and manufacturing en­
claves as well as what Hurd called a series of "residence districts 
divided into classes."6 By the turn of the century, large industrial 
enterprises had joined the middle class in fleeing the congestion, 
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disorder, and labor unrest of the inner city for locations on the 
periphery. The suburbanization of industry facilitated the trans­
formation of the city center into a commercial and financial district 
and the managerial headquarters of the great national corpora­
tions. Meanwhile the increasingly foreign-born urban masses, un­
able to escape to the periphery because of the high cost of housing 
and transit or unwilling to abandon familiar neighborhoods or 
nearby jobs, crowded into the ring of speculative real estate sur­
rounding the central business district where the tenement districts 
appeared. By 1910 a rudimentary outline of the new metropolitan 
form had already emerged. 
Suburbanization, which entailed a complete reorganization of 
the city, affected the lives of all urbanites; but its costs and benefits 
were not equally shared. Metropolitan structure, Hurd explained, 
conformed to "two uniform tendencies as a city grows": "greater 
dispersion" at the periphery and "greater concentration" at the 
core.7 Indeed inner-city populations continued to grow in absolute 
numbers, even as the central business districts were given over 
to exclusively commercial functions. While some middle-class 
Americans enjoyed the world's most spacious suburban commu­
nities, tenement districts such as those on the Lower East Side of 
New York confined the densest populations in the Western world.8 
Moreover, suburbanization and the new metropolitan form both 
reflected and reinforced the changing social relations of production 
and the larger relationship between the classes in the industrial era. 
Not surprisingly the sharpest political conflicts of the period cen­
tered around the arrangement and uses of urban space. 
THE NEW REALISM 
For a variety of reasons, the 1870s marked a turning point in 
American urban history. The longest uninterrupted period of eco­
nomic contraction in our history, the depression of 1873-78 ush­
ered in dramatic changes in economic practice, social structure, 
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and political ideology. Severe downward pressure on prices cre­
ated cutthroat competition and, in the longer term, the creation of 
pools, cartels, trusts, and oligopolies that attempted to fix prices, 
divide markets, and bring order to the economy. The necessity 
of cutting costs encouraged mechanization, increasingly powered 
by fossil fuels, and the substitution of unskilled for skilled labor 
wherever possible. The quest for economic order and stability 
greatly accelerated both the managerial revolution in business and 
the systematic application of science and technology to industrial 
production. By the end of the decade, the increased concentration 
of capital and the spread of large-scale mechanized production an­
nounced the dawning of the age of corporate capitalism; the 1880 
census found four-fifths of manufacturing workers laboring in a 
factory setting. The economic transformation also generated im­
portant social changes. The growth of an urban, industrial prole­
tariat would accelerate in the coming decades. Meanwhile, the 
managerial revolution and the application of professional expertise 
to economic and social problems would give rise to a new middle 
class by the end of the century.9 
While to some extent immediately visible, the economic and 
social changes would not be fully developed until early in the next 
century. The most immediate impact of the depression was in the 
realm of politics and ideology. Widespread failure among small 
businesses and massive unemployment weakened the republican 
faith in the possibilities of social harmony within a free labor 
economy. At the same time labor discontent and protest alarmed 
the middle and upper classes and promoted a preoccupation with 
the defense of property rights and the status quo. The tumultuous 
railroad strikes during the summer of 1877 climaxed several years 
of industrial violence and underscored the potential explosiveness 
that the growing conflict between labor and capital imparted to 
urban disorder and violence.10 
In the aftermath of the railroad strikes, respectable opinion was 
firmly if not hysterically antilabor. The Chicago Tribune was san­
guine: "The fight with the Communists is at an end. . . . The 
potent argument of bullets and billies did the work. n The Penn­
51 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBANIZATION 
sylvania Railroad's Tom Scott was less optimistic and lamented 
that the workers had been "allowed unfortunately to catch a 
glimpse of their possible power for mischief" in "what rapidly 
grew from a riot to an insurrection."12 The strident tone of anti­
labor opinion was often evidence of its isolation. A major factor 
in the scale of the disturbance was the reluctance of the state mili­
tias to fire on the crowds. In many areas militiamen put down their 
rifles and joined the strikers. "The sympathy of the people," ex­
plained Major General Alfred Pearson of the Pennsylvania militia, 
"the sympathy of the troops, my own sympathy was with the 
strikers. We all felt that these men were not receiving enough 
wages." In many parts of the country industrial capitalists were 
still seen as dangerous outsiders threatening the traditional order.13 
The failure of local militias to put down the strikes alarmed the 
respectable classes. The state militia, wrote one Ohio journalist, 
"is utterly inefficient. Any hour the mob chooses, it can destroy 
any city in the country."14 More analytically the Nation pointed 
out that the "militiaman to be good for anything must be a busi­
nessman, a skilled artisan, a property-holder, somebody having a 
stake in the country, . . . else he is as likely to fraternize with a 
mob as to fire on it."15 The new realism emerged in the wake of 
such frank admissions of the centrality of class conflict in urban 
America. In the short run stability demanded punitive measures; 
Scott among others urged a revamping of the nation's military or­
ganization. But the Nation editorial pointed to a longer-range 
strategy of legitimating the urban-industrial order through a 
wider distribution of its benefits. 
In the wake of the railroad strikes, business owners took the 
lead in transforming the state militias into the modern National 
Guard. In a tacit alliance with business interests, the new National 
Guard developed into what the New York Times in 1892 described 
as "the foremost body of citizen soldiers in the world in organi­
zation, drill, discipline, and efficiency" and took a leading role in 
the protection of property and the breaking of strikes. While state 
governments increased appropriations for the National Guard, 
business leaders provided the main source of additional funds. In 
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Chicago a secret committee of prominent businessmen raised 
funds to purchase Napoleon guns, gatling guns, and uniforms for 
the Illinois National Guard. The Commercial Club, organized in 
the aftermath of the 1877 strikes, donated land for Fort Sheridan 
while the Merchants' Club donated land for the Great Lakes Naval 
Station. Scott's Pennsylvania Railroad also took a leading role in 
building new armories and purchasing new weapons.16 Across ur­
ban America the massive brick and stone armories provided grim 
reminders of the newly enhanced repressive power of the state. 
Such republican visions as Olmsted's communitarian urban 
park now seemed hopelessly inadequate to control the explosively 
dangerous inclinations among the lower classes. Surrounding 
Central Park four new armories, symbols of the new realism, had 
outflanked Olmsted's masterpiece by 1892. Built to withstand "an 
attack from a mob," the armories were replete with "loopholes 
for riflemen, enfilading all approaches." Olmsted had hoped his 
urban parks would recreate the moral order of the village; what 
the New York Times called the "moral effect of the bayonet" 
seemed more appropriate to the new realism.17 However, military 
force alone could not create a lasting and stable order and the re­
alistic approach to urban problems would involve more than mere 
repression. Environmental reform might still prove valuable in the 
physical and social reorganization of the American city, but only 
if it reflected an awareness of the potential for violent urban 
conflicts. 
SATELLITE CITIES 
One of the more striking developments of the thirty years after 
1877 was the movement of industrial production from the urban 
center (where it had often been the focus of mob violence) to the 
urban periphery. At first industrial development crept outward 
along the corridors of rail and water transportation. By the end of 
the century, giant industrial enterprises were located in outlying 
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satellite cities. The major factors in the decentralization of industry 
were undoubtedly economic. Successful industrial satellites tended 
to grow quickly as preexisting services, such as electrical power, 
railroad sidings, and trucking firms, combined with cheap real es­
tate on their edges, made them the most attractive sites for new 
ventures. Insurance companies, wary of multistory wooden fac­
tories that frequently burned with great loss of life and property, 
advocated the use of new materials and slow-burning construction 
designs, which demanded ample space. Industrialists who built 
those sprawling factories paid significantly lower premiums.18 
As Weber pointed out the suburban town held a number of 
other purely economic advantages for the manufacturer: 
They include not only a great saving in rent and insurance, but 
economy in the handling and storing of goods. All carting is 
avoided by having a switch run directly into the factory; saving 
to machinery is effected by placing it all on solid foundations on 
thefirstfloor; and plenty of space is at hand for the storing of 
fuel and materials, so that these may be bought when the market 
offers the most favorable terms. 
But manufacturers favored peripheral locations for other reasons 
as well, including political ones. Relocation beyond the city limits 
allowed manufacturers to escape onerous taxation or the exactions 
of political bosses and to control local government. In the 1890s 
the Standard Oil Company created a "municipal fiefdom" in 
Whiting, Indiana, outside Chicago. Similarly, the incorporation of 
Munhall, Pennsylvania, in 1901, site of the Homestead Steel Plant, 
reported an investigator, "relieves the Steel Corporation from 
much of its responsibility as a property holder." The Ford Motor 
Company's notorious domination of Dearborn, Michigan, en­
abled it to escape responsibility for the relief of the unemployed 
and to resist unionization well into the 1930s.19 
As the Ford example suggests, the decentralization of industry 
had also been designed at least partially for reasons of political 
economy, in an effort to reshape the social relations of production. 
Weber noted that the "suburban employer is likely to secure a high 
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grade of employees." His "large workshops, and the prospect of a 
cottage and garden, and open-air life, attract operatives of the best 
class."20 Such considerations influenced the planning of Pullman, 
Illinois; Homestead, Pennsylvania; the McCormick plant at Canal-
port, outside Chicago; and other industrial satellites. George Pull­
man, whose luxurious railroad cars had discouraged the abusive 
tendencies of the "rougher element" of the train-riding public, 
hoped that a more attractive work environment would similarly 
promote a loyal and efficient work force. Thus he built the model 
community of Pullman where he provided his workers with com­
pany housing and other services and surrounded them with beauty 
and culture, all at a 6 percent profit.21 The Carnegie company, 
acting on the belief that homeownership was a force for conser­
vatism and stability, provided low-interest mortgage loans and 
built some housing for sale to its employees.22 Ironically, Pullman 
and Homestead were the scenes of two of the larger and more 
bitter strikes in the 1890s. 
The difficulty with the Pullman and Homestead experiments, 
as a later industrial planner understood, was that the provision of 
company housing "superimposed the landlord-tenant strife on the 
capital-labor antagonism."23 An artificial division between the dis­
contents of work and the problems of the local community has 
characterized much of American urban political history, a division 
which the company town tended to erase. In the company town 
the employers' normal but often disguised interest in living ar­
rangements, where capitalist values and habits are inculcated and 
the discontents of work alleviated, became more visible. Without 
the usual mediating buffers such as a separate landlord class, a 
multifarious wholesale and retail sector, and government social 
services and public utilities, both work-related and community-
related frustrations were charged to the employer.24 
Pullman's efforts to uplift his workers and exclude saloons had 
already created considerable animosity when his policy of deduct­
ing rents from wages even as those wages were slashed precipi­
tated the bitter strike of 1894. Moreover, while urban politics were 
generally organized around ethnic and neighborhood divisions 
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rather than economic ones, often to the benefit of employers, 
company policies became central to local politics in Pullman. The 
residents of Pullman elected the first socialist alderman to serve in 
Chicago's city council.25 In Homestead the workers displayed a 
disturbingly proprietary interest in both the town and the com-
pany's works. During the 1892 strike the Advisory Committee of 
the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers not only 
patrolled the works and unceremoniously escorted both deputy 
sheriffs and Pinkertons out of town, but it acted as the legal au­
thority in the town, closing saloons, keeping the peace, and issu­
ing ad hoc laws.26 Such developments were not what paternalistic 
employers had had in mind. 
In the wake of the Homestead and Pullman strikes, industrial 
decentralization continued and even accelerated. In 1904 Weber re­
ported that "manufacturing no longer centers in the great com­
mercial cities, but is developing smaller cities of its own."27 By 
1915 when Graham R. Taylor published his study of satellite cit­
ies, large industrial plants operated in East St. Louis, Granite City, 
and National City outside St. Louis; Garfield, Lodi, Kearney, Yon­
kers, and Long Island City surrounding New York; Argo, Haw­
thorne, and Gary in the Chicago region; as well as in Flint, Lacka­
wanna, West Milwaukee, South Saint Paul, and other peripheral 
sites.28 But even before the Homestead and Pullman strikes and 
increasingly after them the industrial satellite was taking on a dif­
ferent form. 
Many industrialists had come to doubt the wisdom of Pullman's 
efforts, and Pullman himself had had second thoughts. In 1883 the 
Cincinnati firm of Procter and Gamble employed Pullman's archi­
tect, S. S. Beman, to build their new plant in suburban Saint Ber­
nard. When young Harley Procter expressed an interest in build­
ing housing for workers, a colleague suggested he speak to 
Pullman who, complaining of difficulties with maintenance, rent 
collection, and evictions, recommended against the idea. Procter's 
new factory was designed with an "eye for beauty as well as 
utility. . .  . A broad lawn separated the factory from the street, 
trees were planted, flower beds set." But there was no provision 
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for company housing and no model town. Taylor reported, "Au­
tocratic control is now generally dismissed from consideration."29 
In St. Bernard as well as in nearby Norwood and Oakley and in 
many other industrial satellites across the country, the day ended, 
Taylor wrote, as the worker "rushed out of a factory set in a land­
scape of open fields and wooded hillsides, scrambled for a seat in 
a street car or grimy train and clattered back to the region of brick 
and pavement, of soot and noise and jostle." Residents of tene­
ment districts like Cincinnati's West End could not afford the sub­
urban housing found in or near the satellite cities. The admirable 
efficiency and even beauty of the suburban plants prompted Tay­
lor to ask whether "similar skill and ingenuity have been applied 
to the community life, to town planning, housing, health, and 
recreation." He found that they clearly had not.30 Pullman's form 
of paternalism had been rejected, but less intrusive forms of labor 
control were still of interest to employers. 
At Gary, Indiana, strategically situated between Minnesota iron 
ore and Pennsylvania coal, the U.S. Steel Corporation had spared 
no expense to streamline production. To perfect the site the cor­
poration leveled sand dunes, filled in swamps, and moved three 
railroads and the Grand Calumet River. But for those industrialists 
and most others, Taylor found, city building remained at best "a 
side issue." The control of labor, however, remained a crucial con­
cern. Taylor discounted the rumors that Gary's Grand Calumet 
River was relocated to serve as a "moat against mob violence" and 
that the corporation thus commanded a position "impregnable to 
mob attack and so calculated to withstand a prolonged siege." But 
he did conclude that the "Steel Corporation's triumphs in the eco­
nomics of production are only less impressive than its complete 
command over the army of workers it commands." And the strike 
of 1919 would illustrate that the corporation's control of the lake­
front did indeed facilitate the importation of strikebreakers from 
cities on the Great Lakes.31 
Employers believed that the suburban plant would keep the so­
cial discontent and labor disturbances of the inner city from dis­
rupting their operations. In the 1880s the secretary of the largest 
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machine tool firm in heavily unionized Cincinnati blamed the "fe­
ver of excitement" when striking machinists paraded through the 
factory district for causing his own employees to strike. In 1905 
the machine-tool industry began its move to suburban Oakley, 
where it successfully resisted both strikes and unionization.32 At 
the turn of the century, a Chicago industrialist complained that his 
city was a "hotbed of trades unionism" and that strikes were chas­
ing away the largest corporations. As new investment came into 
the region, another explained, it was "the smaller towns [that] are 
getting these manufacturing plants." When asked if employers had 
constructed suburban plants to escape unions, the chairman of the 
New York State Board of Mediation and Arbitration laconically 
replied, "They have been located with that end in view."33 
Industrialists expressed similar concerns to Taylor. One ex­
plained that during a street-car strike "every time the strikers pa­
raded past his plant a veritable fever seemed to spread among" his 
employees. Others credited decentralization for keeping "trade 
unionism weak," Taylor reported, probably because suburban 
workers had "less opportunity to learn of new jobs" or to "com­
pare work conditions and wages."34 Weber, too, had noted the 
greater strength of trade unions in large cities. He explained, 
"Even when wages rule the same, many employers have aban­
doned the great city to escape other exactions of the labor 
unions."35 Similar considerations influenced the location of the 
massive coal-fired, electricity-generating plants that often pow­
ered the suburban industries. In a 1906 Engineering Magazine article, 
an industrial designer argued that "suburban locations, slightly 
out of the large centers of population, are desirable owing to the 
fact that labor troubles are not so liable to occur, and should they 
arise they can be handled better when located outside the lime 
light." The use of strikebreakers, he added, was especially facili­
tated "when considerable space is available around the industry on 
which temporary shelters can be erected."36 The labor problem 
was an important factor in the decentralization of industry, but it 
also dictated that industry not move too far from the great city. 
The suburban plants were generally only slightly beyond the 
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large population centers because, as both Weber and Taylor noted, 
the great city retained at least one advantage, an abundance of 
cheap labor. "The great city contains a large population that is 
uneducated, unskilled and poverty-stricken," Weber observed. 
"Incapable of organization, it sells its energies to the bidder at 
starvation wages." In Pullman the tracks of the Illinois Central 
Railroad served as a cautionary reminder of the closeness of the 
reserve army of the unemployed. At the newer suburban plants, 
Taylor noted, it was the "persistent efforts of plant superinten­
dents" to secure extensions of the electric street railway system 
that allowed employers to draw on the urban labor pool. As long 
as the plants remained near a big city, strikes and other labor dis­
turbances would be handled, he explained, "by temporarily draw­
ing upon the large surplus of labor" in the nearby center. By tying 
the industrial satellite to the tenement districts, the street railway 
served to facilitate the decentralization of industry.37 
THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE METROPOLIS 
Residential arrangements reflected the new realism as well. 
Those members of the upper classes who remained in the inner 
city endeavored to shut out the disorder of the streets. A resi­
dent of Cincinnati's once-fashionable West End recalled that the 
"nightly battening-down of the house increased our sense of 
siege."38 In Chicago Potter Palmer's "turreted Wisconsin granite 
fortress" rose above the street like an "angry Gothic castle."39 
H. H. Richardson's famous Glessner house in Chicago, focused on 
an interior courtyard, represented the artistic triumph of this archi­
tecture. With its recessed doorway the Glessner house presented a 
blank face to the street. Such houses, architectural critic Mont­
gomery Schuyler quipped, "were not defensible except in a mili­
tary sense." They eased the "patron's anxiety to have a seat of 
refuge against the uneasy proletariat."40 For those with less cour­
age, the residential retreat to the suburbs was a more typical re­
sponse to urban disorder and to the rise in class tensions. 
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During the 1850s Alexander Jackson Davis's design for the ele­
gant suburb Llewelyn Park, New Jersey, had used curvilinear 
streets, garden designs, open spaces, and restrictive covenants to 
keep urban disorder at arm's length. Although the escape from 
urban disorder continued to be a prime element in the suburban 
ideal, Olmsted's Riverside initiated a series of postwar efforts to 
combine the advantages of the rural retreat with all the conve­
niences of city life. In the 1870s A. T. Stewart, the pioneer of the 
department store, designed Garden City, Long Island, which Ken­
neth Jackson has described as the "most ambitiously planned sub­
urb of the nineteenth century." Lavishly provided with sylvan 
landscapes, Garden City, the New York World reported, was also 
to have "all the appliances of municipal life."41 Even as its impor­
tance as a refuge and a haven from the city became more pro­
nounced, the suburban residence became dependent on a plethora 
of mass-produced goods and public utilities (gas, water, elec­
tricity, transportation) provided by the city. 
Stewart's role was more than coincidental. Just as the depart­
ment store retailed the consumer benefits of industrialization in a 
setting free of the mundane and disagreeable elements of industrial 
production, suburbs like Garden City, Riverside, Lake Forest, 
Brookline and others enabled the suburbanite to enjoy the ame­
nities of metropolitan life without the inconvenience of living near 
the noise, pollution, and poverty associated with industrial pro-
duction.42 In a fashion that paralleled and reinforced the function 
of the department store, suburbanization disguised links between 
a rising standard of living and the urban modes of production (and 
the impoverished urban masses) that made the rise possible.43 
Moreover, in mutually supporting ways the suburb, the depart­
ment store, and the advertisement taught styles of consumption 
and domestic habits that served to distinguish the middle class 
from "the other half."44 
The new suburban life style was an important element in the 
emergence and consciousness of the new middle class at the end of 
the nineteenth century.45 Before the Civil War the ownership of 
property and a measure of economic independence characterized a 
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large American middle class that included farmers and the multi­
farious small producers and retailers of the towns. By the turn of 
the century, a new middle class of salaried employees and profes­
sional servants of the national corporations had begun to emerge. 
As economic independence became less of a defining characteristic 
of the middle class, protection from the insecurities of the new 
urban industrial order became a more important one. Such protec­
tion took the form not only of corporate connections and profes­
sional status, but also of the suburban haven from the violence, 
disease, and squalor of the inner city. 
The tenement was the center of the very different world of "the 
other half." By the 1890s tenement construction had "polluted" 
much of Manhattan and the Bronx, Jacob Riis reported, and rep­
resented the social and physical "boundary line" between rich and 
46poor.  If the granite houses of the rich who continued to brave 
the inner city seemed like fortresses, the tenements resembled pris­
ons. A typical New York City tenement, six to eight stories tall, 
incarcerated one hundred or more people. Lacking sufficient light 
and air and often without sanitary plumbing or even running wa­
ter, the tenement was a breeding ground for a variety of diseases 
including typhus fever, smallpox, and pulmonary tuberculosis. In 
1879 the dumbbell tenement, which in Lewis Mumford's view 
"raised bad housing to an art," won a contest for the best-designed 
model tenement sponsored by Plumber and Sanitary Engineer. The 
dumbbell's pathetically narrow and completely enclosed air shaft 
let in little light and no fresh air and served primarily as a recep­
tacle for rotting garbage. In their study of the tenement house 
problem, DeForest and Veiller recommended it be renamed the 
"foul air shaft." It worked most effectively as a flue in tenement 
house fires.47 
Although New York had the most severe tenement house prob­
lem, Boston, Cincinnati, Chicago and other cities faced their own 
serious housing problems. Only New York and Boston had a 
worse housing problem than Cincinnati, Veiller reported. Cincin­
nati harbored almost every type of bad housing imaginable from 
"large block buildings housing hundreds of people, to the small 
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dilapidated wooden house occupied by two or three families." 
Cincinnati was spared only the infamous dumbbell tenement. But 
Cincinnati had its own notorious accommodations, including the 
one-hundred-room Rat Row along the riverfront.48 In the "Big 
Missouri," a converted spice mill just outside the central business 
district described by a local health officer as "an outrage against 
decency and humanity," three hundred tenants shared a single out­
door water hydrant.49 The speculatively built tenement made a 
rather late appearance in Chicago. But industrialization after 1880 
and a huge influx of immigrants had caused "a dangerous over­
crowding in all the poor districts," and the "building of tenements 
on speculation" had become "a regular and profitable means of 
investing capital," the city health commissioner reported.50 While 
Chicago never suffered from the solid blocks of five- and six-story 
tenements found in other cities, the expansion of the central busi­
ness district and rising realty values led to the overcrowding of 
lots with ramshackle buildings.51 
How THE OTHER HALF SHOULD LIVE 
Suburbanization thus clarified and sharpened class divisions. As 
the physical and social distance widened between the classes, a com­
bination of fear and envy, manipulation and resentment marked 
the relationship between the middle class and the poor. The spec­
ter of "fraternization" between the classes or middle-class sympa­
thy for political radicals and labor agitators became a thing of the 
past.52 Of course the respectable middle class had always ques­
tioned the propriety of their social inferiors. "They love to clan 
together . .  . in filth and disorder," charity leader Robert Hartley 
said of the urban poor in 1851, "provided they can drink, and 
smoke, and gossip, and enjoy their balls, and wakes, and frolics 
without molestation." But the pristine environment of the well-
equipped suburb lent a sharper edge and new imagery to such at­
titudes. Fulminating against the Tammany Hall and its inner-city 
minions, the Reverend Charles Parkhurst blamed "the slimy, oozy 
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soil of Tammany Hall" for turning the city into an "open cess­
pool." Political reform thus became an exercise in "municipal 
sewerage" that served to "drain that political quagmire, and . . . 
get rid of the odor, the mire, and the fever germs."53 
The segregated social order of the metropolis also generated a 
new approach to moral reform. In 1870 Olmsted was already con­
trasting the promiscuous culture of the poor with the middle-class 
ideal of domesticity. He hoped his urban parks would be sufficient 
to break up the "young men in knots" he saw in the tenement 
districts and to encourage the emulation of middle-class mores 
among the poor.54 By the 1880s the leaders of the Charity Orga­
nization Society confronted what they believed to be a much more 
serious problem. In 1887 the society's Charles Kellogg feared that 
"the classes which wealth and poverty and occupation make have 
drifted apart, and are more monotonously uniform. . . . There is 
no solvent of social ties like urban life," he concluded. In response 
the society launched an organized system of friendly visiting in the 
belief that "if we do not furnish the poor with elevating influences, 
they will rule us by degrading ones."55 
The Charity Organization Society's policy of friendly visiting 
was superficially similar to the work of Olmsted's close friend 
Charles Loring Brace. A critic of those institutional reformers 
who had "discovered the asylum" a generation earlier, Brace cre­
ated the Children's Aid Society in the 1850s in the hope of combin­
ing the natural and spontaneous forms of social control associated 
with the family and the small town with a modicum of formal 
organization and structure. While the notion of friendly visiting 
paid homage to Brace's ideal, the charity reformers, both physi­
cally and psychically distant from the lives of the poor and fearful 
of their potential for mischief, laid much greater stress on formal 
organization and structure. Sending detailed reports to employers, 
landlords, bankers, the police, as well as to a host of relief and 
charitable agencies, the "friendly" visitor was part of a highly or­
ganized and bureaucratic effort to control the poor.56 
The conflict between the reformer and the machine politician 
was thus in part the result of a clash between the culture of the 
suburbs and that of the tenement districts.57 The friendly visitor, 
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Jane Addams wrote, "obligated to lay all stress . . . upon the in­
dustrial virtues, and to treat members of the family almost exclu­
sively as factors in the industrial system," could not recreate "the 
emotional kindness with which relief is given by one poor neigh­
bor to another." The poorhouse always stood behind the friendly 
visitor; if moral uplift failed to pay the rent, the destitute would 
be dragged off as he or she "squealed shrilly like a frightened ani­
mal in a trap," as Jane Addams recalled. Only those who witnessed 
poverty arise from the "loss of work, or for other guiltless and 
inevitable reasons" could fully understand the culture of the poor, 
Addams concluded.58 In contrast machine politicians imitated the 
cooperative spirit of their constituents. Holding "beefsteak sup­
pers, chowder parties, picnics, and balls," the machine spread "an 
immense amount of charity work, and an immense amount of 
geniality and relative comfort among the poor," Hutchins Hap-
good noted.59 Though machine politicians failed to provide alter­
natives to the inequities of suburbanization and grafted for their 
own pockets, they also distributed a portion of the tribute they 
exacted from the powerful magnates who shaped the city. 
THE COSTS OF SPECULATION 
The usual stamping ground of the magnate and the focus of 
power in the metropolis was the central business district. The 
grand railroad terminals that symbolized metropolitan power and 
the trolley lines that crisscrossed the central business district un­
derscored its crucial role as the hub of inter- and intracity rail 
transport. Warehousing and storage facilities and light industry of­
ten clustered near the terminals. But the most expensive real estate 
in the central business district was reserved for financial and com­
mercial functions. Sky scraping office buildings accommodated 
banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions; the 
administrative apparatus of the national corporations that coordi­
nated far-flung systems of production, marketing, and distribu­
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tion; and the offices of professionals, especially those with ties to 
the great corporations. Nearby fashionable shopping, hotel, and 
entertainment districts provided a showcase for the consumer cul­
ture of the new corporate order.60 
Thus the reorganization of the central business district must be 
added to the decentralization of industry and the creation of sub­
urban retreats for the new middle class as the rational forces that 
shaped the new metropolitan form. Those elements of the metro­
politan order also foreshadowed what would become the central 
concerns of the city planning profession, specifically a system of 
zoning to codify the functional segregation of the city and im­
proved means of transit to unify the metropolis. But the metropo­
lis was by no means fully the product of rational forces, a fact of 
which the tenement residents were perhaps most painfully aware. 
In a variety of forms, economic speculation and its irrational con­
sequences had a great deal to do with the most disagreeable aspects 
of metropolitan life. 
The major focus of financial manipulation was the new urban 
utilities. Essential to the expanding city and the quality of life, the 
new technologies of transportation and communication were vast 
and profitable enterprises. "Many men regard the city as an eco­
nomic necessity—a thing to be used but not to be loved—as a 
means to riches, power, and pleasure," Delos Wilcox wrote in ref­
erence to the great utility magnates. "In haste to be rich," he 
charged, they are "careless of the city they build so far as its fitness 
for a permanent habitation of men is concerned." The new trans­
portation and communication technologies have "given men a cer­
tain apparent, though partly superficial, independence of locality." 
But their construction and the financial manipulation that sur­
rounded them left the city "fit only for transients" such that the 
"well-to-do get away from it as much as they can." For working 
families that could not or would not leave the city, Wilcox con­
cluded, "locality persistently asserts itself, and the faster distance 
is abolished the more rapidly the price of standing room rises."61 
The cost and accessibility of the new utilities, especially mass tran­
sit, divided suburbanites from the other half. 
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In the 1890s the expansion and electrification of the street rail­
way system was heralded as a way to bring the suburban residence 
within the reach of the working class. Even before electrification 
Boston's Henry M. Whitney spoke of the "moral influence" of the 
five-cent fare in defense of his monopoly of Boston's horse rail-
ways.62 Electrification, extension, and low uniform fares brought 
"suburban residence within reach of large classes of the poorest 
people," argued sociologist Charles H. Cooley in 1891. Street rail­
way expansion acted "as a safety valve to relieve the congested 
districts," reported another student of municipal traction the same 
year. Three years later the labor economist John R. Commons 
credited low fares with allowing workingmen to escape the slum.63 
Certainly the street railway brought home ownership within the 
reach of many of the better-paid, skilled workers. But even those 
who escaped the inner city found that overcrowding and conges­
tion often followed them to the periphery. Residential districts 
such as the Bronx in New York or Roxbury in Boston that were 
opened by street railway extensions were quickly crowded with 
tenements and multiple-unit dwellings. Street railway extensions 
were speculative undertakings; profitability demanded full street­
cars and hence dense neighborhoods. Moreover, street railway ex­
pansion increased the accessibility but also the cost of peripheral 
real estate. Those struggling into the middle class competed for real 
estate with thousands of other potential home owners as well as 
with industrial and commercial interests and speculators. Specu­
lative realty values soared even higher in the inner city served by 
multiple railway lines. There the very poor, the recent immigrant, 
and the unskilled competed for the worst housing on the most 
expensive real estate.64 
Thus, even as it opened the urban periphery, the street railway 
intensified congestion in many residential districts and especially 
in the central business district.65 A great deal of speculation cen­
tered on the deteriorating residential properties on land just out­
side the central business district that might rise precipitously in 
value with a business district expansion. As its value rose and until 
it was actually converted to commercial use, such property had 
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to generate large rental incomes, generally secured by squeezing 
more tenants into the existing buildings. Speculative owners had 
little incentive to maintain their properties while they waited for 
them to be demolished in favor of a commercial use.66 Of course 
not all tenement owners were speculators. Skilled workers and 
small tradesmen often owned tenements and lived in the buildings. 
With limited financial resources and often having paid too much 
for the building, such landlords also generally crowded in tenants 
and neglected maintenance.67 Inflating the costs of real estate, con­
struction, and rents, speculation in all its forms remained the larg­
est part of the tenement problem. 
Lawrence Veiller, an advocate of tenement reform familiar with 
conditions across the country and coauthor of the New York State 
Tenement House Commission report, argued that major improve­
ments in housing would result if buildings were "erected directly 
as an investment on cash," thereby eliminating speculative profits. 
"Hardly one of these houses is erected as an investment, but in 
nine cases out of ten is built purely as speculation," Veiller re­
ported. At the top of the speculative pyramid was the building 
loan operator "whose business is the buying up of land in certain 
portions of the city as opportunity offers, and holding such land 
until some builder desires to build in that neighborhood," and 
then selling "at a greatly increased valuation." Even the conser­
vative Commercial Advertiser agreed that the "building loan opera­
tor adds nothing to the value of the property. . . . On the contrary 
their general plan is to inflate prices by every trick, device, 
scheme, practice, that is known to the business."68 
Most of the builders themselves were also speculators. Tene­
ments were seldom erected singly but in groups. As a respected 
New York builder explained: 
The average speculator who erects a tenement house knows 
practically nothing of building. He purchases the raw materials, 
in the case of brickwork, and awards the contract for putting up 
the masonry to what is termed a 'lumper,' who furnished him 
the labor at a certain price per thousand for laying the brick. A 
similar system prevails in some of thefinishingtrades. . . . The 
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various lumpers who are interested in doing this class of work 
are often irresponsible men who have no interest in the 
building. . . . The result is that, in the average house built under 
this system, the workmanship is woefully bad. . . . The product 
is a miserably built structure . . . and one that will deteriorate 
very rapidly. 
The speculative builder then either sold at an inflated price (in 
which case an overextended purchaser might watch helplessly as 
the building deteriorated) or held the property in the hope that the 
value of the land would increase while he rented it out.69 
At the intersection of the speculation in land, housing construc­
tion, and urban utilities was the street railway. In the late 1880s 
hundreds of independent horse-drawn railways crisscrossed the 
nation's cities. But after Frank Sprague's successful experiments in 
Richmond, Virginia, in 1887, the electrification of street railways 
quickly followed. By 1902 94 percent of street railways had been 
electrified. Between 1890 and 1902 track mileage had tripled and 
the number of passengers doubled in the $2 billion industry. Elec­
trification demanded investments in huge generators. The great 
"gaunt, many stacked structures" devoured hundreds of tons of 
coal daily and contributed to a doubling in fixed costs.70 Once a 
method had been found, with the aid of the Vanderbilt fortune, of 
using "one central producer and distributor of power," a wave of 
merges swept the industry.71 
The electrification and consolidation of street railways offered 
great profits, and it attracted powerful investors. While nearly ev­
ery city had its traction millionaires, the Widener-Elkins-Whitney-
Ryan syndicate dominated all others. Those Philadelphia and New 
York speculators and financiers, with ties to commercial and in­
dustrial capital from Morgan to Rockefeller, controlled $1 billion 
in street railways, the centerpiece of afinancialempire.72 Although 
street railway magnates were not the wealthy, one-dimensional 
malefactors of popular mythology, financial speculation figured 
more prominently in their calculations than the public interest. 
The payment of dividends on watered stock and the failure to re­
tire stock based on depreciated if not decrepit capital weakened the 
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industry, made the lowering of fares problematic, and undermined 
the entire public transit system by the early twentieth century. 
Real estate speculation was inextricably related to the industry 
as well. While many extensions exploited existing residential 
areas, other extensions were aimed at opening areas in which the 
magnates owned tracts of land.73 New York's first surface line ex­
tended to "the suburban villages of Yorkville and Harlem, passing 
through the woods and wild lands of Upper Manhattan, which 
this very line was to transform into a flourishing and continuous 
suburb." Such developmental schemes were replicated throughout 
the country; in 1902 the Census Bureau reported that track mile­
age was expanding more rapidly than traffic. Professional man­
agers such as Herbert Vreeland of New York's Metropolitan lines 
assured their employers that the traffic would come. In the mean­
time real estate speculation could be as important to transit mag­
nates as the billions of nickels collected annually.74 Although such 
speculation ultimately opened the periphery to suburban resi­
dences, it also played a role in inner-city congestion. The specula­
tive withholding of peripheral land increased its ultimate cost to 
suburban builders and added to the pressure on inner-city real es-
tate.75 In deciding against certain extensions, the magnates also 
limited the accessibility of suburban real estate. Cincinnati's Kil­
gour syndicate, heavily invested in suburban real estate in Hyde 
Park and Mt. Lookout, quickly extended service to those areas 
while denying service to rival developments in Oakley and 
Madisonville.76 
THE STREET RAILWAY: SYMBOL OF THE METROPOLIS 
By the turn of the century, the outlines of the new metropolitan 
form had taken shape. The city of concentric circles or what Hurd 
more accurately called the star-shaped city was the product of the 
decisions of industrial capitalists, suburban developers and their 
clients, public utility entrepreneurs, speculators of all sorts, and of 
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the more limited choices of ordinary urbanites. As Weber had un­
derstood, the street railway was not the driving force behind met­
ropolitan development; but as the key to the new spatial arrange­
ments it did serve as the most visible symbol of a transformation 
whose precise delineation was not yet clear. With good reason 
Theodore Dreiser made a street railway financier the central char­
acter in his epic trilogy of life in metropolitan America. In The 
Titan, Dreiser's Cowperwood (closely modeled on Charles Yer­
kes) arrived in Chicago having "gone through a great life struggle 
in one metropolis and tested all the phases of human duplicity, 
decency, sympathy, and chicanery that one invariably finds in ev­
ery American city." Ineluctably drawn to the seat of power in his 
adopted city, Cowperwood "loved the thought of streetcars and 
the vast manipulative life it suggested." Dreiser and others may 
have exaggerated the power and conspiratorial genius of the street 
railway financier, but he was a central figure in the new city.77 
Although the magnates were not omnipotent conspirators, their 
control of enormous financial resources gave them considerable 
power to influence metropolitan development. By 1907 Thomas 
Ryan, for example, held the Equitable Life Assurance Society and 
"the controlling influence in a large number of banks, trust com­
panies, and railroad and industrial corporations."78 Such resources 
not only helped finance the construction of skyscrapers and tene­
ments, the twin towers of metropolitan congestion, but allowed 
the magnates to influence the development of the central business 
district and the placement of industry.79 Not only through the con­
trol of investment capital but in the extension and curtailment of 
lines and in their fare and transfer policies, the magnates influenced 
urban development. Indeed, the particular physical arrangement 
of at least one city seemed well designed to produce a "traction 
bonanza." On the lines between suburban Norwood and Cincin-
nati's West End tenements, Taylor discovered, the "same cars 
which carry factory workers out at 7:30 each morning are loaded 
on the way back with Cincinnati office workers going into the 
city. The reverse happens each afternoon."80 Although the devel­
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opment of urban transportation followed a pattern set by the sub­
urbanization of industry, the residential exodus, and the reorga­
nization of the central business district, it appeared as the most 
visible factor in the city's transformation.81 
While they were not an independent cause of the reorganization 
of the city, the street railways became an easily recognizable and, 
for some, a hated symbol of the new metropolitan order. "Grave 
misunderstandings often arise between street railway companies 
and the public," Edward Higgins noted. The fare structure gen­
erated mistrust as the "public is largely composed of the working 
classes to whom the daily 5 or 10-cent fare forms a material bur­
den." The public widely perceived that the companies were reap­
ing windfall profits. The electrification of street railways, Edward 
Durand argued, "meant, first and foremost, economy," yet "there 
has been no lowering of fares in most of our great urban commu­
nities for several decades." But another source of animosity was 
what Higgins called the "inevitable" accidents ranging "from the 
running down of a peddler's cart to the killing and maiming of a 
carload of passengers." The speed of the trolley's careening around 
New York's Union Square inspired the epitaph "Dead Man's 
Corner."82 
With fares too high and its employees' wages too low, sur­
rounded by corruption, bribery, and public scandal, the cause of a 
growing number of accidents and injuries, the street railway was 
an essential but nevertheless vulnerable link in the metropolitan 
order. A "street-car strike in a great city," Wilcox understood, 
"brings to light the enormous power involved in the control of 
city car lines." The street railway had "so fashioned the growth of 
our cities and so changed the habits of their citizens that a tie-up 
of the lines means a very serious paralysis of city life."83 Street 
railway lines such as Chicago's West Side lines passed through 
tenement districts dotted, as the New York Times put it, with 
"scores of choice spots for mob violence" where "capital is cor­
dially hated."84 Street railway strikes beset metropolitan America, 
disrupting normal business for days or even weeks at a time. With 
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few resources other than a profound frustration, the lower classes 
realized, at least for brief periods, Wilcox's adage that the "control 
of the streets means the control of the city."85 
Although it was fitful and often unsuccessful efforts at union­
ization that precipitated street railway strikes, their scale depended 
on the largely spontaneous participation of the tenement districts. 
An 1886 strike in New York gathered support in the tenement dis­
tricts around Grand Street, the New York Times reported, where 
the "entire neighborhood . . . took no pains to conceal its sympa­
thy with the employees. . . . Everybody in the neighborhood . . . 
seemed to harbor a grievance against the railroad." The strikers di­
rected the crowds in a "methodical and orderly" tie-up of the cars.86 
In 1899 a crowd estimated at fifty thousand from the "thickly 
populated tenement districts" stopped the cars along New York's 
Second Avenue in support of a strike of only two hundred men.87 
In Dreiser's Sister Carrie the end of Hurstwood's harrowing ex­
perience as a scab "came with a real mob" in "an exceedingly 
poor-looking neighborhood."88 Such crowds soaped tracks, dyna­
mited supports, overturned and burned cars, and threatened strike­
breakers. 
The strikes were not, however, confined to the tenement dis­
tricts. The success of the strike and the focusing of attention on the 
grievances which animated the crowds depended upon disrupting 
the business of the city. When the disorder reached the business 
districts, the conflicting interests of the poor and the commuting 
middle class became clear. When the Grand Street cars in New 
York's 1886 strike reached Broadway, white collar workers, pre­
sumably commuters, leaned out of office windows "to applaud 
the police," while shirt-making women from nearby sweatshops 
jeered.89 An 1888 strike in Chicago left North Side commuters "at 
the mercy" of the strikers. During the strike the few passengers 
braving the cars "were surrounded by angry groups" as they got 
off. Soon "business men, clerks, women bent on shopping" all 
sought alternative means of transit.90 In many strikes, like an 1895 
strike in Brooklyn which ended only after National Guard troops 
entered the city, the cars ran completely "empty because of the 
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fear of further violence."91 The effectiveness of the horse militia in 
that strike, firing into open windows and crashing through sa­
loons frequented by strikers, convinced one journalist that "we 
must have more cavalry."92 Such incidents revealed that the heavy 
use of force remained an important part of the metropolitan order. 
At best street railway strikes won higher wages for some work­
ers and vented the frustrations of the tenement dwellers. At worst 
they degenerated into crime, senseless violence, and the wanton 
destruction of property. They did little to illuminate the actual 
forces remaking the late-nineteenth-century city and even less to 
suggest alternative paths of development. But they do provide evi­
dence of the conflicts inherent in the process of suburbanization 
and of the energy that would animate a much more positive and 
serious challenge to metropolitan development. In his 1886 may­
oralty campaign, Henry George's juxtaposition of transit manipu­
lation and the tenement problem proved the most effective part of 
his contest with Abram Hewitt. Although George did not illumi­
nate all the forces remaking the metropolis, he exposed the irra­
tional consequences of speculation and suggested a more rational 
and just path of urban development. Moreover, his condemnation 
of land speculation focused attention on a key element in the po­
litical economy of the metropolis, specifically the arrangement and 
uses of urban space, in a way that every citizen could understand. 
POVERTY AND PROGRESS 
In one sense the contrast between George's fall campaign and 
the street railway strikes that had occurred the previous spring 
could not have been more pronounced. Louis Post recalled the 
great Union Square Parade: 
The police arrangements were the worst possible. In the Bowery 
and Fourth Avenue the procession was every now and again tan­
gled up with horse-cars, and no policeman was at hand. It ap­
pears that large squads of police were massed at different points, 
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in readiness to break up a riot, but there were few to be seen at 
any point where they might have prevented a riot. The horse-
car drivers and the paraders were, however, upon excellent 
terms with each other, and although the confusion was exasper­
ating to both, the utmost good feeling prevailed. 
In its more peaceful and positive way, however, the George cam­
paign addressed the same issues that underlay the strikes.93 
George's platform stated "that existing means of transit should not 
be left in the hands of corporations which, gaining enormous prof­
its from the growth of population, oppress their employees and 
provoke strikes that interrupt travel and imperil the public peace, 
but should by lawful process be assumed by the city and operated 
for public benefit." During the campaign George explained, "We 
could take those railroads and run them free, let everybody ride 
who would, and we could pay for it out of the increased value of 
the people's property in consequence."94 Such arguments prepared 
the way for the more explosive rhetoric George employed in dis­
cussing the issue of home ownership, which he placed at the center 
of his campaign. 
George insisted that the private manipulation of socially created 
wealth in the form of transit franchises and land values was re­
sponsible for New York's housing problem. At Cooper Union in 
early October, George referred to this "great central fact": 
The vast majority of men and women and children in New York 
have no legal right to live here at all. Most of us—ninety-nine 
per cent at least—must pay the other one per cent by the week 
or month or quarter for the privilege of staying here and work­
ing like slaves. . . . Nowhere else in the civilized world are men 
and women and children packed together so closely. As for chil­
dren, they die almost as soon as they enter the world. 
Comparing the density of New York's Lower East Side to both 
London and Canton and citing New York's own health commis-
sioner's estimate of a 65 percent infant mortality rate in the Mul­
berry Bend tenement district, George prepared to turn the crowd's 
outrage to positive effect. "Now, is there any reason for such over­
crowding," he asked. "There is plenty of room on this island. 
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There are miles and miles and miles of land all around this nucleus. 
Why cannot we take that and build houses upon it for our accom­
modation." Only financial speculation and the land monopoly 
stood in the way. He continued, "There is no good reason whatever 
why every citizen of New York should not have his own separate 
house and home; and the aim of this movement is to secure it."95 
In a city where more than 90 percent of the residents were 
tenants, his frequent condemnation of "that monstrous injustice 
which crowds families into tenement rooms" proved effective.96 
George's opponent Abram Hewitt could neither ignore those ar­
guments nor dismiss them as anarchistic bombast. New York's 
respectable classes had appealed to Hewitt to run against George 
precisely because Hewitt seemed to personify the very same values 
(individualism, the self-made man, economic independence, and 
social mobility through honest, hard work) with which George 
promoted the single tax. Indeed Hewitt's only hope of defeating 
George was in attracting the votes of those workers who aspired 
to move up into the middle class through their own initiative.97 
George's doctrine of "confiscation," Hewitt argued, could never 
succeed in a city where "a large majority" of people owned their 
own homes. Hewitt outrageously exaggerated the extent of home 
ownership in the city, but aside from appealing to his reputation 
as a liberal friend of labor and of trade unions and predicting a new 
era of conciliation in labor relations (all of which he did) it is not 
clear what else he could have done. Uncontested, George's argu­
ments undermined the basis of Hewitt's campaign.98 
In a much broader fashion Hewitt challenged George's philoso­
phy and proposals in a campaign reprint of Hewitt's own 1883 
speech at the opening ceremonies of the Brooklyn Bridge.99 That 
same year, in a variation on the theme of progress and poverty, 
George had argued that the bridge project illustrated the failure of 
political morality and ethics to keep pace with technological in­
novation. In reference to a recent scandal involving the suspension 
bridge's steel cables, George wrote, "The skill of the engineer 
could not prevent condemned wire from being smuggled into the 
cable."100 In his speech and campaign reprint, Hewitt also ad­
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dressed the theme of progress and poverty. In a comparison of the 
wages of the slaves who built the pyramids to those of the laborers 
on the bridge, Hewitt argued that the "effect of discoveries of new 
methods, tools and laws of force has been to raise the wages of 
labor more than an hundredfold." Progress steadily eliminated 
poverty, he argued in opposition to George, as "the distribution 
of the fruits of labor is approaching from age to age more equi­
table, and must, at last reach the plane of absolute justice between 
man and man."101 In promoting the development of commerce, 
Hewitt concluded, great public projects like the Brooklyn Bridge 
sped the city toward that ideal. 
Hewitt's use of those arguments during the campaign is ironic. 
It is not only that the secret history of the bridge would later reveal 
Hewitt's own cynical role in the weaving of defective wire into the 
cable. It is also that both the Brooklyn Bridge and another great 
public project, the subway system that Mayor Hewitt would pro­
pose in 1888, actually exacerbated the pattern of speculation and 
high rents that George condemned. The bridge, as the New York 
Tribune noted in an 1882 editorial, was a major focus of the sort of 
speculation so endemic to the metropolis. 
It is understood that certain men expect to make large sums out 
of real estate operations in connection with the bridge. They be­
lieve that when completed it will increase the value of property 
on the line, and adjacent to it, to a degree which will make delay 
a source of profit. They are in no hurry to have their work fin­
ished. They wish to perfect all their plans and get hold of the 
property which they desire first. 
Just as the extension, electrification, and acceleration of transit in 
Manhattan would increase rents, so too would the bridge bring 
high rents to Brooklyn. In support of rapid transit across the 
bridge, the Railroad Gazette predicted that the "building lots in 
Brooklyn, now 30 minutes or more from Fulton Ferry, would 
probably double in price—much more, very likely—should rapid 
transit between the two cities be provided." With the increase in 
rent, the Gazette concluded, the first "really great usefulness" of 
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the bridge would result. By the end of the century, DeForest and 
Veiller reported, high rents had "debarred the smallest home 
seeker" from Brooklyn.102 
PUBLIC TRANSIT, PRIVATE PLANNING 
The same conflict between property values and community val­
ues beset the planning of New York's subway system. Despite 
George's proposals, and although Hewitt had spoken in favor of a 
municipally built rapid transit system as early as 1873, Hewitt 
avoided the transit issue during the campaign. In 1888, however, 
the new mayor issued a special message on rapid transit that pro­
posed the construction with municipal funds of two electrically 
powered subways. Although rejected in 1888 Hewitt's proposal 
later provided the foundation for the construction of New York's 
first subways.103 In contrast to George's, Hewitt's proposal re­
flected a greater passion for economic development than for social 
justice. 
In its Annual Report of 1887, the Chamber of Commerce had 
warned that congestion was dangerously increasing the cost of do­
ing business in the city. Hewitt's special message added to that a 
concern for the future of the city's tax base. "Our rate of taxation 
depends upon the growth of the unoccupied portion of the city," 
Hewitt explained. Without rapid transit, population would be 
driven out to Long Island or New Jersey, outside the city's taxing 
authority. A rapid transit system serving the Annexed District (the 
Bronx) would enable the city "to get the benefit of taxation upon 
the increased value of property, which according to the best au­
thority, increases as the square of the velocity of travel." But in­
creased tax revenues would not justify a subsidy for public transit; 
Hewitt's system would be operated by a private firm and based on 
a profitable five-cent fare.104 
Hewitt's proposal did not meet with immediate success, but be­
tween 1890 and 1894 the Real Estate Record and Builders' Guide led 
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a successful campaign to unite business interests behind it. Point­
ing to the development of municipal ownership under business 
auspices in Europe, the Record and Guide allayed fears that the sub­
way would increase the city's tax burden in insisting that "we want 
the city of New York to go into the rapid transit business largely 
because it is so profitable." A committee of real estate developers, 
anxious to see their properties rise in value, defended the city's 
legal right to enter the transportation field. They pointed to mu­
nicipal ownership of park, water, harborfront, and dock systems 
in support of a similar investment in subways. During the same 
period labor leaders formed their own rapid transit committee and 
initiated a petition drive in favor of a municipal subway. Forty-
seven labor organizations, as well as George and Samuel Gompers, 
backed the proposal of the social reformer Charles Stover that the 
"new rapid transit system be built BY THE PEOPLE AND FOR 
THE PEOPLE." The proposal included a crucial provision that 
the subway "shall be operated by and at the expense of the city."105 
While all parties agreed the city should finance the construction of 
the subway system, the questions of municipal operation and user 
fees remained open. 
In 1894 a new rapid transit bill, largely the work of Hewitt, 
passed the state legislature and created a new rapid transit com­
mission with the power to construct a subway with municipal 
funds. In light of the public scandal over the Brooklyn Bridge 
contracts and the widespread distrust of both private economic 
interests and public officials that he shared, Hewitt had warned 
against simply lending the city's credit to private investors who 
might then bleed the treasury.106 He also vehemently opposed 
handing the rapid transit project over to elected officials; "Spare 
us that horror!" he pleaded in 1894.107 The new commission re­
flected his belief that the city's leading men acting for and through 
the municipality could accomplish this great public work. Unlike 
previous commissions composed largely of elected officials and 
mayoral appointees, the 1894 commission by law consisted of the 
mayor, the comptroller, the president of the chamber of com­
merce, and five leading businessmen. The commission also en­
joyed the power to fill any vacancies that occurred.108 
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The new commission insulated rapid transit planning from la-
bor's demand for a municipal subsidy. Before 1894 business inter­
ests were careful not to ignore working-class concerns. A "cheap, 
well-located system of rapid transit would do much to relieve the 
congestion of the slums," the Record and Guide editorialized, and 
would allow "poor people to live in a small house rather than in a 
small part of a big house." Tempering its enthusiasm for a profit­
able municipally operated system, the Record and Guide had agreed 
that "even should dividends be earned, it would be more profit­
able for the city to spend the excess in betterments and . .  . in 
reduction of the fare than to put it in the treasury." Civic leaders 
echoed those same points.109 Despite the objections of Hewitt and 
others who saw it as "anarchical," labor had secured a provision 
in the 1894 bill providing for a referendum on municipal opera­
tion, apparently establishing the principle of public participation 
in transit planning.110 But labor's failure to win representation on 
the new commission limited the applicability of that principle and 
left rapid transit planning in the hands of the city's business elite.111 
Nevertheless, New Yorkers watched the work of the new com­
mission with great expectations. The East River, one journalist 
explained, had been "cramping the flow of the human tides be­
tween workshop and bedroom into one narrow stream" across the 
Brooklyn Bridge. New rapid transit facilities, he added, would 
facilitate the realization of the Pennsylvania Railroad's long-term 
plan for the great development of Long Island, "not only as a truck 
garden for the great city, but as a residential suburb."112 Under the 
supervision of the rapid transit commissioners, another journalist 
reported, "private enterprise has planned and is executing works 
of great magnitude." The new subways and the construction at 
public expense of a tunnel under the East River for the exclusive 
use of the Long Island Railroad (owned by the Pennsylvania Rail­
road) were "enabling New Yorkers to devote Manhattan Island 
almost entirely to business." Other benefits were expected as well. 
With improved transit "country residences," the journalist added, 
"will become the privilege of the poor." Rapid transit would mean 
"that the men with the dinner-pail, as well as the men with the 
check book" could enjoy suburban living and return refreshed "to 
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their work each morning to renew the struggle for existence . . . 
in the most intense city in the world." U3 Yet rapid transit not only 
failed to realize those social benefits, but it seemed to exacerbate 
the problem of congestion. By 1907 the crush of traffic at the 
Brooklyn Bridge had made it what one journalist called "a place 
of discontent." Still, the public grasped desperately at every new 
rapid transit proposal even when it meant turning planning power 
entirely over to private interests.114 
Two years earlier in 1905, a group of commercial and industrial 
leaders in Brooklyn had formed the Citizen's Central Committee 
to promote the construction of more bridges and tunnels. Under 
the leadership of the future city planner Edward Bassett, the com­
mittee supported Bassett's boyhood friend Charles Hughes for 
governor. One of the first acts of Governor Hughes was to create 
a new and extraordinarily powerful public service commission. 
The new commission had no official connection to the city gov­
ernment or its electorate except the power to pay its bills with 
municipal funds. The municipal reformer Henry Bruere termed it 
"absolutely irresponsible to the community whose interest it is 
intended to conserve." The new commission, Bruere continued, 
made "community control over its utilities seem remote" and thus 
further insulated transit planning from the demand for municipal 
ownership and operation.115 Transit corporations recognized the 
commission was their "best defense against dangerous legisla­
tion," one journalist reported, and accepted it "graciously."116 By 
1917 the public service commission had secured the construction 
of new railroad tunnels under the East and Hudson rivers, increased 
trolley service over the Brooklyn and Williamsburg bridges, com­
pletion of the new Manhattan and Queensborough bridges, and a 
doubling of the rapid transit system to more than six hundred 
miles.117 
Still the new subway system did not realize the great social 
benefits that had once been associated with it. In order to secure 
the extraordinary expansion of transit facilities, the public service 
commission had assured "the operating companies a continuation 
of large profits and placed the burden of carrying deficits from 
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operation upon the city," explained an early historian of rapid 
transit.118 Bassett had insisted on a subway "that would allow the 
riders to pay the expense of operation, interest and amortization" 
and had opposed proposals "to build on a large scale, placing part 
of the future burden on the taxpayers."119 The new subways did 
prove an immediate boon to propertied interests and to the busi­
ness development of Greater New York. 
But the new subways also seemed to confirm the fears of the 
architect and housing reformer Henry Wright that too little atten­
tion had been paid to transit's relation to social problems. At the 
very least, he suggested, fares must be "sufficiently low to induce 
the workingman to move to outlying sections." Raising the issue 
of a municipal subsidy, Wright argued that "operating costs are 
secondary to acceptable living conditions" and urged city officials 
to recognize transit as a legitimate "municipal function."120 At 
least one public service commissioner, Milo Maltbie, was also 
concerned that the demands of social reform had been ignored. 
Addressing the 1913 national conference on city planning, Maltbie 
warned that without careful planning rapid transit would lead only 
to an extension of the tenement districts. Without some control 
over realty values, it would be impossible, he explained, "to have 
subways unless at the same time they are content to have conges-
tion—tenement houses, solidly built blocks and not separate 
dwellings."121 But the dominant role of private interests in trans­
portation planning made it difficult if not impossible to realize 
rapid transit's public promise. 
Insulating transit planning from public debate and political con­
flicts, New York elites had dramatically extended the city's trans­
portation facilities. But at the same time they had minimized its 
potential to inject the suburbanization process with a greater mea­
sure of social justice. Transit improvements unquestionably accel­
erated suburban development, but the benefits of suburban devel­
opment would continue to be unequally shared. More than any 
other issue, rapid transit raised questions about the arrangement 
and uses of urban space. The answers to those questions consti­
tuted a dividing line between the public aspirations of various 
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groups of reformers and the reality of what private development 
would create in the city. In the Progressive Era the rapid transit 
debate served as the battleground where those committed to the 
republican vision of what the American city might be confronted 
the new urban realists who pragmatically accepted what the new 
metropolitan order had to offer. As a result of that debate, a new 
urban discipline would emerge, a new boundary line between the 
public and private cities that defined both the responsibilities of 
municipal government and the limits of urban reform. 
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Social Efficiency and the New Urban Discipline 
Humanity demands that men should have sunlight, fresh 
air, the sight of grass and trees. It demands these things 
for the man himself, and it demands them still more 
urgently for his wife and children. No child has a fair 
chance in the world who is condemned to grow up in 
the dirt and confinement, the dreariness, ugliness and 
vice of the poorer quarters of a great city. It is impos­
sible to think with patience of any future condition of 
things in which such a childhood shall fall to the lot 
of any large part of the human race. Whatever struggles 
manhood must endure, childhood should have room and 
opportunity for healthy moral and physical growth. Fair 
play and the welfare of the human race alike demand it. 
There is, then, a permanent conflict between the needs 
of industry and the needs of humanity. Industry says men 
must aggregate. Humanity says they must not, or if 
they must, let it be only during working hours and let 
the necessity not extend to their wives and children. It 
is the office of the city railways to reconcile these conflicting 
requirements [emphasis in original]. 
Charles H. Cooley, 1894 
In the Progressive Era a series 
of questions surrounding public transportation, from municipal 
ownership and fare structures to the unionization of transit work­
ers, proved to be the most explosive issues facing municipal poli­
ticians. The republican ideal of balancing the advantages of urban 
life with those of rural life had generated a widespread and intense 
interest in rapid transit; as early as the 1840s journalists had lauded 
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the "levelling and democratic Omnibus" and its essential "repub­
licanism." But by the turn of the century, at least in part due to 
Henry George's dream of relocating inner city populations in gar­
den cities, Americans saw rapid transit as nothing less than a pana­
cea for a wide range of urban problems. Cooley's assertion that 
rapid transit would do nothing less than resolve the conflicting 
demands of industry and humanity reflected the unrealistic hopes 
Americans attached to rapid transit in the 1890s.1 
In 1892 Carroll Wright, U.S. commissioner of labor, argued 
that "as municipal governments undertake to solve the problems 
that are pressing upon them," they looked to rapid transit to "dis­
tribute the population of congested districts through country dis­
tricts." Cheap, rapid transit was an "ethical consideration" and a 
key to "the improvement of the condition of the masses." Regard­
ing municipal ownership Wright believed that if "the spirit of 
altruism . . . among our millionaires" did not provide rapid tran­
sit, then the people would "insist upon a public solution of the 
question."2 In 1898 Adna Weber warned that Americans would 
not "become reconciled to the idea of bringing up their children 
in hot dusty, germ-producing tenements and streets. But a solu­
tion of the problem is now in sight, the suburb unites the advan­
tages of city and country. . . . More rapid transit is urgently 
needed for metropolitan populations and is the only solution of 
their problem." Pointing to England's 1883 Cheap Trains Act and 
its $2 million annual subsidy, Weber suggested the need for a 
similar subsidy. Social reformers, settlement workers, and labor 
unions joined in the chorus recommending rapid transit as a solu­
tion to urban problems.3 
The hopes associated with rapid transit were exaggerated. Such 
factors as racial and ethnic prejudice, the cost of new housing, and 
habit vitiated rapid transit's capacity to disperse population.4 So 
too did the demands of profitability. Elevated and underground 
rapid transit facilities opened new middle-class residential dis­
tricts, but to the extent that they dispersed population they under­
mined their own profitability. Private control of transit went hand 
in hand with the concentration of population simply because, in the 
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transit magnate Charles Yerkes's unfortunate phrase, "the strap­
hangers pay the dividends."5 
But cheap rapid transit nevertheless represented a potentially 
important social reform in metropolitan America. Even without 
dispersing population, rapid transit widened employment oppor­
tunities which, in turn, enabled families to afford better housing. 
The nationwide movement for three-cent fares or special work-
ingmen's tickets enlisted the support of labor organizations and 
reflected the importance of public transit to working families.6 If 
rapid transit systems were to be publically owned and operated, 
then they potentially promised even greater benefits. Public fran­
chises, as both George and a number of social reformers he had 
influenced argued, were a form of socially created wealth that 
grew with the community. If a transit system was to be run on a 
profitable basis, they insisted, the profits rightfully belonged to the 
community. The capitalized value of public franchises, Frederic 
Howe argued, "would adorn the city with school houses, parks, 
and playgrounds; it would pave streets, build sewers, and beautify 
the city with works of art."7 Urban experts such as Wright and 
Weber suggested that public ownership would bring lower fares 
and equal access to the suburban periphery.8 
Public control of rapid transit might also have provided an im­
portant tool for directing the city's growth and for encouraging 
greater public participation in municipal affairs. A municipal sub­
sidy would have overcome the contradiction between the demands 
of profitability and the desire to disperse population and might 
have enabled urban governments to ease congestion. Moreover, 
municipal ownership of public utilities that touched the average 
citizen on a daily basis, Howe argued, would "convert every citi­
zen into an effective critic" and "create a public sense, a social 
conscience, a belief in the city and an interest in it." Voter turn­
out for referenda on municipal ownership and other transit issues 
reflected public interest in transit planning. In 1904 more than 
170,000 Chicago voters participated in a referendum on municipal 
ownership. Howe argued, "It is this democratic flavor of reform 
in Chicago that makes for its permanence."9 
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Yet relatively little came of the grand hopes associated with 
rapid transit. Indeed, only a few cities actually built rapid transit 
systems and few of these were municipally owned and operated. 
The proponents of municipal ownership, who rarely advocated a 
municipal subsidy for mass transit and encouraged the belief that 
municipal ownership could simultaneously lower taxes and fares 
while dispersing population, were themselves partly to blame. 
"Instead of dealing with public ownership as a necessary addition 
to the responsibilities of city government," advocates of municipal 
ownership too often "described it as something of a free ride," as 
Paul Barrett has said of Chicago's Edward Dunne. The rise of pro­
fessional city planning in the twentieth century failed to revive 
interest in rapid transit; if anything professional planners contrib­
uted to its demise. Instead, the dream of breaking up the slums 
and dispersing urban population once attached to public transit 
became associated with the private automobile.10 
Barrett has done more than anyone to clarify how that hap­
pened. Paradoxically, Americans believed that public transporta­
tion should be provided by regulated private enterprise, while pri­
vate transportation in the form of the automobile deserved (and in 
fact benefited from) lavish public subsidies. The frequent condem­
nation of the huge profits of greedy transit entrepreneurs, al­
though not without justification, reinforced the belief that mass 
transit could and should be profitable even as it dispersed popula-
tion.11 While mass transit suffered from constant political contro­
versy, the automobile, James Flink has suggested, seemed "an es­
pecially attractive reform to Americans because it did not involve 
collective political action."12 The American preference for indi­
vidualistic and technological solutions to social problems as op­
posed to those that were collective and political undermined sup­
port for rapid transit. But the demise of rapid transit also involved 
the development of the realistic approach to urban problems dur­
ing the Progressive Era. 
Social reformers who advocated rapid transit perpetuated the 
republican effort to use municipal government as a vehicle for 
transforming the city in the interest of the commonwealth. By the 
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end of the Progressive Era, however, a new set of realistic reform­
ers had wrested the reform mantle from the republicans. Though 
responding in part to the public aspirations kindled by the repub­
licans, the realists charged municipal government with a different 
responsibility. "Social efficiency," a phrase that reflected an im­
portant shift in urban thought, became the watchword of the re­
alistic reformers. Uniting the image of the well-organized corpo­
ration and the well-managed factory with the growing prestige of 
social science and social engineering, the drive for social efficiency 
implicated municipal government in the effort to create an urban 
environment conducive to maximizing production and accumu­
lating capital. 
Creating such an environment entailed not only an efficient eco­
nomic infrastructure but at least a measure of social harmony. By 
securing needed physical improvements and protecting the con-
sumer's interest in a bevy of urban utilities and services, reformers 
would secure social efficiency. The logic of social efficiency thus 
also demanded an enhanced role in municipal governance for a 
variety of professionally trained experts at the expense of the ma­
chine politician and the ignorant voter.13 Despite its great cost, 
rapid transit could be (and in New York was) defended as a nec­
essary infrastructural improvement and an important public ser­
vice. It was as an impediment to the other elements of social effi­
ciency that its fate was sealed. As a source of graft and as a 
patronage mill, it provided too many opportunities for the corrupt 
and incompetent politician. More importantly, advocates of rapid 
transit seemed intent on using it to raise divisive economic ques­
tions. Chicago alderman William Dever suggested that rapid tran­
sit involved nothing less than "the more equal distribution of the 
great wealth of this country."14 Rousing the masses, exacerbating 
class tensions, and drowning out the rational logic of the expert, 
the rapid transit debate frustrated the drive for social efficiency. 
Further burdened with frequent labor controversies, rapid transit 
seemed to create more problems than it solved. 
The realists' rejection of rapid transit was part of the develop­
ment of the new urban discipline. A set of principles and practices 
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that defined both the responsibilities of municipal government and 
the limits of urban reform, the new urban discipline represented 
the realistic reformers' program for dealing with the physical and 
social problems of the metropolis. While some realists were em­
phatic about keeping costs low, most were willing to support 
reforms that promoted economic and social efficiency; and mu­
nicipal expenditures generally increased under their tenure.15 But 
realists consistently shunned reforms that raised divisive economic 
questions or threatened social harmony.16 Their program would 
serve as the municipal wing of a national effort to stabilize, ratio­
nalize, and legitimate the corporate order.17 
Before the realists could supplant the republicans, however, 
they had to offer some alternative to rapid transit and the tremen­
dous hopes it raised. As an integral part of the new urban disci­
pline, city planning represented the realists' response to the prob­
lem. City planning worked within the existing political economy 
not only to make the metropolis more efficient but also ideally to 
ameliorate its social problems and to promote social harmony. At 
the First National Conference on City Planning, the realtor Henry 
Morgenthau called on planners to attack congestion, which he de­
scribed as "an evil that breeds physical diseases, moral depravity, 
discontent, and socialism.''18 At the same conference the landscape 
architect Robert Pope emphasized the importance of city planning 
in "lessening class strain, of ameliorating the struggle between la­
bor and capital."19 Improved sanitation and sewerage, better street 
paving, and traffic regulations would improve public health and 
safety and ease congestion. Above all exclusionary zoning, essen­
tially a system of building restrictions, promised to improve resi­
dential conditions and even, the most optimistic predicted, to de­
populate the tenement districts. Best of all, in the realists' view, 
city planning would do all that without raising troublesome ques­
tions about the urban political economy.20 Thus the journey from 
rapid transit to city planning illuminates a larger transformation 
of urban politics around the turn of the century, a transformation 
based on a changing perception of the city itself. 
FROM RAPID TRANSIT TO CITY PLANNING 
TH E MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION AND THE CITY TRENCHES 
In proposing the confiscation of the rental value of land and the 
use of that social wealth in the interest of the commonwealth, 
George and the United Labor party had challenged the contempo­
rary perception of municipal government and of the city. Drawing 
on an artisanal politics that had been common in the late eigh­
teenth century, George and the ULP treated the city as a republican 
commonwealth. In the eighteenth century the municipal corpora­
tion, threatened by scarcity and prodded by the commonwealth 
ideal (stressing the government's responsibility to promote the 
common good) and the mutualist and producerist traditions of the 
crafts, had carefully regulated the local economy in the interests of 
economic justice.21 Although increasingly marginal, that practice 
had continued into the nineteenth century. 
By 1825, however, municipal governments had begun to focus 
less on controlling commerce, prices, and crafts than on enhancing 
the health, safety, and convenience of the urban environment. The 
shift in municipal functions occurred for a variety of reasons. In 
part, municipal officials simply responded to a growing demand 
for clean water, basic sanitation, fire and police protection, and 
other public goods. At the same time a declining threat of eco­
nomic scarcity and the liberal faith in the invisible hand of the 
market made regulation seem unnecessary and unwise; if munici­
pal government was to have any economic function at all, it would 
be to facilitate individual initiative rather than to regulate in the 
public's interest. The development of political democracy simul­
taneously introduced residence, property, and age, rather than 
membership in a guild or other agency of the economic commu­
nity, as the new criteria for citizenship. With broader political par­
ticipation and increasing partisan affiliation, residential proximity 
rather than common economic interests appeared to be the basis 
of the urban community.22 
The rise of the political machine coincided with, reflected, and 
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reinforced the new conception of municipal politics. The machine 
emerged just as urbanites began to view the city as a residential, 
as opposed to an economic, community; and the machines orga­
nized voters on a residential basis.23 As cities spent increasing 
amounts in providing police, fire, and health protection, building 
schools and streets, and providing charity and other social ser­
vices, the municipal revolution placed substantial economic re­
sources (jobs, contracts, and services) in the hands of local officials 
who used those resources to organize their machines. But the rise 
of the machine and the changing perception of municipal politics 
were also closely linked to the emergence of industrial conflict.24 
Industrialization eroded both the commonwealth ideal and the 
traditions of the crafts upon which the perception of the city as an 
economic community had been based. Amy Bridges writes: 
In 1828, New York's artisans believed in the interdependence of 
economic pursuits, that there was a concrete and identifiable 
common good, and that government's proper concerns included 
facilitating prosperity by assisting economic development. By 
the election of Lincoln, few in the city dared claim that the inter­
ests of capital and labor were the same, and few citizens believed 
that any set of government policies could ensure prosperity and 
comfort. 
Thus the municipal revolution served to remove divisive eco­
nomic questions from urban politics and provided the machine 
with an arena in which the conflict between capital and labor 
might be accommodated.25 Rather than organizing workers on 
the basis of common economic interests, the machine engaged 
workers as residents of neighborhoods in a competition for an ex­
panding array of public goods and services.26 
Standing between labor and capital, the machine channeled class 
conflict into what Ira Katznelson has called a system of "city 
trenches" that prevented a direct confrontation between antago­
nistic economic groups. When George and the ULP threatened the 
system of city trenches, good-government reformers temporarily 
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shelved their condemnation of corrupt and grafting politicians and 
stood with the machine in defense of the city trenches. Submerg­
ing his differences with Tammany, Abram Hewitt accepted the ma-
chine's nomination in order to defeat the attempt "to organize one 
class of our citizens against all other classes. . . . The idea which 
underlies this movement," he protested, "is at war with the fun­
damental principles upon which our government was organized 
and rests."27 In Cincinnati a "Republican-Democratic-Capitalist" 
alliance condemned the ULP leaders as foreign rabble rousers 
"without any understanding of our institutions." A similar fusion 
of machine and reform forces across party lines in Chicago con­
demned the ULP as "anarchists and cutthroats."28 Those coali­
tions defeated the ULP but they were not able to preserve the 
system of city trenches intact. 
George had hoped to inaugurate a new era in American politics 
and to inject his principles of political economy into urban poli­
tics. The new system of urban politics that emerged in the Progres­
sive Era was certainly not what he had envisioned. But George 
and the ULP had had an important impact on urban politics.29 
Their most important legacy was a group of social reformers who 
united the tactics of machine politics with the strategy of the 
ULP.30 Such social reformers as Detroit's Pingree, Cleveland's 
Johnson and Howe, Toledo's Jones and Whitlock, Cincinnati's 
Bigelow, and New York's Wagner mobilized the voting power of 
the urban masses, encouraged their active participation in mu­
nicipal affairs, and attempted to redistribute economic and politi­
cal power in their cities. Rapid transit and municipal ownership 
served as their most important organizing issues. 
MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP AND THE CITY REPUBLIC 
Mayor of Detroit during the 1890s Hazen Pinegree was among 
the first and more imaginative of the social reformers. In his fight 
with Detroit's transit corporations for a three-cent fare, Pingree 
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mobilized mass support by exposing bribes paid to corrupt alder­
men, organizing boycotts, encouraging petition drives, and even 
personally directing what was essentially a three-day riot against 
the city's street railways. Similar events occurred in other cities. 
"For the greater part of nine years, Cleveland was an armed 
camp," wrote Frederic Howe of Tom Johnson's struggle with 
the street railways. "There was but one line of division."31 The 
debate over rapid transit and municipal ownership proved both 
so explosive and such an effective organizing tool because it 
raised fundamental questions about the political economy of the 
metropolis. 
The 1898 Chicago municipal elections provide one example of 
the issue's impact. When the transit magnate Charles Yerkes tried 
to secure a fifty-year extension of his franchises with the help of 
corrupt councilmen and state legislators, Mayor Carter Harrison 
mobilized his constituency against the scheme. When Harrison 
promised to secure 10 percent of gross receipts for the city as a 
way to lower property taxes, former governor John Altgeld joined 
the fray to accuse Harrison of ignoring the needs of the poor and 
favoring wealthy taxpayers. Recommending municipal ownership 
and operation of the street cars with a four-cent fare, Altgeld 
broadened the terms of the debate. In turn Harrison took his case 
to the people in a volatile series of neighborhood debates with 
local aldermen. When the election went against Yerkes, the in­
transigent magnate tried to force his new franchises through the 
lame-duck council. Citizens inflamed by the rhetoric of the recent 
campaign held protest meetings, staged angry marches, and sur­
rounded city hall on the night of the crucial vote, carrying nooses 
and guns and threatening to hang any aldermen who voted for 
Yerkes's franchises. Harrison recalled "I seriously doubt whether 
any American community has ever been as completely aroused on 
an economic issue as was Chicago in those days."32 
The rapid transit debate, social reformers found, led naturally 
to larger issues, especially the connection between realty values 
and the housing problem, the benefits of the single tax, and the 
plausibility of the garden city ideal. In a 1904 article ostensibly 
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about the decentralization of industry, Adna Weber stumbled upon 
these issues. "We have learned that the packing of human beings 
into tenement barracks devoid of light and air is not due to the 
necessity of any natural law, but to the greed of man. The city, 
even the largest city, can now be made as healthful as the country, 
because cheap rapid transit enables city workers to live many miles 
away from their work-places." The unrealized potential of rapid 
transit, Weber argued, demanded "a strict control of franchise 
privileges by the public authorities."33 Weber went on to illustrate 
the persistent association of rapid transit with the single tax. Com­
menting on Ebenezer Howard's garden city experiment, Weber 
noted that "the title to the land is transferred to the whole com­
munity, the aim thus being to preserve to the city as a whole the 
unearned increment due to the mere growth of the city." If the 
experiment succeeded in "abolishing ground-rents and appropri­
ating to the communal treasury the increase in land values," he 
concluded, "it would open unlimited possibilities for the recon­
struction of urban centers."34 Coming from as respectable a figure 
as Weber, such statements suggested why banks, trust companies, 
and other powerful economic institutions with vested interests in 
metropolitan realty values vehemently opposed republican sup­
porters of municipal ownership such as Tom Johnson.35 But they 
also reveal why the transit debate was central to the strategy of the 
social reformers. Rapid transit and municipal ownership remained 
both prominent and volatile issues because they were so inextri­
cably linked to questions about the impact of economic and po­
litical power on urban life. 
Social reformers found referenda on municipal ownership and 
other transit issues an effective way of promoting working-class 
participation in municipal affairs. New York's Robert Wagner re­
called that his fight for a five-cent fare to Coney Island "readily 
commended the support of the urban masses" and quickly became 
the "most discussed topic in the metropolis."36 Cleveland's John­
son seemed to thrive on the controversy surrounding the transit 
issue. A long-time transit entrepreneur himself, Johnson seemed 
vulnerable to popular attack. Howe recalled: 
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Frequently his meetings were on the verge of riot; in the east end 
where feeling was most vindictive and but a handful of his 
friends would be present he would stand on the edge of a jeering, 
sometimes a hissing crowd that packed the tent far out to the 
street lines, smilingly leaning on the edge of the table until the 
uproar quieted. Then he would frequently win the meeting by a 
simple story or sweet appeal . .  . He seemed to court this kind 
of exposure to attack. 
Johnson directed the anger less on the corrupt alderman than on the 
forces that corrupted the alderman and especially on "the kind of 
big business that deals in and profits from public service grants and 
taxation injustices." Wagner, Harrison, Pingree, Johnson, Howe, 
Jones, Whitlock, and Bigelow all used transit issues to mobilize 
working-class constituencies and to focus attention on questions 
of power.37 
The transit issue provided social reformers a base from which 
to alter the distribution of political and economic power in the 
city. In his study of the evolution of municipal functions, Milo 
Maltbie argued that the non-taxpaying citizen "recognizes that 
there are certain limits to his demands for greater municipal ac­
tivity," but social reformers worked hard to extend the activities 
of municipal government to the benefit of their poorer constitu-
ents.38 Borrowing money for poor relief, sponsoring municipal 
gardens, opposing wage cuts for municipal workers, financing 
large public works projects while canceling orders for labor-saving 
machinery, pressuring private utilities to launch new projects and 
hire new workers, and threatening to erect a municipal bakery 
unless bread prices were lowered, Detroit's Pingree administration 
developed a program of "municipal stewardship" that broadened 
the municipal government's social responsibility.39 
Elsewhere social reformers and urban liberals extended the ef­
fort to redistribute economic and political power by strengthening 
unions, regulating business, and creating a more equitable system 
of taxation. Pingree had led the way in trying to shift a greater 
proportion of the city's tax burden onto large corporations and 
realty interests.40 Urban liberals secured lower utility rates, shorter 
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hours and better wages for city workers, and a variety of services 
from education and public housing to improved sanitation and un­
employment relief for their working-class constituents.41 From 
their electoral bases in the cities, social reformers and urban liberals 
also advocated broad-based state and national reform programs, 
addressing inequities in both the workplace and the living space.42 
Thus the rapid transit and municipal ownership issues not only 
gave rise to movements that expanded the agenda of municipal gov­
ernment into the realm of political economy, but they generated 
an attack on economic inequality on the state and national level. 
It was Frederic Howe who articulated the theory of municipal 
governance that underlay those efforts by stressing "industrial de­
mocracy" as the key to municipal reform.43 City building, he ar­
gued, involved far more than the paving of streets and the laying 
of sewers. It involved the development of "a city-consciousness, 
that instinct which is willingness to struggle for the common 
weal, and suffer for the common woe,—then, and not until then 
does the city spring into life." The municipal ownership of public 
utilities, Howe insisted, was the key to the creation of that city-
consciousness.44 Arguing that the city was potentially the most 
democratic of our political units, Howe called for "a new sort of 
sovereignty" in the form of a "city republic." The key element of 
this new sovereignty would be the authorization of "the people of 
a city to call a constitutional convention, made up of delegates 
from the several wards, with power to adopt, alter, or amend the 
fundamental laws of the community; to determine what powers 
may be exercised, as well as the means of raising and expending 
revenue." Thus Howe saw municipal government as the basis for 
a revitalized and more democratic republic. Howe quite con­
sciously built on George's efforts.45 "If we have gained nothing 
else," George had announced after the 1886 mayoral election, "we 
have given the powers that be a very sincere respect for the work-
ing-man's vote."46 Indeed, George and the ULP had helped to turn 
the working-class vote into a potent force in municipal politics, 
one that generated new strategies and new initiatives in urban poli­
tics among elite reformers. 
95 
FROM RAPID TRANSIT TO CITY PLANNING 
TH E MORAL EQUIVALENT OF THE MACHINE 
The efforts of George and the ULP and of the social reformers 
to revive the perception of the city as a republican commonwealth 
did not ultimately succeed. But neither did the competing view 
of the city as a single, cohesive residential community survive in­
tact the political upheavals of the period. Rapid spatial expansion 
and the functional segregation that accompanied it were creating a 
network of discrete neighborhoods within the metropolis. While 
interdependent, those neighborhoods were divided not only by 
geography but also by social and economic differences that gave 
to each a distinct set of needs, functions, and attitudes. As neigh­
borhood divisions increasingly paralleled social and economic ones, 
the segregation of rich and poor not only threatened the natural 
bonds of the social order and spontaneous forms of social control, 
but also the artificial political accommodations defended by the 
machine, the system of city trenches.47 Hence social reformers and 
urban liberals had been able to use the machine's own tactics to 
storm those city trenches. 
But even before that happened, elite reformers, who had once 
grudgingly accepted machine politics as necessary to social order, 
began to see the machine as a potential threat. Two years after 
George's mayoralty campaign, the political scientist Frank Good-
now traced New York's political crisis to the process whereby the 
"middle class, which had thus far controlled the municipal gov­
ernment, were displaced by an ignorant proletariat."48 Some re­
formers called for mass disenfranchisement or radical structural 
changes to minimize working-class influence.49 Those drastic so­
lutions to urban problems, however, proved unacceptable to much 
of the American public and even to many elite reformers. Slowly, 
a less drastic and more influential approach to municipal reform, 
one that saw the city as an interconnected organism and the central 
business district (rich with business and professional talent) as its 
brains, began to emerge. 
In a series of speeches and articles between 1887 and 1892, the 
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Brooklyn reformer Seth Low outlined the new approach. Low ad­
dressed two closely related questions: "First, what ought a city 
undertake to do?" and second, "what form of organization" ought 
municipal government take? In answering the first question, Low 
pointed out "that a city has not a single attribute of sovereignty." 
He flatly rejected the republican position in arguing that rather 
than a political commonwealth, the municipal government was 
simply a business corporation supplying certain public services. 
Municipal politics concerned only the "best means of conducting 
this business" rather than the larger issue of "the liberties of the 
people."50 But neither did Low accept the view of the structural 
reformers who blamed everything on the ignorant or corrupt 
voter. Low defended universal manhood suffrage because "it 
Americanizes our foreign-born citizens more rapidly than any 
other system possibly could."51 In a strange amalgam of the con­
cerns of the structural reformers and the republican vision, Low 
explored the role municipal government might play as an agency 
of both social control and social justice. 
As befit a future president of the National Civic Federation, an 
agency dedicated to mediating the labor-capital conflict and stabi­
lizing the corporate order, Low saw a threat to American civiliza­
tion in the rising level of urban conflict. Anticipating the new ur­
ban discipline, Low argued that the American city faced a choice 
between social efficiency and obsolescence.52 The federal system of 
divided authority and checks and balances, he argued, should not 
have been extended to municipal government. Such procedures 
paralyzed bureaucratic efficiency and allowed machine politicians 
and backroom bosses to control municipal affairs without accept­
ing responsibility. He argued that the representative legislature in 
the city should really be seen as "a board of directors." Authority 
and hence responsibility should be centralized in the mayor, he 
added, as the chief executive officer of the city.53 
Such reforms promised great results. "If we could only have 
more confidence in our city governments," he told a group of 
Philadelphia reformers, "how much more they might do for us 
than now they do. Think of what has been done in some of the 
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best cities of Europe; bad neighborhoods have been renovated 
through the action of the authorities; unwholesome buildings have 
given way to open spaces and small parks; public baths have been 
erected and maintained for the public benefit." Low even raised 
the issue of the municipal ownership of public utilities but quickly 
added that "few American cities have manifested so great compe­
tency in other directions as to justify a very strong inference that 
they would administer successfully business of this kind." He 
deeply regretted that such incompetence prevented the assumption 
of additional responsibilities. "Losses of this character fall almost 
entirely on the poor," he argued.54 Here was the crux: if controlled 
and administered by the right men according to business princi­
ples, municipal government could become a powerful force for 
social harmony and economic development.55 
The program of municipal reform paralleled in many ways the 
pattern of machine politics. Rejecting mass disenfranchisement, 
Low recognized a need to develop neighborhood organizations 
similar to the machine s.56 Municipal reform had failed in the past, 
Low's associate Carl Schurz explained, because reformers lost 
"contact with the masses of the people, while the representatives 
and agents of Tammany Hall remained constantly among the 
classes of population which furnish the most votes."57 By the 
1890s social settlements like New York's University Settlement, 
which Low actively supported, had begun to create neighborhood 
organizations rivaling those of the machine's.58 Settlement leaders 
like Boston's Robert Woods pledged to remain "in natural, con­
tinuous association with the humblest citizens." "Neighborliness 
is at the basis of even bad politics," Woods professed, "and sound 
government can be built on no other foundation." Developing an 
"accurate and minute familiarity with the local pattern of streets, 
houses, and institutions," he concluded, the settlements would de­
velop "the same exhaustive acquaintance and knowledge of per­
sonal minutia" as the machine.59 
Although many settlement leaders appreciated the positive fea­
tures of the machine, they still saw it as a major obstacle to more 
important reforms. The local alderman understood the poor and 
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their problems, Jane Addams admitted, "better than the big guns 
who are always talking about civil service and reform." James 
Reynolds of New York's University Settlement also recognized 
why the poor looked more to the ward leader than to "the moral 
leaders of standing, whose abodes are remote from them." But the 
machine's "municipal program was limited," Reynolds charged, 
and lacking in "intelligent purpose and . . . moral ideas." The 
"positive evils of corrupt government . . . fall heaviest upon the 
poorest," Addams wrote in echoing a point made by both Low 
and Reynolds. A purified government could reverse that equation 
and do a great deal for the poor. "Go into politics. Every force 
that believes in making righteousness pervasive should do the 
same," Reynolds implored his colleagues. "Political reform is the 
great moral opportunity of our day, and let us be wise enough to 
seize it." The settlements' view of municipal reform as essentially 
a moral problem complemented the realists' efforts to de-empha-
size economic issues.60 
In alliance with the realists, settlement leaders would take over 
the machine's role in mediating class conflict. The Haymarket ex­
plosion and its political repercussions had alerted Woods to the 
dangerous development of a class system "based predominantly 
on income." As spearheads of reform, settlement leaders would 
build up "the state at the precise point of its greatest disintegra­
tion," the working-class neighborhood.61 A rising level of class 
conflict worried Jane Addams also. Although she supported the 
labor movement, she envisioned it in moral terms and criticized 
labor leaders for turning it into an adversarial agency and for being 
"apathetic to higher motives." When "class interest becomes the 
governing and motive power," she warned, "the settlement can 
logically be of no value to either side."62 Admiring Addams's ef­
fort to mediate between "the suburb and the city center," Graham 
Taylor, the founder of the Chicago Commons settlement, hoped 
that the settlements would "stand in between" organized capital 
and organized labor "before the lines of difference became rigidly 
set for conflict."63 
The settlements also borrowed the machine's strategy of engag­
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ing neighborhood constituencies in a competition for public goods 
and services. Settlement leaders came to recognize, as Woods put 
it, that the machine and the boss's "ever-present philanthropy" 
met "important and legitimate needs and yearnings."64 But mu­
nicipal reformers could provide those services more efficiently and 
without the corruption and immorality associated with the ma­
chine. Woods urged his neighbors to "come together as consum­
ers" to procure the "professional services they need."65 Replacing 
"the variety of casual services" that the machine offered in "vol­
untary but calculating ways" with similar services dispensed by 
"municipal and philanthropic institutions with high professional 
standards," the settlements would provide a moral equivalent of 
the machine.66 
The actual political power of the settlements in the neighbor­
hoods, however, rarely matched their rhetoric. Their would-be 
constituents often saw the settlements as a "bunch of people plan­
ning for us and deciding what is good for us without consulting 
us."67 In a series of electoral contests in the 1890s, settlement can­
didates, Woods admitted, "far from being welcomed, were scorned 
or resented." The settlements' program for municipal govern­
ment, "taking thought for its bookkeeping, safeguarding its fi­
nances, and enhancing its administrative efficiency," he lamented, 
made "but a sorry appeal" among their neighbors.68 Addams won­
dered, "What headway can the notion of civic purity, of honesty 
of administration make against this big manifestation of human 
friendliness, this stalking survival of village kindness?"69 Addams 
recognized that the poor did not lack moral and ethical standards, 
but that they had to "balance their opinions by their living" and 
the machine was often the only thing standing between them 
and destitution.70 Woods understood that the poor dreamed of "a 
broadly and humanly serviceable city, powerful, generous, con­
siderate" and the machine, despite its often cynical motivations, 
came closest to that ideal.71 
In his own neighborhood Woods elected to cooperate with the 
"Honorable Jim" Donovan, a machine politician dedicated to so­
cial reform. But elsewhere the failure to defeat corrupt aldermen 
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convinced the settlements of the need, Woods recalled, to go 
"over the heads of both machine and electorate" to secure munici­
pal reform.72 Fortunately, the electoral campaigns, Addams noted, 
had created "a sense of identification with public-spirited men 
throughout the city who contributed time and money."73 The al­
liance between commercial and industrial leaders and the settle­
ments strengthened with the turn of the century.74 The settlements 
brought to the alliance "a rival body of knowledge capable of be­
ing used to create a political substructure and superstructure analo­
gous but superior to the machine," Woods explained, while com­
mercial and industrial leaders supplied financial resources that 
allowed settlements to create "a system of public services often far 
in advance of what district political leaders are capable of achiev-
ing."75 But the effort to "institutionalize the welfare program," as 
Amos Pinchot put it, and to replace the machine's social role in 
the neighborhood was only a secondary aim. In helping to create 
"a new type of city-wide public spirit," the settlements encour­
aged the development of a program of municipal reform that tran­
scended both the machine and its neighborhood constituency.76 
T H  E NE W URBAN DISCIPLINE 
The new reform program and the settlements' role in it was 
multifarious. Among the residents of Greenwich House, for ex­
ample, were the municipal reformer Carl Schurz; Crystal East­
man, who later worked on the Russell Sage Foundation's Pitts­
burgh survey; the labor reformer and future New Dealer Frances 
Perkins; Benjamin Marsh, organizer of the city planners' first na­
tional conference; and fellow planner George Ford. When Seth 
Low became mayor of Greater New York, James Reynolds of the 
University Settlement became his personal secretary. The tene­
ment reformer Lawrence Veiller had also resided at the University 
Settlement in the 1890s. Graham Taylor, head of the Chicago Com­
mons, served on the Municipal Voters League and at least two of 
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his residents, John Smulski and William Dever, became municipal 
reformers. His son, Graham R. Taylor, contributed a study of in­
dustrial decentralization to the city planning movement.77 
The active participation of business leaders was a key element 
in this new city-wide program of municipal reform. The growing 
potential of the working-class vote, the persistent volatility of ur­
ban politics, as well as the increasing complexity and cost of the 
city's infrastructure convinced business leaders, many of whom 
had once supported the machine, of their own interest in munici­
pal reform. As Cincinnati's Walter Draper put it, "the problems 
that confront us will not be settled by the radical nor by the stand-
patter, but by the progressive conservative." Reform-minded busi­
nessmen recognized, Draper argued, that a "new order of things 
must prevail . . . [and] have determined that the knife that will 
perform the operation must not cut deeply enough to kill."78 By 
the end of the Progressive Era, the combined efforts of business 
leaders and moral reformers (and increasingly of technically trained 
professionals) would coalesce into the new urban discipline. 
In the interests of social harmony, the proponents of the new 
urban discipline often supported a wide range of useful improve­
ments, including the municipal playgrounds, gymnasiums, librar­
ies, and baths for which social reformers campaigned. Settlement 
leaders in particular often cooperated directly with social reform­
ers and voiced republican attitudes. Lambasting commercial rec­
reation "which ministers to pleasure in order to drag it into excess 
because excess is more profitable," Jane Addams called for mu­
nicipally sponsored alternatives. "We are only beginning to un­
derstand what might be done through the festival, the street pro­
cession, the band of marching musicians, orchestral music in 
public squares and parks."79 But the logic of their support would 
change subtly as the new urban discipline took shape. 
Moral reformers with ties to the traditional middle class had often 
expressed anticorporate attitudes. Blaming starvation wages and 
crumbling tenements for urban immorality, Benjamin Flower, the 
crusading editor of Arena, called for "radical economic changes" 
and an end to the "vicious class legislation" of "a soulless plutoc­
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racy." But the reverse side of moral reform was the condemnation 
of the immorality of the poor, their search for "bestial gratifica­
tions" as Flower put it, and the call for individual and social regen-
eration.80 The moral reformers' association with business leaders 
would result in a greater emphasis on moral effect than on eco­
nomic cause and on social efficiency than on social justice. 
That pattern was particularly pronounced in regard to the city's 
congested tenement districts. Henry Foreman, president of Chi-
cago's South Park Commission, explained that neighborhood 
parks would reduce "poverty, intemperance, immorality, crime, 
and sickness" and hence were "not merely humane" but "impera­
tive for reasons of public safety."81 In Chicago's parks, settlement 
resident Ernest Poole noted, "play has become a deep, wholesome 
Americanizing force." Poole particularly lauded the shower rooms 
where young boys benefited from "cleansing under official eyes."82 
Graham Taylor rejoiced, the "city which has made its reputation 
by killing hogs has awakened to the fact that manufacturing good 
and sturdy citizenship is even more important."83 Were the parks 
orderly? asked the recreation planner J. Horace McFarland. "Yes," 
he answered in affirming their function as a new means of social 
control, "and without blue-coated restraint."84 Neighborhood 
parks, McFarland recognized, and a carefully planned physical and 
social environment might take the place of force in regulating the 
behavior of the lower classes. 
On a grander scale proponents of the city beautiful movement 
predicted similar results. "Mean streets make mean people," ar­
gued Charles Mulford Robinson. The dreary lives of tenement 
dwellers who descended from "dismal rooms to sadder streets," 
Robinson wrote, explained why "lights and music sometimes lure 
them into dangerous places, or that the voice of the agitator alone 
awakens in them an echo in dull ears." The "improved street," he 
advised, "has, in short, an improved population."85 Robinson 
urged the erection of civic centers that would "visibly dominate" 
the city: "To them the community would look up, seeing them 
lording over it at every turn, as, in fact, the government ought to 
do."86 Broader streets, impressive civic centers, neighborhood 
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parks, and other improvements would create not only a more 
beautiful but also a more orderly city. 
But it was not the greater emphasis on social efficiency and so­
cial control than on social justice alone that distinguished the pro­
ponents of the new urban discipline from social reformers. It was 
also a difference between democracy and paternalism (as Robinson's 
view of the civic center suggests). Where social reform relied on 
the organized voting power of the urban electorate to demand re­
form, the new urban discipline relied on the rational analysis of 
the urban expert and the enlightened self-interest of the progres­
sive businessman to institute reform from above. Those municipal 
issues that raised divisive questions, exacerbated class tensions, and 
encouraged mass participation and popular debate thus undermined 
both the means and the ends of the new urban discipline. New 
municipal functions that addressed the needs of urban consumers 
served the realists' program well; those that addressed problems 
associated with urban modes of production proved troublesome. 
Unfortunately for the realists, it was precisely those conflicts 
endemic to the political economy of the metropolis, between land­
lord and tenant, factory worker and employer, labor and capital, 
that had created the demand for new municipal functions in the 
first place. After his year-long study of the evolution of municipal 
functions, Milo Maltbie reported, "There is hardly a municipal 
function which has not been made necessary" by an increase in 
such conflicts.87 Even something as seemingly innocuous as the 
creation of Chicago's system of neighborhood parks might raise 
divisive questions. Watching park attendants "endlessly sweeping 
and mopping in an effort to keep off the dark coating of sticky, 
greasy soot that settles down from" the nearby stockyards led the 
settlement resident and future socialist Ernest Poole to contem­
plate the stark contrast between Chicago's brand-new parks and 
its slum neighborhoods. It was a contrast, he concluded, that 
raised such troubling "questions as wages and rents, city charters, 
inheritance taxes," and the municipal ownership of public utili-
ties.88 This was made all the more problematic when social re­
formers such as Howe called for a constitutional convention to 
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extend municipal powers. The proponents of the new urban dis­
cipline had to assert their own expertise in prescribing the proper 
functions of municipal government and to instruct the voting pub­
lic. In that sense the new urban discipline was literally an academic 
discipline, the discipline of political science.89 
MUNICIPAL INNOVATION AND THE FUNCTIONS 
OF CITY GOVERNMENT 
In his study of municipal functions, Maltbie found a clear divi­
sion between the taxpaying and non-taxpaying electorates on how 
municipal services should be financed. Taxpayers wanted new 
services financed by user fees while a larger and growing group 
of non-taxpayers, supported by labor organizations, wanted in­
creased property taxes to subsidize user fees. At the center of the 
controversy was the public utility corporation. Maltbie reported 
that the "citizen learns from the political economist that in certain 
industries an increasing density of population is invariably accom­
panied by increased consumption and decreased cost per unit." 
Appropriating that "unearned increment," Maltbie continued, the 
public utility "corporation thus receives most of the benefits from 
conditions which it has little or no hand in creating."90 Most ur­
banites came to agree that the corporations should be forced to 
pay a greater share of their profits to the city; the issue was 
whether the result should be lower taxes or lower user fees. 
Particular attention focused on the transit corporation. "The 
proposition that municipal street railways ought to be supported 
by taxes or loans meets with no approval," Maltbie observed. 
"Everyone recognizes that free transportation at present would be 
unjust."91 It is true that relatively few voices called for free, sub­
sidized transit; but there were plenty of voices demanding that 
excessive profits be taxed as means to lowering fares. Pingree led 
a nationwide movement for the three-cent fare based on the propo­
sition that compensation from transit corporations should bene­
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fit the unpropertied majority of citizens in the form of lower fares 
rather than the propertied minority through lower property taxes.92 
Nor did the appeal to professional expertise generally quiet popu­
lar demands. In certain fields such as public health and sanitation, 
technically trained professionals had been able to assert that their 
particular expertise placed them above politics. But the long his­
tory of controversy in regards to transit, the public's familiarity 
with the service, and the profit-basis of the enterprise made it dif­
ficult to abstract expert opinion from the political context.93 
Early in the 1890s New York business interests had expressed 
enthusiasm for a municipally constructed subway and defended it 
as a proper function of municipal government. But once the pro­
vision of public transit was accepted as a legitimate municipal 
function, New York businessmen learned to their dismay, it was 
extremely difficult to control public debate.94 The creation of New 
York's rapid transit commission, which placed planning power in 
private hands and insulated it from popular demands, suggested 
one way that rapid transit might have become an important part 
of the new urban discipline. "It is obvious," the Real Estate Record 
and Guide argued in defense of the subway and other such public 
improvements, "that without an orderly, dignified, and splendid 
city the highest type of citizen if impossible." Settlement leaders 
and elite reformers in New York similarly saw rapid transit as a 
way of extending the benefits of the middle-class life to at least the 
aristocracy of labor and thus of stabilizing the urban order.95 
Other cities created commissions similar to New York's; but be­
cause rapid transit never could be completely divorced from divi­
sive economic issues, it did not become an integral part of the new 
urban discipline. 
In the early twentieth century, neither transit corporations nor 
transit engineers exhibited much enthusiasm for either municipal 
ownership or operation. Since it was the pressure exerted by 
business interests and professional organizations, the "extra-legal 
molders of municipal rule," that often tipped the balance in favor 
of new functions, a lack of enthusiasm on their part could help to 
keep the issue entirely off the municipal agenda.96 Neither did such 
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reform organizations as the National Civic Federation (NCF) and 
the National Municipal League (NML) show much enthusiasm for 
municipal ownership of public transit; after careful study of the 
transportation question, neither would endorse municipal owner-
ship.97 The NCF and NML, which forged links between business 
leaders and professionals on a national scale, reflected the growing 
disenchantment with the municipal ownership of transit among 
the proponents of the new urban discipline. 
During the same period a group of urban reformers, experts, 
and academics whom Kenneth Fox has described as "municipal 
innovators" developed a functional prescription for city govern­
ment widely adopted by city administrations. The combined ef­
fort of officials with the NML, the Census Bureau, and academic 
political scientists, this functional prescription codified the lack of 
enthusiasm for either the municipal ownership of transit facilities 
or a municipal subsidy of transit fares. Although the prescription 
left open the possibility of municipal ownership, it effectively dis­
couraged it. The municipal innovators defined as legitimate mu­
nicipal functions 
[those] activities which are performed for all citizens alike with­
out compensation, the expense being met by revenue obtained 
without regard to the benefits which the contributors may indi­
vidually derive from any or all municipal activities. . . . Most of 
them are essential to the existence and development of govern­
ment and to the performance of the governmental duty of pro­
tecting life and property and of maintaining a high standard of 
social efficiency [emphasis added]. 
Public transit, which some citizens did not use at all and which was 
financed directly through user fees, did not fit that description.98 
Moreover, the intense controversy that surrounded public tran­
sit and its association with the incompetent boss and corrupt ma­
chine violated the principles of social efficiency and hence disquali­
fied it as a proper municipal function. Municipal ownership of 
transit was theoretically a possibility under a separate category, 
quasi-private or commercial undertakings, but the definition of 
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such functions—"those activities from which a revenue is derived 
that represents a partial or full compensation or return for the 
privileges granted, commodity or property sold, or specific ser­
vice rendered"—precluded free transportation and discouraged a 
municipal subsidy." Adopted by reform administrations across 
the country, this functional prescription discouraged consideration 
of municipal ownership of transit facilities as a proper function of 
city government. Instead, municipal governments limited their in­
volvement with public transit to the regulation of private corpo­
rations in the consumers' interest. 
The municipal innovators expressed a genuine concern about 
the conflict between efficiency and democracy. Yet for all their 
insistence on the importance of the democratic control of munici­
pal government they (unlike the social reformers) precluded de­
bate over the proper tasks of city government from their concep­
tion of municipal democracy. Leo Rowe, a political scientist and 
municipal innovator, predicted that the "democracy toward which 
we are approaching will be a democracy of pleasures and enjoy­
ments rather than the democracy of the suffrage." Rowe's state­
ment was a fair description of the realists' program of municipal 
reform. Fulfulling Low's desire that municipal government focus 
on the business of providing public services rather than the liber­
ties of the people, the realists excluded the larger issues of eco­
nomic and political power from municipal debate. 10° 
Notwithstanding the work of the municipal innovators, popu­
lar interest in rapid transit died hard; and its persistence helped the 
republican program of social reform survive. It was only the rise 
of the automobile and the development of city planning, less con­
troversial means of inspiring at least some of the same hopes as­
sociated with rapid transit, that allowed the new urban discipline 
to emerge triumphant. By the end of the Progressive Era, as Paul 
Barrett has clearly shown in the case of Chicago, the dream of 
perfecting urban transportation and emptying the slums had be­
come attached to the automobile and the city planning profession 
that developed around it. Of course the dream did not turn out as 
planned. Improved roads, traffic regulations, and zoning resolu­
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tions won middle-class support and indeed benefited the middle 
class; but they did little either to solve the transportation problem 
or to empty the slums. Moreover, the streetcar system, the essen­
tial means of transportation that determined the employment, 
shopping, and entertainment opportunities for the working class, 
deteriorated as public funds were invested in the automobile infra­
structure. Yet working-class Chicagoans, transfixed by the prom­
ise of the automobile, supported or at least acquiesced in the 
triumph of city planning.101 Similar stories occurred across met­
ropolitan America. The history of Cincinnati's ill-fated rapid tran­
sit beltway illustrates the role of the new urban discipline in the 
journey from rapid transit to city planning. 
CINCINNATI'S HOL E IN THE GROUND 
In 1913 Maltbie addressed the national conference on city plan­
ning on the relationship between public transit and city planning: 
In the discussions of city planning there has been a noticeable 
lack of consideration of transportation facilities. Volumes have 
been written on the relative advantages of street plans, and the 
ingenuity of engineers, landscape architects and municipal ex­
perts has been taxed to discover the most attractive design. But 
with the exception of this one factor, the public highway, so 
little consideration has been given to transportation that it is al­
most a virgin field from the standpoint of city planning. Yet I 
venture to assert that there is no one factor, with the possible 
exception of topography, which has a greater influence not only 
upon the direction of city development but upon the character 
of the city from every standpoint. 
After Maltbie's address Alfred Bettman, city solicitor of Cincin­
nati, related public transit to his city's housing problem. In Cincin­
nati the "working people as a rule travel enormous distances over 
the surface system, going from factories which lie more or less in 
the outlying portions of the city into tenement houses or con­
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gested districts," he explained. Aside from easing the daily com­
mute and increasing the range of employment opportunities, he 
argued, rapid transit would encourage the development of "new­
residential localities which may help to solve the housing prob­
lem" and distribute "population into more healthful surround­
ings." The administration of Democratic Mayor Henry Hunt of 
Cincinnati, Bettman concluded, was developing plans for a rapid 
transit beltway that would achieve those goals.102 Hunt's plan re­
flected his conflicting commitments to social efficiency and social 
reform and proved to be a major factor in the demise of his admin­
istration. Throughout 1913 a bitter street railway strike (which 
ironically began just as Bettman returned from the planning con­
ference) and an acrimonious debate over municipal ownership be­
set discussions of rapid transit, severely strained Hunt's tenuous 
coalition of elite Republican reformers and insurgent Democrats, 
and helped to defeat his reelection effort. 
Twelve years later the beltway was still uncompleted. Municipal 
reformers, who had not elected a mayor since Hunt, blamed the 
corruption and inefficiency of the Republican political machine for 
the notorious "hole in the ground" and urged abandonment of the 
project. Bettman, now a nationally renown planner, argued that 
comprehensive city planning offered the best means of addressing 
the city's social and economic problems. In 1925 the city's reform­
ers, having secured a new municipal charter and an official master 
plan, organized themselves as the Charter party, elected Murray 
Seasongood mayor, and went on to control city government for 
the next decade. The reformers' abandonment of rapid transit and 
their embrace of city planning was a crucial factor in the triumph 
of reform in Cincinnati.103 
During 1912 Hunt had been negotiating with the city's traction 
monopoly to effect a compromise favorable to his rapid transit 
plan. The delicate negotiations were pursued behind closed doors, 
but it proved impossible to keep them there. When Hunt, in an 
effort to revive the central business district, ease congestion and 
the daily commute, depopulate the tenement districts, and bring 
suburban homes within reach of Cincinnati's workers, introduced 
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his plan late in 1912 he found himself embroiled in a volatile debate 
he could not control.104 Inextricably linked to profound social and 
economic changes in the city and burdened with a legacy of po­
litical controversy and great expectations of social reform, rapid 
transit invited controversy. Still, in January 1913 Hunt seemed on 
the verge of winning agreement for a $29 million valuation for the 
properties on which regulated profits would be figured. But the 
contentious single-taxer Herbert Bigelow, fearing that an inflated 
valuation would destroy any hope for eventual municipal owner­
ship, introduced state legislation that would revoke the franchise 
and substitute an indeterminate permit based on a three-cent fare. 
Although the bill died in committee, it disrupted Hunt's negotia­
tions and inflamed public opinion.105 
By the end of April, it again seemed as though an agreement 
might be reached with the traction monopoly when the city's 
street car workers entered the debate. While an international union 
attempted to organize a Cincinnati local, a delegation of labor 
leaders called on Mayor Hunt. They suggested, the Cincinnati Post 
reported, "that motormen and conductors be given some share, 
through higher wages, in the benefits of the proposed $29,000,000 
traction settlement."106 The men saw the negotiations as an op­
portune time to press their demands for a ten-hour day, half pay 
for waiting crews, and a five-cent raise in pay. In an effort to 
strengthen their position they also adopted a resolution demand­
ing municipal ownership and formed a Citizen's Municipal Own­
ership League.107 When the traction monopoly remained intransi­
gent, the streetcar employees' municipal ownership league gained 
the support of the city's major labor organizations and was rechris­
tened the Trades Union Municipal Ownership League.108 At the 
same time Bigelow launched a People's Street Railway League 
with the aim of securing a referendum on municipal ownership 
that would repudiate Hunt's traction settlement.109 
Meanwhile the city braced for what one newspaper feared 
would be "the greatest strike in the history of this city."110 The 
crisis quickly became, the Times-Star reported, "the most exacting 
through which the city officials have had to pass since the begin-
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ning of the Hunt administration."111 At the end of the first full 
week of the strike, a crowd of several thousand clashed with police 
downtown where the streetcars converged at Fountain Square. At 
midnight Hunt requested troops from the governor and was re-
fused.112 The next day, insisting that the city was beset by rioting 
and mob violence, Hunt renewed his call for troops but was again 
rebuffed.113 
A municipal takeover of the transit system now appeared to be 
the only remaining course of action. Later that same day city so­
licitor Bettman filed suit against the company, asking the court to 
take charge of the properties, appoint a receiver, and initiate con­
demnation proceedings.114 Pressured on all sides the traction com­
pany recognized the union on Monday. The biggest loser in the 
whole affair, however, was Hunt. Despite his effort to remain neu­
tral and to secure a just settlement, his call for troops had earned 
him the enmity of many of his erstwhile labor supporters. On the 
other hand, one traction company stockholder expressed privately 
an attitude probably shared by many elites in the city. The "poli­
ticians in both parties are trying to take advantage of the situation 
to play the so-called labor vote," he complained. Bettman's suit, 
he added, was "a disgrace to any lawyer."115 Hunt's reform coali­
tion could not survive in that atmosphere. His negotiations with 
the traction company and his hopes for the rapid transit beltway 
were also in shambles. Nor were his troubles yet over. 
At the end of the same week in which the strike ended, Bigelow 
stepped up his campaign to secure a referendum on municipal 
ownership.116 Speaking to large crowds in the city's working-class 
neighborhoods, areas which were the most tenuous part of Hunt's 
coalition, Bigelow vowed to bring municipal ownership and the 
three-cent fare to Cincinnati. Criticizing his opponents for trying 
to "scare the little property owners . .  . as though municipal own­
ership would increase the debt of the city and raise the taxes of the 
citizens," Bigelow painted an overly rosy picture of municipal 
ownership that included a three-cent fare, higher wages, and 
enough profits to finance the construction of the beltway.117 Bige­
low raised expectations that Hunt could not possibly fulfill and 
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convinced many voters that Hunt had made too many compro­
mises with the traction monopoly. In July a Hunt-backed slate of 
commissioners was elected to write a new charter that would fa­
cilitate his rapid transit plans, but the voters rejected the charter in 
the fall.118 The turbulent summer also cost Hunt his reelection bid 
in November when the Republican machine returned to power.119 
In the aftermath of Hunt's defeat the Republican machine picked 
up the rapid transit plan as its own.120 During the next ten years, a 
new machine-appointed Rapid Transit Commission, dominated 
by leading business interests and insulated from public debate, 
resolutely pushed forward the plan.121 The city's reformers, how­
ever, abandoned rapid transit. The transit imbroglios of 1913 had 
contributed to a year of social tensions and political controversy 
unlike anything the city had experienced since the ULP campaigns 
of the 1880s. The charter campaign of 1913, the reformers' Citi­
zens' Bulletin lamented, had been marred by "demagogism," "sen­
sationalism," and "the indulgence of hysterics." What was needed, 
the Bulletin added, was an atmosphere conducive to "cool judge­
ment . . . seasoned with temperate thought and accurate and pre­
cise reasoning."122 Without such an atmosphere the proponents of 
the new urban discipline failed to solve much of anything.123 
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During the next decade Cincinnati's reformers embraced city 
planning as a way of addressing the same problems that had be­
deviled Hunt. Bettman led the effort with the organization of the 
United City Planning Committee (UCPC) in 1915. The passage 
of a state city-planning enabling bill in 1915 and the creation of an 
official city planning commission in 1918 were among the major 
accomplishments of the UCPC. City planning, Bettman argued, 
was central to a city-wide and comprehensive assault on the city's 
physical problems. The comprehensive approach, which included 
a master plan for the city, city-wide housing codes, and zoning, 
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would bring improved housing, community development, and 
economic efficiency, Bettman concluded.124 The Better Housing 
League (which Hunt had helped to create and of which Bettman 
was a member) announced, "There is every reason to believe that 
zoning will have the effect of hastening the provision of transpor­
tation facilities to new districts and of encouraging the construc­
tion of workingmen's homes near factory sections so that workers 
may live nearer to their work and be spared the necessity of trav­
eling long distances." Securing the same benefits as rapid transit 
zoning would also prevent the sort of "violent controversy" that 
resulted from the commercial and industrial invasion of residen­
tial districts and thus serve to ease rather than exacerbate social 
tensions.125 
In 1921 the UCPC issued a report critical of the rapid transit 
plan, urging the abandonment of the project and that the $3 mil­
lion already spent be charged off as a "dead loss." In 1923 the 
Technical Advisory Corporation, a group of consultants hired by 
the City Planning Commission to prepare a comprehensive master 
plan, recommended that construction of the beltway be halted and 
that the remaining funds be used in a comprehensive street repav­
ing program. The following year a survey of the city's municipal 
government estimated that $11 million would be needed to com­
plete the beltway and warned that, due to the increased use of 
automobiles and declining ridership, "the taxpayers rather than the 
car riders will be required to pay for practically the entire improve­
ment." In 1925 the UCPC urged that the remaining beltway funds 
be spent in "developing main radial thoroughfares."126 Indeed, the 
"hole in the ground" was now more valuable to reformers as a 
club with which to beat the inefficient and corrupt Republican 
machine than as a major social reform.127 
Cincinnati's master plan, adopted in 1925, completed the es­
trangement of the city's reformers from rapid transit and their em­
brace of the automobile. Downtown congestion, the master plan 
suggested, could be relieved through the rerouting of street cars, 
the widening of some streets, extensive creation of one-way streets, 
restriction of heavy trucking and deliveries, parking restrictions, 
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and other traffic regulations. Outside the central business district 
the plan called for an extensive program of widening, extending, 
and repaving existing thoroughfares. The plan pronounced rapid 
transit "financially undesirable" and added that the money "that 
would have to be spent in completing the loop could be far more 
profitably spent in developing main radial thoroughfares."128 
The hopes for housing reform once attached to rapid transit 
were now tied to zoning and the regulation of subdivisions (and 
effectively limited to the middle class).129 Zoning, which estab­
lished building districts with height, bulk, and use restrictions, 
prevented the spread of the tenement districts, but it provided no 
solution to existing slums. By excluding low-income housing 
from the choice residential districts, zoning probably exacerbated 
the problem. Although the Better Housing League had predicted 
improved housing conditions for all residents, other supporters of 
the zoning resolution were less optimistic. The city's health com­
missioner admitted, "Zoning is not a cure for present ills, but it 
does safeguard the future against a repetition all over the city, of 
evils which now prevail in certain sections."130 
The master plan reflected a similar pessimism. Noting that 
30 percent of the city's population paid escalating rents to live in 
increasingly overcrowded tenements, the master plan concluded 
that the tenement problem was "bound to remain a problem for 
several decades to come," especially in light of the recent influx of 
blacks into the city. The costs of constructing single-family and 
even four-family and row houses drove rents above what "the vast 
majority of colored families and a great many white wage earners" 
could afford. "This means that it is not feasible now to give any 
consideration as a part of the City Plan to providing housing for 
low-wage earners," the plan stated. The provision of housing 
for higher income groups might ease congestion somewhat, but 
beyond that the plan provided only for "the amelioration of living 
conditions in the older parts of the town by zoning protection and 
by provision of parks, playgrounds, community centers and open 
spaces."131 In reference to the city's sixty-five hundred existing 
tenements, the Public Health Federation reported that "practically 
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none promote health, comfort and good standards of citizenship." 
Describing the tenement problem as "practically hopeless," the 
federation called for more supervised playgrounds to teach "the 
lessons of self-control." Such playgrounds were needed, added 
one reformer, "to counter-balance the evils of this industrial pe-
riod."132 Reformers now faced the unenviable task of managing a 
housing problem that they had little hope of solving. 
Unquestionably, the shift from rapid transit to city planning 
reflected the growing significance of the automobile and the pres­
sure it placed on municipal officials.133 It also reflected an impor­
tant redefinition of the housing and other urban problems. Refer­
ring to the rapid transit plan as part of the city's "patchwork 
planning," Bettman argued that comprehensive city planning rec­
ognized a "close organic relationship between each city improve­
ment and every other city improvement." City planning defined 
urban problems in terms of the interdependent parts of an organic 
metropolitan community rather than focusing exclusively on the 
poor. The immediate problems of the poor were deferred in the 
belief that with the general improvement of metropolitan condi­
tions, the poor would ultimately benefit.134 But the reformers' em­
brace of city planning also revealed the influence of the new urban 
discipline and a commitment to social efficiency. 
Whereas the campaign for rapid transit had brought the city only 
divisiveness and recrimination, city planning promised economic 
efficiency and social harmony. Planning would improve the effi­
ciency of civil engineering, testified the president of the Ohio Me­
chanics' Institute. Zoning, Bettman argued, "will promote build­
ing by the protection it affords to investments in buildings and 
preserve land values." As a force for social harmony, planning 
would fight juvenile delinquency, explained a charity worker, and 
"promote peace and contentment among" the citizenry. Zoning, 
explained a labor leader, meant that "the man anxious to own a 
home would be assured that his property would not depreciate in 
value," a principle that "holds good for the wage earner as well as 
the man of independent means." Addressing the same theme, an­
other zoning supporter argued that the "worker who retires in his 
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modest home surrounded by plots of verdure and foliage, and 
whose nostrils are filled with pure ozone during his nocturnal rest 
will certainly show fewer nihilistic tendencies than the worker" 
living amidst the noise, filth, and overcrowding of the tenement 
districts.135 
The statement of one medical expert and zoning proponent 
most clearly established the close connection between city plan­
ning and the new urban discipline. Referring to the noise, pollu­
tion, and congestion associated with large factories, he cautioned 
that "of economic disturbances and inequalities I am not speaking; 
it is only from the standpoint of health and particularly of 'ner­
vousness' that I desire to write these few remarks."136 Distancing 
themselves from demands for broad social change and avoiding 
political controversies, city planning proponents created an envi­
ronment in which the rational arguments of the expert would 
dominate public debate. 
To be sure zoning and city planning proved far less controversial 
than rapid transit, winning widespread if sometimes lukewarm 
support and generating very little opposition. In that sense they 
did contribute to social tranquility. But they also failed, as Cincin-
nati's master plan had predicted, to solve the housing problems of 
the city's poorer residents and probably exacerbated them.137 Of 
course rapid transit proponents too had promised more than they 
could deliver, even in the best of circumstances. But the rapid 
transit debate had at least raised larger questions about economic 
and political power in the city. 
In contrast city planning left untouched the larger economic in­
equalities that had created urban problems in the first place.138 "If 
long hours, low wages, and extensive periods of unemployment" 
were the prime causes of congestion and urban misery, Charles 
Beard had asked in reference to city planning in 1912, "how can a 
municipal government hope to make any radical changes when the 
underlying economic forces are beyond its reach."139 Although he 
wrote before the emergence of the city planning profession and 
while a wide-ranging public debate over the province of city plan­
ning was still taking place, Beard's question anticipated the limi­
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tations of professional planning. In the 1920s an acceptance of the 
political economy of the metropolis and the veneration of the ex­
pert would become the hallmarks of the city planning profession. 
When the city planning debate began early in the century, how­
ever, nothing was inevitable about the direction it would take. The 
development of the city planning debate and the subsequent pro­
fessionalization of city planning is an important and complex story 
in its own right. 
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The Professionalization of City Planning 
and the Scientific Management 
of Urban Space 
From high atop the American 
Railway Building that he had designed, Daniel Burnham surveyed 
his beloved Chicago. The beautiful watercolor prints that adorned 
his Plan of Chicago and the plan itself reflected a similar lofty per­
spective of the city's commercial and financial elite. Perhaps better 
than anyone this "architect of capitalism" understood the enor­
mous pressures exerted by rising realty values in the city. One of 
his central concerns was to protect those values while eliminating 
the economic inefficiency with which they were associated. Burn-
ham warned that planless growth was "neither economical nor 
satisfactory" and that both "overcrowding and congestion of traf­
fic paralyzed" the city's economy. Yet Burnham's interests ex­
tended far beyond the central business district.1 
Just as Jules Guerin's watercolors offered an idealized view of 
Chicago's future, Burnham too envisioned a harmonious and or­
derly city. Although Guerin's paintings revealed nothing of the 
physical squalor and social chaos of metropolitan Chicago, those 
conditions were very much on Burnham's mind. The view from 
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the city's skyscrapers took in not only the costly congestion in the 
central business district, but also such reminders of political con­
flict and social disorder as the Halsted railway yards, Haymarket 
square, the west side tenement districts, and the distant Pullman. 
Rapid growth and the influx of "many nationalities without com­
mon traditions or habits of life," Burnham knew, had created a 
demand for a "well-ordered" city.2 Social efficiency as much as 
economic efficiency characterized Burnham's plan for Chicago. 
TH E BEAUTIFICATION OF CONGESTION 
In addressing the problem of congestion, Burnham faced the 
nearly impossible task of easing congestion without threatening 
the realty values based on that congestion. Between 1877 and 
1892, as Chicago dominated an ever-larger region, the value of 
real estate in the central business district had increased by 700 per­
cent. The extension of mass transit, the construction of the ele­
vated Loop, and the spread of the skyscraper spurred another 
increase of more than 100 percent between 1894 and 1910.3 Burn-
ham's patrons in the Commercial Club had no desire to see that 
trend reversed. The enhanced realty values that resulted from 
Burnham's lakefront park plans had played an important role in 
the Commercial Club's commissioning of the Plan ofChicago. Nor 
did Burnham himself have any desire to slow the aggrandizement 
of what he called the "Metropolis of the Middle West." In the 
broad prairie surrounding Chicago, Burnham saw an "illimitable 
space now occupied by a population capable of illimitable expan-
sion."4 Admiring Haussmann's decision to drive Parisian boule­
vards far into the surrounding region, Burnham proposed a series 
of concentric highways encircling the region and a system of ar­
terial roads connecting every nearby town to the metropolis. Chi­
cago officials, he argued, would have to oversee the planning of 
areas throughout the region "to care for the traffic that will be 
imposed upon them by reason of their location in relation to the 
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business district."5 Burnham's plan would ensure that the me­
tropolis dominated an ever-larger region. 
The pressure on central Chicago, Burnham recognized, would 
"increase in geometrical ratio" with the expansion of the metro­
politan region. Congestion would strangle Chicago unless it was 
redesigned with an eye to efficient circulation. In speeding the 
movement of people, the automobile and street improvements 
rather than public transit held pride of place in Burnham's plan.6 
Where congestion reigned, Burnham advised, "new streets must 
be created at whatever present cost." The "remorseless cutting of 
main lines through the district to be developed" would prove the 
most economical in the long run. Even his boulevards, which 
were to beautify the city and to serve other social purposes, would 
be designed so "that circulation shall be everywhere promoted but 
never impeded."7 To facilitate the transportation of goods, central 
Chicago would be transformed into "a traffic clearing house." A 
giant freight-handling center on the southwest side would encour­
age the decentralization of industry and allow through freight to 
be diverted around the city. For handling materials destined for 
the city itself, the freight center would mesh with two harbors and 
an underground connecting system to "form one complete ma­
chine." Those improvements would enable the central business 
district to handle "many times" its current traffic, Burnham ex­
plained, and protect the interests of Chicago's commercial and fi­
nancial elites.8 
Burnham's plan also included benefits to the city's industrial in­
terests. The new freight center would well serve industrialists al­
ready located on the southwest side and encourage others to move 
there. Burnham's suggestion that the city's freight be handled "as 
largely as possibly by machinery" must have pleased industrialists 
harried by the city's notoriously militant teamsters.9 Beauty would 
benefit industrialists as well. Labor productivity necessarily im­
proved in a work force whose "nerves cease to be wracked by 
irritating conditions," Burnham explained. Light industries lo­
cated along the boulevards would benefit from increased sunlight 
and fresh air, which would enable labor to "work with greatest 
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effectiveness." Civic improvements, which Burnham was quick to 
point out would encourage the wealthy to spend more time and 
money in the city, would also make Chicago "a good labor market 
in the sense that labor is sufficiently comfortable to be efficient 
and content."10 
Burnham's concern for working people extended beyond the 
workplace and the demands of economic efficiency to a concern 
with both social justice and social order. The "lakefront by right 
belongs to the people," Burnham insisted; recreational opportu­
nities in lakefront parks and wooded preserves would enable wage-
earners to "take up the burden of life in our crowded streets and 
endless stretches of buildings with renewed vigor and hopeful­
ness." Broad boulevards and spacious parks would accommodate 
"parades and pageants" and "give charm and brightness to the life 
of people who must of necessity pass long summers in the city."11 
Beauty might even ease class antagonisms. Railway and utility 
buildings (frequent targets of mob attacks), Burnham advised, 
should present "a smiling face to the public." A "well-arranged 
grass plot will often turn away wrath from a public service cor-
poration,"12 Beauty served in the struggle for social efficiency. 
In his innovative responses to the problems of capital accumu­
lation, Burnham contributed to the realistic approach to met­
ropolitan development. His response to the social problems of 
the metropolis, however, still reflected the moral attitudes of the 
small-town America of his youth.13 The realistic Burnham argued 
that beauty "has always paid better than any other commodity, 
and always will," but the moralistic Burnham insisted that "cities 
which truly exercise dominion rule by reason of the appeal to the 
higher emotions of the human mind."14 A religious man of gen­
erous instincts, Burnham valued his plan above all else for its 
ability to create a moral order in the city. "After all has been said," 
he argued, "good citizenship is the prime object of good city plan-
ning."15 In this Burnham reflected the larger city beautiful move­
ment, which had its origin in the host of village improvement 
associations that sought to recapture the sense of community as­
sociated with small-town America.16 City beautiful advocates pre­
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dieted a moral reawakening as a result of their efforts. Charles 
Mulford Robinson, for example, called for a city "more pride-
worthy . . . , more majestic, [and] better worth the devotion and 
service of its citizens."17 
In that vein Burnham saw the tenement districts essentially as a 
moral problem. Fearing that the municipality might some day 
have to provide housing for those "so degraded by long life in the 
slums that they have lost all power of caring for themselves," 
Burnham offered street improvements as an alternative solution.18 
By narrowing residential streets grassy plots could be provided 
that would induce "habits of neatness and comfort" and bring 
"people from cellars and dark rooms out into the light, thus con­
tributing to good order and higher humanity." Burnham lauded 
Haussmann's remaking of old Paris with "its dirty, crowded, ill-
smelling, narrow, winding streets, the hotbeds of vice and crime" 
and advocated similar measures for Chicago. Some districts, like 
the Halsted-Chicago Avenue district where the 1877 railroad strikes 
had exploded into violence, represented "a menace to the moral 
and physical health of the community" and demanded drastic 
measures. The "cutting of broad thoroughfares through the un­
wholesome district," Burnham prescribed, would serve to lance 
the moral inflammation.19 
A monumental civic center, which was never built, was to be 
the centerpiece of Burnham's moral order. The civic center would 
evoke civic loyalty, promote good citizenship, and provide a focus 
for public life. The "right of the people to assemble for discussion 
is fundamental," he maintained in a republican vein, and appro­
priate public spaces must be provided even if at the expense of 
efficient circulation. Yet Burnham's design seemed to confuse im­
perial awe with republican virtue. Combining city, county, and 
federal offices, the civic center would reflect the "dignity and im­
portance of the city," Burnham wrote, and promote the "good 
order . . . essential to material advancement." The impressive 
grouping of public buildings would represent "a long step toward 
cementing together the [city's] heterogeneous elements." In par­
ticular the court house would teach Chicago's disorderly masses 
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"the lesson that 'obedience to law is liberty.'" Soaring to an "im­
pressive height, to be seen and felt by the people," the central 
administration building would serve as a symbol of "civic order 
and unity."20 The civic center reflected the uneasy mixture of 
realistic, moralistic, and even republican elements in Burnham's 
thought. 
The richness of the Plan of Chicago, despite its occasional ex­
cesses and contradictions, attests to the breadth of vision and 
largeness of purpose of its author. At first it seems difficult to 
associate the work of Burnham with the profession of city plan­
ning that was just beginning to emerge when the plan was pub­
lished. His interest in moral order seems to place him closer to 
Olmsted than to the professional advocates of zoning. His asser­
tion of the rights of the people (to the lakefront, parks, and public 
spaces) is rather more reminiscent of George and his followers 
than to the proponents of the city efficient. Moreover, Burnham, 
like other members of the city beautiful movement, understood 
the city as a complex social organism for living and working 
rather than in the more limited terms of the economic machinery 
of the city efficient.21 
But unlike other city beautiful advocates, Burnham had a firm 
grasp of the economic logic of the city efficient.22 Thus he antici­
pated the outlook and orientation of the new profession in his 
championing of metropolitan dominance of the region, his con­
cern with efficient circulation, street improvements, and highway 
design, and in his working relationship with metropolitan elites. 
More importantly, he suggested how planning might be divorced 
from the most controversial issues of the day (low-income housing 
and mass transit, for example, neither of which figure promi­
nently in his work) and still have a significant impact on urban 
development. In 1909 when the Commercial Club presented the 
Plan of Chicago to the public, however, the view of a noncon­
troversial program of city planning was still only a suggestion and 
not yet a reality. At that time city planning was still part of a 
wide-ranging political debate about the course of metropolitan 
development. 
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T H  E PLANNING DEBATE 
The city planning debate was part of a larger struggle concern­
ing the proper role of government in promoting social progress. 
As Robert Wiebe and others have argued, both middle-class pro­
fessionals and businessmen played prominent roles in overturning 
the laissez-faire and social Darwinist attitudes to economic and 
social development.23 Business support for government regulation 
and public planning often stemmed from a desire to stabilize and 
legitimate industrial capitalism.24 The members of the new tech­
nical and managerial professions, from medicine to engineering, 
often provided the personnel for that "search for order" and con­
tributed their own concerns with rationality, order, and social 
efficiency. 
City planning was in part a result of the search for order. At the 
Second National Conference on City Planning in 1910, Frederick 
Law Olmsted, Jr., delivered a ringing condemnation of laissez­
faire and the unhealthy and wasteful urban environments it cre­
ated. He argued, *'Mankind will not be content with such an atti­
tude after the imagination has grasped the larger possibility of 
control."25 Professionals were particularly intrigued by the pos­
sibilities of physical and social planning. John Dewey, the philoso­
pher of the reform-minded professionals, argued that the most 
effective reformation of society depended on "the intelligent selec­
tion and determination of the environments in which we act."26 
City planning reflected the effort to reshape the physical and hence 
the social environment of the American city. 
Though some sort of planning was crucial to any effective pro­
gram of urban reform and a clear advance over the non-policy of 
laissez-faire, it created problems of its own. Many conservatives 
opposed planning because they doubted it could be reconciled with 
a commitment to liberty and free market capitalism. On the left 
radicals asked whether an effective form of planning demanded 
some control over economic as well as physical and social devel­
opment. Even more problematic was the question of whether plan­
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ning and a reliance on a bevy of experts could be made compatible 
with democracy. The potential conflict between efficiency and de­
mocracy raised the question of who would exercise the "larger 
possibilities of control," who would select the proper environment 
for whom.27 Despite the political nature of such questions, profes­
sional planners came to see themselves as disinterested and to see 
planning as a technical and managerial activity that was above 
politics. Many believed, in the luckless phrase of the city planner 
George Ford, that in "almost every case there is one and only 
one, logical and convincing solution of the problem involved."28 
Whether professionals acknowledged it, however, planning re­
mained a profoundly political undertaking. Moreover, their's was 
not the only view of the planning province. 
The origins of many elements of progressive reform are to be 
found in the mass discontent organized by Gilded Age radicals as 
much as in the middle- and upper-class search for order.29 That 
was certainly true of the movement for city planning. The repub­
lican critique of land speculation and of the costs of congestion 
and the alternative vision of an urban commonwealth played a ma­
jor role in undermining the laissez-faire defense of the unplanned 
city and continued to influence the city planning debate in the Pro­
gressive Era. The republican view particularly found expression in 
the Committee on the Congestion of Population (CCP), whose 
members organized the First National Conference on City Plan­
ning in 1909. Benjamin Marsh, the young secretary of the CCP, 
was particularly well acquainted with Henry George's work. 
An important part of the criticism of the city beautiful move­
ment came from a republican perspective. Marsh, for example, 
argued: 
[The] grouping of public buildings, and the installation of speed­
ways, parks and drives, which affect only moderately the daily 
lives of the city's toilers, are important, but vastly more so is the 
securing of decent home conditions for the countless thousands 
who otherwise can but occasionally escape from their squalid, 
confining surroundings . .  . to experience the aesthetic delights 
of the remote improvements.30 
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At the 1909 conference the landscape architect Robert Pope 
complained that "we have rushed to plan showy civic centers of 
gigantic cost . . . when pressing hard-by, we see the almost un­
believable congestion with its hideous brood of evil; filth, disease, 
degeneracy, pauperism, and crime. What external adornment can 
make truly beautiful such a city?" Is "not external splendor a 
mockery when cloaking congested slums," Pope asked; the main 
task of city planning, he insisted, was "to remedy congestion." 
Those criticisms were overly harsh and, worse, they probably 
alienated republican sympathizers and potential allies within the 
city beautiful movement. They certainly aided the realistic pro­
ponents of the city efficient who, from a very different perspec­
tive, attacked the city beautiful for its extravagance and neglect 
of economic efficiency.31 But those criticisms do suggest that an 
awareness of mass discontent and a desire for social reform played 
an important role in the origins of the national conference on city 
planning.32 
In 1907 a group of settlement leaders, convinced that congestion 
was a leading cause of distress in their neighborhoods, had orga­
nized the Committee on Congestion of Population and launched 
a campaign to bring relief to the tenement districts. Under the 
chairmanship of Mary Simkhovitch, the CCP developed an ex­
hibit, including maps, diagrams, charts, statistics, models, and 
photographs, which toured the country highlighting the social costs 
of congestion and its connection to realty values. Although parts 
of the exhibit reflected antiurban attitudes, Simkhovitch devel­
oped a positive concept of regional planning that owed a great deal 
to republican ideals. Speaking before the national conference 
on city planning, Simkhovitch called for "a rational, conscious 
suburbanization," that would bring the advantages of urban 
civilization to the countryside and preserve the advantages of 
the vibrant urban neighborhood while eliminating dangerous 
congestion.33 
The CCP also resembled the republicans in its willingness to 
tackle the controversial political problems associated with conges­
tion. Citing the social costs of congestion in terms of tuberculosis 
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and infant mortality, Simkhovitch called for a legal limit on popu­
lation density: 
We can reduce the number of persons to an acre by lowering 
the limit on the height of tenement houses. This will in some 
cases result in its being unprofitable to build tenements on very 
valuable land, and will serve to force people out of cities. It may 
be that this is unconstitutional, that the society which has cre­
ated land values can not constitutionally do away with those val­
ues. This is a serious question demanding the most careful 
consideration. 
Marsh was even more forthright in his Introduction to City Plan­
ning, which served as a companion volume to the exhibition. Like 
Simkhovitch, Marsh linked congestion to death and disease and 
argued that in an urban community "bulling the real estate market 
is tantamount to murder of its poorer citizens."34 At the national 
conference Marsh continued that line of attack, arguing that "the 
enormous tribute of disease due to land speculation and exploita­
tion must be checked by the only competent power—the Govern­
ment." He called for "a commission on land values in our great 
cities, similar to the Interstate Commerce Commission." Marsh 
concluded, "It is not my province to determine what is a fair profit 
on real estate, but it is needless to state that a profit of three or 
four fold in a few years is prohibitive, is essentially unsafe and 
unnecessary and undemocratic."35 In the view of the CPP, politi­
cal and economic issues were central to an effective program of 
city planning. 
Simkhovitch and Marsh also treated city planning as a demo­
cratic process. In a different context Simkhovitch argued that it 
was "unsound to divorce politics from a passionate interest and 
turn it into a cold-blooded art for the intellectual"; the CCP ex­
hibit was designed to stimulate public opinion towards a passion­
ate and democratic assault on the problem of congestion. She also 
understood that an effective program of city planning would have 
to take into account her neighbors' very real love for urban life.36 
Lillian Wald, another member of the CCP, knew that "not only 
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the East Side 'intellectuals' but the alert proletariat may furnish 
propagandists of important social reforms."37 Marsh referred to 
city planning as the "challenge to democracy" and argued that the 
problem of inflated land values demanded a "radical change in the 
attitude of citizens toward government and the functions of gov-
ernment."38 The members of the CCP understood that their radi­
cal proposals demanded a mass democratic movement. 
New York City's Commission on Congestion of Population, 
created in response to the work of the CCP, provided a blueprint 
for putting those ideas into practice. Adding the overcrowding of 
factories, low wages, and long hours to land speculation as the 
prime causes of congestion, the commission urged a coordinated 
attack on the problem that included stronger factory legislation 
and enforcement, support for the hour and wage demands of labor 
unions, the taxation of land at a higher rate than buildings, and 
the creation of garden cities. In his review of the commission's 
report, Charles Beard argued that precisely that sort of mixture of 
economic and physical reconstruction offered the most promising 
model for a democratic program of city planning.39 Soon after the 
commission's report was issued, the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Com­
pany factory fire, in which one hundred forty-six female employ­
ees died, provided the impetus for a democratic assault on the 
physical and social problems of the metropolis. Unfortunately, the 
nascent city planning profession was already moving in other 
directions. 
A PARTING OF WAYS 
The tragic factory fire focused public opinion on the problems 
of the industrial working class and spurred the Tammany ma­
chine, with the urging of Robert Wagner and Al Smith, to create 
the New York State Factory Investigating Commission. After 
holding more than twenty public hearings and making exhaustive 
and first-hand investigations, the commission successfully recom­
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mended passage of fifty-six separate laws related to problems 
ranging from factory safety, fire and sanitation regulations to 
minimum wages.40 In calling for the building of a safer and more 
healthy city, the commission addressed some of the same issues as 
did city planners; it also faced some of the same obstacles. 
The demand for stricter safety codes for factory buildings and 
the elimination of tenement sweatshops raised the ire of powerful 
realty interests. "You can no longer distinguish the real estate 
owner by the smile of prosperity," complained the counsel of New 
York's Real Estate Board, "because his property is now a burden 
and a liability instead of a comfort and source of income."41 But a 
powerful Democratic majority in the state legislature, backed by 
strong public support, overcame such objections. In basing their 
recommended legislation on the police power and relating their ob­
jectives to the health, safety, and welfare of the community, the 
commissioners frustrated efforts to overturn the legislation in court. 
The work of the CCP, the report of the New York City Com­
mission on Congestion of Population, and the success of the Fac­
tory Investigating Commission illustrated the potential for a demo­
cratic program of city planning linked to a broad agenda of social 
reform. In fact the Triangle factory fire did play an important role 
in the development of New York's pioneer zoning resolution. Yet 
zoning, which became the city planning profession's most impor­
tant tool, ironically served to separate city planners from the mass 
discontent and the program of social reform that had given rise to 
the First National Conference on City Planning.42 The widening 
gap between social reformers and professional city planners would 
illustrate Sam Bass Warner's contention that "the late development 
of the labor movement, legitimatized only in the mid-thirties, and 
the consequent failure of the labor and urban reform movements 
to coalesce have contributed to the heavy middle-class bias of our 
urban programs—and weakened all attempts to serve the lowest 
third of our population." Yet the work of the Factory Investigat­
ing Commission did contribute to the development of an impor­
tant alternative to the realistic vision of the city planning profes­
sion, an alternative that carried republican ideals into the 1920s.43 
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Strengthening Tammany Hall's support among the city's work­
ing class and poor and improving its reputation among reformers, 
the Factory Investigating Commission catapulted both Smith and 
Wagner to state and national prominence. As governor of New 
York, Smith created a New York State Commission of Housing 
and Regional Planning (CHRP) in 1923.44 In creating the CHRP 
Smith reached out to the dissenting architects and planners who had 
organized the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA). 
Lewis Mumford, the intellectual leader of the RPAA, was a promi­
nent critic of metropolitan aggrandizement who urged planners to 
recognize the "interdependence of city and country." That inter­
dependence led Mumford and his colleagues to embrace the gar­
den city ideal.45 The garden city ideal, based on a balancing of the 
advantages of urban life with those of rural life, a limitation on 
the size of cities, and the communal ownership of land, owed a 
great deal to republican ideals and especially to Henry George. 
Placing the garden city in the larger context of regional planning, 
the RPAA extended the republicans' political approach to urban 
development.46 
Recognizing the political determinants of urban development, 
Mumford and his colleagues proposed a new set of political pri­
orities as the key to implementing regional planning and cre­
ating garden cities.47 In a critique of metropolitan aggrandizement, 
Mumford explained, "Regional planning asks not how wide an 
area can be brought under the aegis of the metropolis, but how 
the population and civic facilities can be distributed so as to pro­
mote and stimulate a vivid creative life throughout the whole re-
gion."48 Clarence Stein (a member of the RPAA and chairman of 
the CHRP) added, "To the few the great city gives all. To the 
millions it gives annually less and less."49 Regional planning would 
redress that balance. New York State, Smith argued, "must be 
planned to serve the interests of every man, woman, and child and 
to give opportunity for a fuller and finer life, and not for the bene­
fit of privileged groups."50 Thus Governor Smith endorsed the 
view of planning as part of a larger program of social reform. 
In an extensive survey of New York City's housing stock con­
131 
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CITY PLANNING 
ducted in 1925, the CHRP found that for the two-thirds of the 
city's families with income less than twenty-five hundred dollars, 
not even the minimum standards of the 1901 tenement law could 
be met. Thousands of the old-law tenements had been destroyed, 
but the slow pace and high cost of new construction had forced 
even more people into those remaining. The fifty thousand new 
tenement apartments built since 1901 rented at twice what the av­
erage family could afford. Since financing represented as much as 
55 percent of the expense in the costs of commercial construction, 
the CHRP argued that "responsible officers of financial institu­
tions should recognize a social responsibility" to provide low-cost 
mortgages for low-income housing. The public should "insist on 
the realization of the social trust as well." The CHRP harbored no 
"real hopes" for the private market, however, and concluded that 
public credit, tax exemptions, and innovative land-use planning 
were necessary to solve the housing problem.51 
The philanthropic, limited-dividend housing corporation might 
possibly provide low-income housing, but the CHRP regretted 
that such ventures "cannot get adequate capital." Granting tax ex­
emptions for new housing, as provided for in New York's 1920 
tax law, attracted capital to the field; but the law had failed to 
provide for minimum standards and maximum profits.52 In New 
York City, Roy Lubove argues, the law had subsidized speculative 
builders rather than tenants.53 At the urging of the CHRP, the leg­
islature amended the law in 1926 to exempt only limited-dividend 
corporations from state taxes and authorized municipalities to 
similarly waive local taxes. 
To illustrate the usefulness of the law, the RPAA, in coopera­
tion with the philanthropist Alexander Bing, organized the City 
Housing Corporation, which built the model communities of 
Sunnyside in Queens and Radburn, New Jersey. Stein and fellow 
architect Henry Wright illustrated the advantages of cooperative 
residential planning in their design for Sunnyside. Using the block 
rather than the individual lot as the unit of planning, their one-, 
two-, and three-family row houses covered only 28 percent of the 
total block; speculative projects covered from 50 to 90 percent. 
132 
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CITY PLANNING 
Collecting the remaining open space into an interior commons on 
each block, Stein and Wright provided both a parentally super­
vised play area for children and a focus for neighborliness. But the 
experiment also revealed that serious obstacles to community plan­
ning and to the solution of the housing problem remained. Bur­
dened at Sunnyside with New York's excessive and wasteful grid 
of streets and utilities, Wright insisted that the comprehensive 
planning of streets and utilities as well as housing was crucial to 
proper community development.54 More troublesome, the Sunny-
side experience proved that even under the best conditions, philan­
thropy could provide decent housing only at a cost above what 
New York's poorer two-thirds could pay. 
The work of the CHRP and the Sunnyside experiment con­
vinced Mumford that the housing question was not simply a prob­
lem of minimum standards. It concerned nothing less than the 
question of "how the great mass of people with an income below 
a decent subsistence level can purchase for themselves the necessi­
ties of life." A solution to the problem, he insisted, depended on a 
society "willing to distribute the income of industry with some 
relation to the biological needs of the worker."55 Governor Smith 
agreed that building housing "for wage earners of small income is 
unprofitable under the existing system." In 1926 Smith and the 
CHRP called for the creation of a state housing bank, armed with 
the power of condemnation, to provide funds and building sites at 
a nonspeculative cost for limited-dividend corporations.56 
Although the New York state legislature failed to act on those 
recommendations, Mumford attended the 1927 national confer­
ence on city planning in order to impress the seriousness of the 
problem on professional planners. If planners were to improve liv­
ing conditions, they could no longer plan on the basis of past trends 
with an eye to "limitless growth and expansion" and grand finan­
cial returns, Mumford told the conferees. Better housing and a 
more healthful distribution of population would have to become 
their primary concerns. If the speculative cost of real estate and of 
investment capital stood in the way of those goals, he concluded, 
then these too must be subjected to "intelligent social control."57 
133 
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CITY PLANNING 
Mumford pleaded for a program of city planning with social re­
form as its primary goal. He spoke to a profession, however, 
which since its inception had moved steadily away from social 
reform and into close partnership with the dominant economic 
interests. 
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF PLANNING 
Benjamin Marsh, who worked as hard as anyone to make city 
planning a vehicle for social reform, later charged that "specu­
lators and bankers had captured the city planning movement." 
Marsh knew what he was talking about. In a series of efforts to 
shift the burden of taxation in New York from buildings to land 
values, he earned the ill will of some of the city's most powerful 
institutions from the New York Real Estate Board to the Catholic 
church. By the time of the CCP exhibit, his reputation was secure. 
"I don't believe you know how radical that man Marsh is," Stan­
dard Oil executive Charles Pratt explained to a CCP representa­
tive in refusing to contribute to its work. Upon meeting Marsh 
and learning of his enthusiasm for the single tax, Robert DeForest 
had warned him that "if you touch the land problem in New York, 
you probably won't last here two years."58 Marsh lasted longer 
than two years, but the pressure on him took its toll. 
By 1910, when he testified before Congress on the city planning 
movement, Marsh had begun to make concessions to the powerful 
opposition he faced. Although he continued to insist that low 
wages were part of the housing problem, he assured the politicians 
that he was not a single-taxer.59 Six years later when leading plan­
ners such as John Nolen were urging their colleagues to remember 
that the "controlling purpose of land subdivision is profit" and the 
younger Olmsted was acknowledging that the basis of the Ameri­
can city "must inevitably be in private ownership," Marsh had 
already abandoned the movement to pursue other initiatives.60 
Five years later New York's city engineer would warn planners at 
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the national conference against "throttling the speculative instinct 
and vision of the real estate developer to which, if kept within 
reasonable bounds, every city owes so much in what spells prog-
ress."61 Whether or not speculators, bankers and other powerful 
economic interests actually controlled the city planning move­
ment, they certainly had a profound influence on its development. 
The arcane process of professionalization, however, also had its 
impact. 
At the First National Conference on City Planning, Robert Pope 
advocated the creation of "a profession equipped to make city 
planning the social and economic factor it ought to be."62 The 
organizing committee created at that conference included repre­
sentatives of the Committee on Congestion of Population, the 
American Institute of Architects, the League of American Munici­
palities, the American Society of Landscape Architects, the Ameri­
can Civic Association, and the National Conference of Charities 
and Corrections. The composition of the organizing committee, 
argued civil engineer George Swain in 1912, reflected the belief 
that city planning was primarily an architectural and sociological 
problem. Swain lauded the multifaceted approach to planning, but 
he protested that the role of the engineer had been neglected. 
While illustrating the eclectic nature of the profession's origins, 
Swain overestimated the extent to which the engineering perspec­
tive had been excluded from the early movement.63 
As early as 1910 Olmsted had noted the paramount importance 
of "treating all the means of circulation in a city as a single con­
nected system, and at the same time of recognizing clearly the 
differentiation of all its parts, so that each shall fit its function 
simply but without waste, from the biggest terminal down to the 
smallest alley." The influence of the engineering perspective grew 
in the years following Swain's protest.64 In 1913 George Ford 
boasted that "city planning is becoming as definite a science as 
pure engineering."65 Three years later New York's chief engineer 
Nelson Lewis argued that "the fundamental problems of city plan­
ning are, and from their very nature must be, engineering prob­
lems." Social issues such as low-income housing and public health, 
135 
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CITY PLANNING 
Lewis concluded, "were matters of administration rather than plan-
ning."66 As the profession donned scientific pretensions, the en­
gineering perspective tended to crowd out the interest in social 
reform. 
Professionalization also narrowed the occupational composition 
of the city planning movement and the educational background of 
its members. Representatives of five occupations (landscape archi­
tects, engineers, attorneys, architects, and realtors) accounted for 
nearly three-fourths of the charter members of the American City 
Planning Institute, the planners' professional organization creation 
in 1917. At least ten of the charter members were graduates or 
employees of Harvard, where the profession edited its own journal 
beginning in 1917 and created the nation's first school of city plan­
ning in 1929.67 Of the eighteen contributors to John Nolen's pro­
fessional handbook published in 1916, nine had received a degree 
from Harvard.68 
The scientific pretensions and elite education of planners won 
them a measure of professional recognition, but it tended to di­
vorce planning from the social and political forces that had origi­
nally given rise to the demand for city planning. Professional plan­
ners lost sight of the very people in whose interests they claimed 
to plan. The hopes, fears, and aspirations of local neighborhoods 
and communities became increasingly marginal factors in profes­
sional planning. As early as 1913 George Ford had complained 
that "our best laid plans may be interfered with by some political 
or local prejudice," ignoring the possibility that the planners' own 
proposals represented political choices or that local traditions were 
based on sound reasoning.69 Six years later Bruno Lasker charged 
that planners knew only the "viewpoint of the master class" and 
urged them to acquaint themselves with the viewpoint of the 
neighborhood.70 
A lingering concern with social reform survived within the pro­
fession even into the 1920s, but it was a decidedly minor theme. 
In 1921 the national conference adopted a resolution "that every 
city should create conditions that will make one-family detached 
houses possible for people with small incomes." The planner's first 
136 
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CITY PLANNING 
responsibility was "to protect those who cannot protect them­
selves," argued Robert Whitten at the same conference. In 1927 no 
less a figure than Henry Hubbard, editor of the profession's jour­
nal and founding director of the Harvard School of City Planning, 
still saw city planning as a powerful instrument for social reform. 
Meeting head-on those skeptics who doubted whether city plan­
ning constituted a true profession "distinct from architecture, en­
gineering, law, or some other already existing and recognized pro­
fession," Hubbard argued that city planning synthesized "all the 
fields of human endeavor that concern themselves with the better­
ing of the surroundings of civilized humanity." City planning was 
not only a legitimate profession, he concluded, but a profoundly 
humanistic one.71 Hubbard's ideal, however, worked against the 
trend toward specialization within the profession. 
THE STRANGE CAREER OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 
The most important factor in the early development of the city 
planning profession was zoning. Essentially a legal device, zoning 
divided the city into districts with specified uses and limitations 
on the height and bulk of buildings. The legal and technical prob­
lems associated with zoning helped planners to lay claim to expert 
status. E. M. Bassett, eager to establish city planning as a recog­
nized profession, explained that he had tried to "separate city plan­
ning from architecture, landscape architecture, and cognate call­
ings." Defining planning as the legal platting of the city and its 
zoning districts, Bassett warned that any effort to "broaden" plan­
ning beyond that would make it "meaningless." The limited and 
specific objectives of zoning served to isolate the profession from 
controversial discussions of social reform.72 
To be sure some saw zoning as the high road to social reform, 
free of the divisiveness and uncertainties of earlier efforts. The me­
chanical aspects of the city, wrote architect John Taylor Boyd, 
"function more efficiently, and reach higher standards than do the 
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non-mechanical activities of political administration and of social 
and economic relationships." Zoning's transformation of the city 
into a smooth-running mechanism would not only be easier than 
previous efforts at social reform, but it would provide unexpected 
benefits. With the perfection of the city's mechanical organization, 
Boyd concluded, "the political and social side of the city, with all 
its human relationships, might become more wholesome."73 While 
this view had very little impact on the city planning profession in 
the 1920s, it does suggest the lingering association of zoning and 
social reform and the complex origins of zoning. 
The original enthusiasm for zoning had grown out of the larger 
planning debate. In his Introduction to City Planning, Marsh de­
scribed zoning as a key to the success of German city planning and 
to the future health of the American city. What particularly at­
tracted Marsh and other planning advocates to German zoning 
was its association with the public ownership of land and a pro­
gressive land tax policy. In German cities where as much as 60 per­
cent of urban real estate was publically owned and up to 10 percent 
of speculative realty values were taken in taxation, zoning gave the 
municipality considerable control over urban development. At the 
first national conference several participants spoke glowingly of 
the German city and the promise of zoning.74 
Social reformers, especially Frederic Howe, were also fascinated 
with the German example of zoning's promise.75 In fact the history 
of social reform intersected at several points with the origins of 
zoning. The Triangle factory fire spurred the zoning movement, 
when public outrage was directed at the serious overcrowding of 
the garment industry's multi-story lofts. The enthusiasm for rapid 
transit also had its impact on the zoning movement. In 1912 public 
service commissioner Bassett, concerned that new subway exten­
sions would exacerbate the already critical problem of congestion 
among lower Manhattan's skyscrapers, began exploring new build­
ing regulations with Manhattan Borough president McAneny and 
other city officials. Their concerns would soon become an impor­
tant reason for the appointment of a new commission.76 
The composition of New York City's Heights of Buildings 
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Commission (HBC), appointed by Mayor William J. Gaynor in 
1913, reflected those diverse origins. The HBC included Abram I. 
Elkus, a prominent and reform-minded lawyer who had served 
as counsel to the Factory Investigating Committee, and Lawson 
Purdy, president of the city's tax commission who had at one 
time promoted Georgist tax reforms from a soapbox in Madison 
Square. The HBC also included the foremost authority on the 
tenement problem, Lawrence Veiller.77 Befitting its origins, zon­
ing seemed to be in the hands of a group of men interested in social 
reform. Even HBC chairman Bassett, not known as a crusading 
social reformer, professed a commitment to the decentralization 
of population and the single-family home. Despite his own role in 
gutting the reformist potential of New York's subways, he would 
continue to argue that rapid transit was "the only thing that will 
bring low rent and sunny homes to working people in great 
cities."78 
The city's financial and commercial interests, however, were 
also well represented on the commission. The HBC included four 
major realtors, two large commercial builders, two manufacturers, 
and two members of the Fifth Avenue Association of merchants. 
Despite the diversity of zoningJs origins and the membership of 
the HBC, the commissioners gave relatively little attention to the 
problems of industrial safety and housing that had contributed 
to the original interest in zoning. Their 1913 report emphasized 
"first, regulation of high buildings, second, districting, and third, 
Fifth Avenue conditions. No specific recommendations were made 
on factories and residences."79 The dominant perspective of the 
Heights of Buildings Commission, as its official name suggests, 
was that of the city's skyscraping financial and commercial elite.80 
The issue of height limitations had first been raised in 1912 by 
the quasi-official Fifth Avenue Commission, created at the request 
of the Fifth Avenue Association of merchants and composed of six 
of its members and the city's chief engineer. Recommending a 
height limitation of 125 feet in the Fifth Avenue area, the mer­
chants hoped to exclude the lofts and especially the immigrant 
labor force of the garment industry from their fashionable shop­
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ping district. They became the most vocal supporters of zoning. 
But height limitations also concerned the skyscraping business 
district of lower Manhattan. City officials facing improved rapid 
transit feared that the concentration of population had already 
overwhelmed their ability to deal with a serious fire or other ca­
tastrophe. The HBC observed, "This being the situation to-day, 
the question arises as to what might happen in case of a general 
panic should the entire district be solidly built up with buildings 
of the present extreme heights."81 
The tendency of skyscrapers to rob the air and sunlight from 
surrounding buildings created additional problems, not only for 
the health of office workers but for the stability of realty values.82 
Bassett later explained that the "real estate owners were at a loss 
to know what to do with their property. They were looking at any 
angle as a talking point and they were more inclined to help along 
a promising plan like zoning."83 The instability of realty values, 
which began with the financial panic of 1907 and was exacerbated 
by the expansion of transit facilities and skyscraper construction, 
won over the downtown property owners to modest height limi­
tations (three hundred feet with the mandatory use of setbacks 
above that height). With the support of those powerful interests, 
the HBC successfully recommended state legislation granting the 
city the power to establish building zones. 
The HBC proved conservative, however, even in its approach to 
building controls. Reformers from George to Marsh had pointed 
to the need for public control of land to limit the role of specula­
tion in city building. But Purdy, who was well acquainted with 
such arguments, promised to "pay reasonable regard to the char­
acter of buildings in making its zoning regulations in order to en­
hance the value of land and conserve the value of buildings."84 As 
Purdy's case suggests, the imperative of allaying the fears of the 
city's realty interests shaped many of the commissioners' decisions. 
They rejected the acquisition of city land through the power of 
eminent domain, their 1913 report explained, precisely because the 
"expense and burden of condemnation proceedings and litigation 
in multitudinous cases would create a tax burden that would in­
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crease rather than compensate for injury to property interests."85 
Instead the HBC relied on the city's police power to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. The police power pro­
vided the city with a relatively cost-free method of limiting the 
height, bulk, and uses of buildings; but the commissioners used 
that power cautiously. They decided against dealing retroactively 
with inappropriate buildings (a power upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1915) because, as Bassett later explained, "the purpose of 
zoning was to stabilize and protect lawful investment and not to 
injure assessed valuations or existing uses."86 The influence of fi­
nancial and commercial interests had transformed zoning into an 
effective defense of their interests. 
The greatest long-term impact of zoning, however, stemmed 
from its role in preserving suburban residential districts from in­
vasion by industry or low-income housing. That aspect of zoning 
had been foreshadowed in the HBC's 1913 report. The interest in 
exclusive residential districts stemmed from the same principle as 
the Fifth Avenue merchants' desire for exclusive shopping dis­
tricts. Both were predicated on the need to divorce the alluring 
consumer benefits of industrial society from the disagreeable as­
pects of industrial production. Robert Cooke of the Fifth Avenue 
Association complained of the "appalling" invasion of the fashion­
able shopping district by the workers of the nearby garment dis­
trict: "Nothing so blasting to the best class of business and prop­
erty interests has ever been seen or known in any great retail 
district as this vast flood of workers which sweeps down the pave­
ments at noontime every day and literally overwhelms and engulfs 
shops, shopkeeper and the shopping public." For J. Howes Burton, 
also of the Fifth Avenue Association, the exclusionary principle 
concerned not just Fifth Avenue but "the very heart of New York, 
and comprised all that makes the city worth while as a place to 
shop, play, work, and live in."87 Residential developers, the HBC 
noted, used restrictive covenants to exclude "apartments, stores or 
factories" and ensure "the creation and maintenance of a residence 
section of a certain desired type."88 But restrictive covenants cre­
ated legal and practical problems; zoning would provide a more 
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effective and legally sound method of protecting the residential 
suburb.89 
The use of zoning to protect residential suburbs also appealed to 
those interested in promoting the single-family residence. But its 
ultimate inclusion in the zoning resolution owed more to the im­
peratives of legal justification than social reform. As a proper con­
stitutional use of the police power, the zoning resolution would 
have to be not only nondiscriminatory but based on, as the leading 
expert on the police power put it, "an informed and deliberate pub­
lic opinion."90 If zoning restrictions were applied to the Fifth Ave­
nue and Wall Street districts alone, the zoning resolution might be 
declared a discriminatory and hence unconstitutional use of the 
police power. But "as part of a comprehensive plan for the control 
of building development throughout the entire city" it could be 
legally defended.91 Between 1913 and 1916 a second commission, 
similar in composition to the first, was charged with the respon­
sibility of making specific recommendations. Bassett and other 
members of the commission attended public meetings with home­
owners in the fashionable districts of the city. As a result certain 
neighborhoods were zoned as exclusively residential districts, from 
which not only commercial and industrial enterprises but low-
income and multifamily buildings were excluded. In conjunction 
with the campaign of the Fifth Avenue merchants, the public 
meetings constituted the informed and deliberate public opinion 
on which zoning's legality rested. 
In the 1920s zoning became the lodestar of the profession and it 
spread across the country. Bassett understood that as "court ap­
proval of police power regulations depended to a large extent on 
the general use and application of that form of regulation, we 
ought to spread zoning throughout the country." During the next 
twenty years, Bassett did exactly that as counsel to the second zon­
ing commission.92 In 1921, at the behest of Commerce secretary 
Hoover, Bassett helped Nelson Lewis and Veiller draft the Stan­
dard State Zoning Enabling Act, which included provisions for 
"the creation of one-family residence districts."93 Chicago enacted 
its zoning law in 1923; Cincinnati followed a year later. By the end 
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of the decade nearly eight hundred cities, representing 60 percent of 
the nation's urban population, had adopted zoning resolutions.94 
" T H  E LEGAL AGEN T OF INTELLIGENT CITY PLANNING" 
Notwithstanding its great popularity among professionals, zon­
ing had relatively little to do with any broader conception of 
city planning. In the best of circumstances, Lewis Mumford ar­
gued in 1929, zoning represented "the legal agent of intelligent 
city planning." In establishing a "social concept of real property," 
zoning had "performed a salutary service to the commonwealth." 
But the host of cities that had adopted zoning legislation as a sub­
stitute for comprehensive planning, Mumford feared, revealed the 
widespread misconception that "zoning is an automatic relief for 
all the evils of unregulated or badly regulated city development."95 
Once divorced from a broader conception of city planning, zoning 
encouraged or at best regulated existing trends. 
Although the zoning ideal superficially resembled Ebenezer 
Howard's garden city scheme, it actually owed more to metro­
politan trends dating back to the late-nineteenth century. Howard 
argued that controlling the size of cities was the essential first step 
in planning, but zoning advocates accepted and even encouraged 
unlimited metropolitan growth.96 New York's zoning resolution 
allowed for a residential population of 77 million and a working 
population of 344 million.97 Chicago's resolution would have en­
abled Chicago to crowd the entire population of the United States 
as well as all the trade and industry of the Midwest within its bor-
ders.98 Howard had not only urged that industrial areas be segre­
gated from residential ones, but he had hoped to make industrial 
production compatible with a cooperative social order. Zoning 
merely extended the effort to segregate the disagreeable elements 
of industrial production, including industrial workers, from the 
consumer culture upon which the legitimacy of corporate capital­
ism increasingly rested.99 The segregation of factories and low­
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income housing from exclusive residential and shopping districts 
represented the acme of the zoning ideal. At best it provided a legal 
framework for preventing gross disorder from disrupting the 
status quo, but at the same time zoning preempted the growth of 
alternative plans of development.100 
In their infatuation with zoning, professionals abdicated the re­
sponsibility to plan. Instead they opted to manage existing trends 
in concert with the powerful. As they retreated from the challenge 
of imagining alternatives, professional planners embraced the com­
forting theory that the crucial factors of urban development were 
beyond their control. Certainly there was some truth in the state­
ment of John Ihdler, one of the more reform-minded planners, 
that "there are forces beyond our control which determine the lo­
cation and size of cities."101 When George Ford urged planners to 
study the "laws" of urban growth, at least he argued that those 
laws could in some measure be "controlled or modified by intel­
ligent planning."102 More disturbing was Robert Whitten's re­
sponse to the charge that zoning segregated residential districts 
along economic and racial lines and permitted dangerous conges­
tion in lower-class districts. Such problems were inevitable, he ar­
gued, but perhaps zoning did "in a small measure . . . facilitate the 
natural trend."103 
The professionals' insistence that their efforts were distinct from 
larger political conflicts underwrote such casuistry and disguised 
their subservience to vested interests. The Chicago Plan Commis-
sion's Walter Moody found "something paradoxical in the whole 
situation of labor versus capital." Rather than being "devised 
solely in the interest of a class," the Chicago plan was a rational 
plan "worked out by experts," he insisted, and would benefit all 
equally.104 Such planning organizations as the Sage Foundation's 
Regional Plan Association, argued Thomas Adams, were "free 
from political influence."105 City planning, according to Harland 
Bartholomew, concerned the "physical rather than the political de­
velopment of cities."106 Such statements obscured the role of po­
litical and economic power in both urban development and city 
planning. 
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Despite the planners' caveats the distribution of economic and 
political power influenced both planning and zoning. As Bassett 
frankly explained to a group of Chicago realtors, it was the "prac­
tical people," the property owners, who would determine the zon­
ing regulations.107 Acknowledging that under New York's zoning 
resolution "a very congested type of tenement can still be built," 
Bassett was sincerely "trying to bring about some amelioration to 
that, but the officials are not responding as readily as we might 
wish because they do not feel any popular demand."108 The offi­
cials did not feel any public demand at least partly because Bassett 
and the other zoning commissioners had done little to organize 
such a demand. The "grass roots" campaign conducted by New 
York's zoning commission reached down only as far as middle-
class home owners. The social groups generally found in the tene­
ment districts had little to do with the zoning campaign.109 Those 
planners who genuinely hoped to secure social reforms limited 
their own effectiveness by failing to enlist popular support. 
The effects of zoning reflected the character of the political 
forces that supported it. While managing the conflicting rights of 
property owners and stabilizing realty values, zoning did little to 
improve conditions in the tenement districts and actually exacer­
bated the problem of residential segregation. The most important 
legal challenge to zoning, Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 
illustrated that point. Situated on Cleveland's eastern border, Eu­
clid lay in the path of the larger city's industrial and commercial 
expansion. Euclid's zoning resolution would halt that expansion 
by establishing exclusive residential districts. The resolution was 
unconstitutional, federal judge David Westenhaver argued, be­
cause it restricted the property rights of the Ambler Realty Com­
pany, which held speculative real estate in the village. Westenhaver 
thus declared Euclid's zoning resolution invalid not because it was 
unfair to those in need of low-income housing, but because it in­
terfered with free market forces. His decision did include, how­
ever, the gratuitous charge that zoning tended to "classify the 
population and segregate them according to their income or situ­
ation in life." No crusading reformer, Westenhaver nevertheless 
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recognized that zoning played an important role in "furthering 
such class tendencies."110 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Ambler's attorney, 
Newton Baker, argued that the zoning resolution was an uncon­
stitutional use of the police power because it was not supported by 
an informed public opinion. Zoning advocates, he argued, had 
made only a limited effort to develop "new conceptions of social 
needs" such as the "communal control of private property" which 
would "bring within the legislative power fields previously not 
occupied."111 While Baker's arguments did not convince the Su­
preme Court, which overturned Westenhaver's decision and firmly 
established the constitutionality of zoning, the one-time reformer 
understood how widely zoning and social reform had diverged 
and how little of zoning's initial promise had been realized. 
Of course tenement dwellers, labor leaders, and social reform­
ers can be blamed for failing to shape the zoning resolution to their 
needs and ideals. In fact, some of New York's building trade 
unions did oppose zoning for the less than admirable reason that 
its restrictions threatened jobs.112 Elsewhere labor leaders, as one 
planner explained, complained that zoning allowed the well-to-do 
to "live in protected . . . restricted home neighborhoods and let all 
the stables and public garages and other dirty businesses intrude 
into any block of workers' home neighborhoods."113 But such iso­
lated protests had little impact. Part of the problem was that the 
political strategy behind the zoning campaign had been conceived 
in such a way as to exclude the propertyless. New York's 1916 
zoning resolution was the result of a series of compromises among 
realtors, merchants, industrialists, and, to a lesser extent, home 
owners. The propertyless were simply not part of the bargaining. 
The legal principles behind zoning as well as the entire legal 
process surrounding it also held the rights of property predomi-
nant.114 In 1917 when the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisville 
zoning ordinance that created racial districts, it did so not on the 
basis of social justice but on the right of sellers to choose their 
buyers. In 1924 when the Supreme Court upheld once and for all 
the legality of zoning in the Euclid case, it based its decision on the 
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doctrine of sic utere tuo. ut alienum non laedus (use your own prop­
erty in such a way as not to injure that of another).115 Once estab­
lished, zoning regulations could be challenged before a zoning ap­
peals board, but only by property owners deprived of a fair return 
on their property.116 Property owners loved zoning, George Ford 
reported; they *'throng hearings to protect their rights as estab­
lished by zoning."117 Without legal standing, one critic noticed, 
the propertyless were left to resent the "invasion of their district 
by big public garages which house the motors of prosperous citi-
zens."118 Through zoning the management of conflicting property 
rights came to define the essence and the limits of professional city 
planning. 
THE SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT OF URBAN SPACE 
In the 1920s the Russell Sage Foundation's Regional Plan of New 
York and its Environs (RPNYE), the most ambitious planning pro­
ject of the period, extended the close association of planners and 
property interests that had emerged during New York's zoning 
campaign. The inspiration of Charles Norton, a patron of the Plan 
oj Chicago, the RPNYE completed its work while New York was 
tripling its office space with such massive projects as the Empire 
State Building, the Chrysler Building, and Rockefeller Center. 
Enlisting the efforts of New York's most talented and powerful 
leaders, the RPNYE's board of directors included representatives 
of such institutions as J. P. Morgan and Company, the Rockefeller 
Institute, and the First National Bank of New York, which were 
the architects of the real estate boom. The experiences of Bassett, 
Purdy, McAneny, and Lewis (all veterans of the zoning campaign) 
with what was rapidly becoming New York's dominant industry 
also shaped the work of the RPNYE.119 
But the RPNYE did not simply do the bidding of the realty in­
terests. Its greatest achievement was the development of a strategy 
that maximized opportunities for capital accumulation while si­
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multaneously managing the conflicting needs of realty, financial, 
construction, and industrial interests.120 That strategy, first out­
lined in New York's zoning resolution, might best be called the 
scientific management of urban space. 
A central element in the scientific management of urban space 
was the long-time dream of real estate promoters, expressed by 
Henry Morgenthau at the First National Conference on City Plan­
ning, to devote all of Manhattan below Fifty-ninth Street to those 
financial and commercial uses that would maximize realty values. 
What had been called the "city beautiful" would give way to the 
"city rentable."121 The mix of land uses south of Fifty-ninth Street 
occasioned an uncharacteristic sense of outrage in planners who 
had been hardened to the intractable problems of the tenement 
districts. 
Some of the poorest people live in conveniently located slums 
on high priced land. On patrician Fifth Avenue, Tiffany and 
Woolworth, cheek by jowl, offer jewels and jimcracks from sub­
stantially identical sites. Child's Restaurants thrive where Del-
monico's withered and died. A stone's throw from the stock ex­
change the air is filled with the aroma of roasting coffee; a few-
hundred feet from Times Square, with the stench of slaughter 
houses. In the very heart of this "commercial" city on Manhat­
tan Island south of 59th Street, the inspectors in 1922 found 
nearly 420,000 workers employed in factories. Such a situation 
outrages one's sense of order. Everything seems misplaced. One 
yearns to re-arrange the hodgepodge and to put things where 
they belong. 
Certain activities, "managing and administering, buying and sell­
ing, financing and risk-bearing, investigating and advising," be­
longed in the central city. Others did not.122 
Market forces generally provided for the dominance of the 
higher functions; but where they did not, as in the case of the 
garment industry, the scientific managers of urban space would 
step in to encourage a more rational, and profitable, use of space. 
That, the RPNYE explained, was the essence of city planning. 
One of the most stupendous dreams of the social control of civi­
lization concerns the remaking of cities. It is proposed to decen­
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tralize them deliberately. By removing obstacles or interposing 
deflecting factors, the decentralization which is actually going on 
may be guided, accelerated and focused. This is the meaning of 
city planning. In the process of deliberate decentralization, sci­
ence is ultimately to decide what elements in the present city 
ought to remain and what ought to go. 
The natural law at the core of that science was the maximization 
of realty values.123 
Although the maximum realty values meant that most indus­
trial production would be removed from Manhattan, the RPNYE 
planners were not insensitive to the needs of industry. The "Ameri­
can city must be planned," explained planning director Thomas 
Adams, as "a center of highly organized and standardized produc­
tion." Professional planners had gained valuable experience since 
the zoning crusade that would guide the work of the RPNYE. 
During World War I, when planners offered their services to the 
Council on National Defense and built army cantonments, in­
dustrial plants, and workers' housing, the profession became ac­
quainted with the high rate of labor turnover and other problems 
facing the industrial employer.124 Professionals increasingly in­
cluded the problems of industrial design in their understanding of 
planning. Zoning, Charles Cheney argued in 1919, would "guar­
antee a definite and safe place for industrial investment . . . and 
assure more contented labor conditions." Alfred Bettman sug­
gested in 1923 that the city plan performs the same function for 
the city as a plan for an industrial plant. Planning, George Ford 
added in 1924, meant "merely doing for the city what every good 
business man or manufacturer does for his own plant."125 Indus­
trial efficiency and the promotion of a stable work force, planners 
had come to understand, were important elements in a compre­
hensive city plan. 
The brief popularity of the Industrial Workers of the World and 
other radical groups and especially the postwar wave of strikes 
focused new attention on the tenement and the slum as factors in 
the labor problem. The ugliness and disorder of the industrial 
city, John Nolen argued in 1919, was "one of the main causes of 
unrest and strikes." Poor housing and living conditions, the vet­
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eran housing reformer Lawrence Veiller added in 1920, were key 
factors behind "industrial discontent and low productivity." In 
exploring that theme Veiller explained that the "slum is exactly 
like a cancer on the body social and the body politic." Conditions 
in the tenements drove workers to the IWW and other radical 
groups. "'Destroy all the skyscrapers and tenement houses of the 
present. Build hoses surrounded by garden and orchards,'" read 
Veiller from a radical manifesto distributed in the streets. "This 
may not be divine discontent," he argued, "but it is discontent that 
must be reckoned with." Thus Veiller seconded Ihdler's hope that 
the new "liberal attitude" of employers, even if inspired by "a fear 
of labor," would encourage them to attack the housing shortage 
and other community problems.126 
Veiller broadened the discussion in 1922 in an article titled "Are 
Great Cities a Menace?" Recent strikes in New York, Veiller ar­
gued, had demonstrated "that a small group of men, controlling 
vast numbers of workers, held the city in the hollow of their hand, 
and by their ability to manipulate the transportation of the city and 
its food supplies could . . . bring New York to its knees." Quoting 
Lord Bryce, Veiller warned of the dangers of the great city: 
People live in crowds, under the ceaseless stimulus of always 
seeing one another in crowds, always moving to and fro in street 
cars and railroads and automobiles . .  . at an increasing rate of 
speed. . . . The more men are crowded in great masses the more 
easily they become excited, the more they are swept away by 
words, and the more they form what might be called a revolu­
tionary temper. 
Such concerns drove Veiller to a consideration of the garden city 
idea, an idea he had long resisted. Having been assured by Ebe­
nezer Howard that the public ownership of land was not an essen­
tial part of the garden city, Veiller recommended it to employers 
concerned with the "stabilizing of labor" through the "improve­
ment of the living environment of the workers."127 
Apparently employers heeded only part of Veiller's message. In 
1924 George Ford argued that "industry and wholesale business 
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must be legislated or pushed or encouraged to move out into the 
suburbs." While he found a "marked tendency" towards industrial 
decentralization, he lamented that the "majority of workers" were 
"still living in the heart of the city . . . spending much time and 
energy in commuting."128 The pattern of industrial decentraliza­
tion established at the turn of the century, a pattern that did not 
generally include improved housing for the laboring population, 
continued into the 1920s. 
The RPNYE planners joined in the enthusiasm for industrial 
decentralization. Congestion and other diseconomies of scale had 
made Manhattan an inefficient place for manufacturing. Trade 
unions had created additional problems. The RPNYE planners 
heard "much complaint regarding the competitive disadvantage 
suffered because of the 'exactions' of trade unions." Cigar and silk 
manufacturers blamed difficulties with trade unions for their de­
cision to leave the region. One clothing manufacturer bluntly re­
vealed his "intention to move his plant from New York to some 
town where he could tell those damned Bolsheviks to go to hell." 
The "trade unions appeared to find it an easier task to organize 
workers in a large city," the planners reported.129 The region in­
cluded hundreds of new sites for industrial development free of 
Manhattan's drawbacks, however, of which the RPNYE compiled 
a careful inventory. 
The regional planning of the RPNYE was far different from the 
regional planning simultaneously promoted by Mumford and his 
colleagues in the RPAA.130 Essentially zoning writ large, the Re­
gional Plan of New York and Its Environs was geared towards the 
needs of capital accumulation. "The metropolis," the RPNYE plan­
ners explained, "is essentially a piece of productive economic ma­
chinery competing with other metropolitan machines." The eco­
nomic costs of congestion, which made the metropolitan machine 
less competitive, had long concerned planners. While helping to 
draft New York's zoning resolution George Ford had argued: 
Counts should be taken with a view to determining the loss of 
time to pedestrians and to the various forms of traffic due to 
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congestion and blocks caused by the narrowness of the street. 
This loss of time multiplied by the money value of the time of 
the people involved and by the time interest on the capital tied 
up in vehicles and their loads, will give a definite figure. 
The urban development of the past fifty years, the RPNYE argued 
in the same vein, had made the city "slower and less efficient."131 
The RPNYE was determined to speed the circulation and hence 
the accumulation of capital. 
In addressing that task the RPNYE planners looked to the ex­
ample of industrial production. The "area of New York and its en­
virons may be likened to the floor space of a factory," the RPNYE 
planners explained. Transport systems and land uses would be ar­
ranged so as to minimize the frictions of space and eliminate un­
necessary movement. The rearrangement of the region would not 
only bring the many superfluous rural inhabitants into the metro­
politan circulation of "shirts, breakfast foods, radio, and warm 
radiators," but it would benefit manufacturers through the "lower 
cost of supplying consumption goods at convenient assembly 
points."132 In its review of the completed regional plan, the New 
York Times marveled that people and goods would move through­
out the region "with the precision of parts and materials through 
a modern automobile factory."133 Indeed, the RPNYE planners 
had borrowed the strategy and the techniques of the scientific 
managers of wage labor, who had sought to maximize profits 
through the control of the labor process. 
THE VELOCITY OF CAPITAL AND THE PROBLEM 
OF COMMUNITY 
Henry Ford's River Rouge plant provided a model of such plan­
ning. The Rouge site, an undeveloped valley in suburban Detroit, 
"had been tamed, paved, and molded in steel and concrete into 
geometric forms of an industrial design," converting "land into 
machines." Inside the plant, its numerous assembly lines perfected 
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the "flow of production." The elaborate technology allowed man­
agement to control both the pace and the character of work and to 
turn labor into a factor of production as passive as coal or steel. 
Machine processes dictated and circumscribed human organiza­
tion. The simple act of walking across the floor of the Rouge plant 
was next to impossible. Philip Haglund, a Ford engineer, noted 
that the plant's "limited space and measured time . . . imposed a 
kind of physical isolation" upon the worker. The work force had 
to be "made over" to accept the new conditions. Greater efficiency 
justified the measures; outside experts agreed that what appeared 
to some as congestion was actually efficiency. But Haglund, re­
sponsible for the smooth operation of the plant, recalled that "ev­
erybody was on edge. They ran around in circles and didn't know 
what they were doing. Physically everybody was going like a 
steam engine but not so much mentally."134 This picture of isola­
tion amid constant motion and confusion amid furious activity 
suggests similar problems in the metropolis. 
At the First National Conference on City Planning, Simkho­
vitch had complained of the effects of the constant scurry of met­
ropolitan life. 
The industrial and the social pace go hand in hand, and there 
is something in the presence of huge numbers of people which 
makes people desire more and more excitement to satisfy the 
jaded senses. Congestion means the gradual substitution of sen­
sationalism as opposed to reason, and that means social demor­
alization, ever ready to catch at the latest news, to float on the 
surface of the hour, never to think a thought through, but to go 
on rapidly from one sensation to another. 
The "clang and honk and shriek" of traffic enveloped the city in 
the 1920s. "Are the finer lives of peace and depth," asked one 
citizen, "to give way to the . . . jaded thirst for 'getting somewhere 
in order to get somewhere else,' the endless trailing of moving 
multitudes that watch rather than think."135 Their shared goal of 
maximizing the velocity of capital created similar problems for the 
scientific managers of wage labor and urban space. Difficulties of 
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adjustment, rapid labor turnover, and a lack of morale among 
workers who had become little more than machine tenders or au­
tomatons troubled the scientific managers of wage labor and gave 
rise to the discipline of industrial psychology.136 The scientific 
managers of urban space faced the problem in a slightly different 
form, the problem of community. 
Treating the city as a piece of economic machinery, planners had 
lost sight of its social and communal functions. An excessive con­
cern with the circulation of commodities, including wage labor, 
tended to crowd out other human purposes. "From earliest times 
bridges have been meeting places," one city planner observed. 
"There did people stop to chat." But now, he cautioned, our 
bridges "accommodate itinerant mankind who must needs be in 
constant motion. . . . Nervous excitement" and the ubiquitous 
automobile created "such a tension that a few minutes delay" made 
people "desperate." A bridge plaza might enhance community 
life, this planner concluded, but efficient circulation demanded its 
elimination.137 In 1927 Lewis Mumford lampooned the fixation on 
efficient circulation. He predicted the "spread of subways and . . . 
more efficient means of packing them," and the "disappearance of 
the dwelling house, partly due to the small amount of time left, 
after subway rides, to enjoy that ancient fixture."138 But it was the 
automobile that had become the linchpin of metropolitan circula­
tion. While planners built hundreds of "new major arteries exclu­
sively for automobile use," complained one streetcar executive, 
they ignored the deterioration of public transportation.139 
Throughout the 1920s planners widened streets at the expense 
of sidewalks and parks, sacrificing beauty to traffic.140 Widening 
the thoroughfares and rounding the corners increased the useful­
ness of the street for economic purposes, but it made the city less 
sociable and more dangerous.141 Once a vital element in the life of 
family and neighborhood, where children played and neighbors 
chatted with vendors and with one another, the newly paved and 
widened street became an increasingly dangerous place.142 In 1925 
New York State alone recorded forty-seven thousand accidents re­
sulting in fifty-four thousand injuries. In 1934 thirty-six thousand 
154 
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CITY PLANNING 
fatalities nationwide attested to the automobile's intensification of 
the "bitter war . . . between drivers and pedestrians."143 A foreign 
critic of the motorist quipped, "Speed permits me to avoid the look 
of those whom I offend. . .  . I hardly have time to feel ashamed." 
The "automobile has not conquered space; it has spoiled it, ruined 
it," he concluded.144 An excessive concern with efficient circula­
tion proved detrimental to, if not incompatible with, the life of the 
community. 
The scientific managers of wage labor and urban space also 
shared a common skepticism about the abilities of the average citi­
zen. Just as the scientific managers of wage labor redesigned work 
for supposedly incompetent laborers, professional planners tended 
to minimize the role of the average citizen in the city planning 
process. RPNYE director Adams argued that the "incalculable 
force" of the modern city "lessened the value of past experience as 
a guide to the solution of present problems." But before "the pub­
lic will accept the proposals in the Plan it must understand them," 
he conceded. "This means that much educational work must be 
undertaken." Working from a "scientific basis," Adams doubted 
he had much to learn from a confused public.145 That skepticism 
was itself a major reason why both morale and community were 
so difficult to achieve. 
In the same year as the publication of the first volume of the 
RPNYE survey, H. A. Overstreet read an address to the national 
conference on city planning that suggested the planners' recogni­
tion of the problem of community and the difficulty they had in 
resolving it. The neighborhood life of the nineteenth-century city, 
Overstreet argued, where people "knew each other . . . played 
together, worked together, bought and sold together" was gone 
forever and had been replaced by "a kind of futile atomicity." Pro­
claiming the collapse of "the older group formation of our social 
life," he described city dwellers as "simply human integers in spa­
tial juxtaposition." Ignoring the planners' own role in the collapse 
of a sense of community, Overstreet suggested that the "revital­
ization of our community life" could be accomplished by "enlist­
ing groups in vital community projects" like city planning.146 
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But in promoting community involvement, Overstreet cau­
tioned, planners would have to recognize the fundamental differ­
ence between "the Leaders and the Led." The planners' primary 
appeal was to "the man who owns lots of property . . . the 
banker . . . the active controlling minds." Once the property in­
terests had been lined up, public enthusiasm could be manufac­
tured. Advocating the use of visual images that "instantly tell the 
story" and "arouse people's emotions," he noted "that mere repe­
tition has an almost compelling effect. . . . Say a thing enough 
times and people will at last believe it." The public hearing was 
important if only to avoid the appearance of arrogant and dicta­
torial methods, he warned. But he assured professionals that such 
hearings would not jeopardize their expert decisions: "There will 
be no suggestions, for the simple reason that each suggestion will 
involve so many other changes that the task will at once appear 
too difficult for the ordinary citizen." An increasingly dominant 
element of the realistic tradition that city planners helped to shape, 
profound skepticism about the abilities of the average citizen un­
dercut any useful discussion of the problem of community.147 
Exhibiting great faith in economic efficiency, professional city 
planners, like their counterparts in the factory, had come to believe 
that advances in productivity would resolve social conflicts and pre­
clude the need for political debate. Embracing the view of the city 
as a potentially smooth-running mechanism, they had obscured 
the impact of economic and political power on urban develop­
ment, disguised their own subservience to powerful propertied in­
terests, and championed the role of the expert. The professionals' 
strategy for the scientific management of urban space neglected 
the social functions of the city, minimized the role of the average 
citizen in city planning, and left both city and citizen bereft of a 
sense of community. But the logic of social efficiency that had 
done so much to shape the early planning debate still demanded 
attention to social problems and to the question of social harmony. 
The planners' own best instincts also led them back to a concern 
with the social aspects of the city. What professional planners 
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needed was a social theory of the city that was consistent with 
their own assumptions about the city and its inhabitants and that 
pointed the way to a new sense of community or, at least, to social 
adjustment and social stability. In the 1920s they would find that 
theory in the new academic discipline of urban sociology. 
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An Urban Sociology: 
Robert E. Park and the Realistic Tradition 
Writing at the end of the 1920s, 
the University of Chicago sociologist Harvey Zorbaugh surveyed 
the last half century of urban reform from good-government and 
anti-vice campaigns through muckraking to the settlement houses. 
Those efforts, he argued, had been "the inevitable result of the 
conflict of urban and rural cultures." The typical reformer, bur­
dened with the cultural baggage of rural America, had been a "fa­
natic who has waged an uncompromising war on reality. He has 
been a sentimentalist and romantic who has thought all things 
possible." While acknowledging the idealism and imagination of 
the romantics, Zorbaugh insisted that "their dreams are hopeless 
while they remain unrelated to the realities of life." Clinging to 
outmoded concepts and traditions, the romantics frustrated social 
progress. Their allegiance to the neighborhood and local com­
munity, even to democracy and republican government, stood in 
the way of an effective program of reform.1 
In the concluding chapter to his study The Gold Coast and the 
Slum (1929), Zorbaugh welcomed the emergence of a new realistic 
tradition in urban reform in which city planning was central. 
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Lauding the work of zoning and planning commissions, Zor­
baugh argued that the city planning profession, in alliance with 
realtors, public utility corporations, research foundations, and 
urban academics, had developed "a new city plan, a plan that is 
possible because it is based upon a recognition of the natural pro­
cess of the city's growth, a plan that is the dream not of an ideal, 
but of a real, city." Their realistic strategy of "recognizing the 
trends of city growth and evolving new techniques to utilize 
them" offered the best hope for reform.2 Zorbaugh recognized 
that city planners had abandoned not only idealism and imagina­
tion but even the discussion of alternative paths of development, 
and he applauded them for it. 
SOCIAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL PLANNING 
City planning, however, did not represent a complete program 
of realistic reform. While city planning encompassed the manage­
ment of urban space, the human and social problems of urban in­
dustrialization remained unaddressed. Because of the incompe­
tence of representative governments in the late-nineteenth century, 
Zorbaugh argued, "the host of social questions that came with the 
industrial society, and which were the real if imperfectly recog­
nized issues of the day, were rarely acknowledged as political is­
sues." But Zorbaugh traced the origins of a new program of "so­
cial politics" (his awkward term for an emerging policy of expert 
social planning) to the late-nineteenth century. The muckrakers 
had first stepped into the political vacuum to expose the social 
problems of urban-industrial society. Despite their sentimental at­
tachment to the values of rural America, the muckrakers "had cre­
ated a faith in publicity, a realistic tradition, which was to play a 
leading role in the development of a new politics."3 The social 
survey, typified by the Russell Sage Foundation's Pittsburgh sur­
vey, supplanted muckraking and addressed the same social prob­
lems with less sensationalism and a greater emphasis on the expert 
collection and publication of facts. The social survey initiated the 
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new social politics, a struggle for remedial legislation fought less 
in the legislature with the weapons of debate than in the arena of 
public opinion with the weapons of publicity.4 
Unfortunately, the romantic effort to revive the neighborhood 
still distracted the social politicians. The decline of the neighbor­
hood, Zorbaugh insisted, was an inevitable "result of the funda­
mental processes of the city's growth." Most of the problems so­
cial politicians addressed resulted from the inevitable dissolution 
of the neighborhood. Social politicians only slowly came to rec­
ognize that. Neither were they yet "fully aware of the potentialities 
of the public that has replaced" the local community. The tech­
niques of publicity had been "left to the exploitation of the tabloid 
and the demagogue." But city planners, who had taken a leading 
role in the development of a realistic conception of city life, were 
also the first to alert the social politicians to the effective uses of 
publicity. The campaign for the Plan of Chicago, for example, in­
cluding motion pictures and the use of the plan as a civics textbook 
in the city's schools, had given "the city a conception of itself— 
a self-awareness, a sense of its history and role, a vision of its 
future—in short, a personality." Social politicians, Zorbaugh ar­
gued, were finally learning to use mass forms of communication 
and the techniques of publicity to bring social problems to the 
attention of the public.5 
The same alliance of professional experts and the metropolitan 
elite that had come to dominate the city planning movement 
would also direct the new social planning. Social politics, Zor­
baugh warned, was "not democracy in the old sense. . . . Those 
who formulate the legislation and put it across are not members 
of the communities most affected. Moreover, social agencies tend 
more and more to a system of interlocking directorates, where 
a small number of experts control, to all intents and purposes, 
the policies of these agencies and of social legislation" [italics in 
original]. Along with such parallel movements as city planning, 
bureaus of municipal research, the commission and city manager 
forms of government, social politics served "to introduce into 
city government the standardization and scientific management al­
ready found in industry."6 
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The decay of local community life and the trend toward stan­
dardization and scientific management, Zorbaugh explained, also 
demanded a "re-evaluation of the city's human resources." While 
the "old democracy" cherished the political competence of every 
citizen, the "realistic attitude toward the city and its problems 
attaches a new importance to good will, vision, leadership, and 
wealth." Those resources were concentrated in the city's socioeco­
nomic elite. Chicago's Gold Coast, he concluded, "is the only ele­
ment in the city's life that sees the city as a whole, dreams dreams 
for it as a whole. . . . No other group of citizens is competent to 
do what the Gold Coast is doing for the life of the city."7 Social 
politics complemented the city planning movement both in articu­
lating a social theory of the city that exalted the political forces and 
assumptions behind city planning and in addressing the social 
problems that city planners often overlooked. 
Zorbaugh's work reflected the self-confidence and ambition of 
the social scientists at the University of Chicago during the 1920s, 
where Zorbaugh earned his doctorate in sociology. An examina­
tion of the complex social mosaic of Chicago's near North Side, 
The Gold Coast and the Slum represented one of the more ambitious 
studies in the new urban sociology. In his introduction to Zor-
baugh's work, the pioneer urban sociologist Robert E. Park ar­
gued that "we must base our program for the reorganization of 
our own political and collective life" on such studies.8 Carried out 
under Park's direction, Zorbaugh's study, one of the first fruits of 
the Local Community Research Council (LCRC) which the Uni­
versity of Chicago political scientist Charles E. Merriam had or­
ganized, also suggested the growing interest in social science and 
realistic reform among metropolitan elites. The preeminent en­
trepreneur of social science research, Merriam had created both 
the LCRC and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in 
1924-25 as vehicles for attracting foundation grants to the social 
sciences. In 1925 representatives of the Rockefeller, Spelman, Sage, 
Carnegie, and other foundations began meeting annually with the 
SSRC to discuss funding and research. By 1933 the SSRC had 
distributed more than four million dollars from the foundations.9 
Merriam's career illustrated Zorbaugh's analysis of the emer­
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gence of the realistic tradition. Merriam served his apprenticeship 
as a scholar-in-politics with New York mayor Seth Low early in 
the Progressive Era. He continued to explore the potential of rep­
resentative, parliamentary politics as a Chicago alderman and an 
unsuccessful candidate for mayor. In the wake of his defeat at the 
hands of the demagogic Thompson machine in 1915, Merriam 
joined the Committee on Public Information, a federal propa­
ganda agency during World War I. In 1925, in a passage that sug­
gested the impact of those experiences, Merriam argued that the 
modern "demagogue employs the arts of his classical predecessor, 
but with the added weapons of modern high-geared machinery 
and the scientifically manufactured poison gas of propaganda."10 
Like Zorbaugh he came to believe in a need for "a readjustment of 
the bases of the political order." As responsible agencies learned 
to use new techniques, politics would become less a matter of rep­
resentative institutions and parliamentary debate than "the science 
of constructive intelligent control."11 Civic organizations such as 
the Commercial Club and the Municipal Voters' League would 
work "more closely with the press" and replace the role of the 
national parties in "formulating and administering policies" and 
creating a "discriminating and informed public opinion."12 Shed­
ding his faith in representative government, Merriam embraced 
publicity and expert social planning. 
Merriam also shared Zorbaugh's admiration for the city plan­
ning movement as a model for the new political order they imag­
ined. A member of the Chicago Plan Commission, author of the 
city's zoning resolution, and a founder of the Regional Plan Com­
mission, Merriam heralded the Plan of Chicago as "one of the mir­
acles of recent urban progress." Before the creation of the Chicago 
Plan Commission, Merriam recalled, "real estate speculation, in­
dustrial expansion, street railway extension" and other private and 
conflicting forces had shaped the city in irrational ways. Burn-
ham's plan had pointed to a way of managing those conflicting 
interests, and publicity had proved crucial in securing public ac­
ceptance of the plan. "Newspapers and commercial interests gen­
erally supported the plan, and helped override the objectors who 
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were many," Merriam explained. "Illustrated lectures and news­
paper publicity were incessant in their appeal."13 
The successful formula of the city planning movement had 
wider applications. "Masses of facts are being compiled in zon­
ing, planning, housing, and transportation studies," Merriam re­
ported, but "much of the material is lost for local use even, to say 
nothing of more general utilization." Endorsing Walter Lippmann's 
proposal for intelligence bureaus at the federal level, Merriam 
called for a greater role for experts and social scientists in govern­
ment. But that effort would have to be supplemented by "widely 
increasing education," Merriam added, for "only as insight and 
judgement are generously diffused will the suggestions of the sa­
vants be found to have any weight."14 A public educated to en­
dorse the wisdom of the expert would preserve the form if not the 
content of democracy. 
Merriam's greatest contribution to the realistic tradition was in 
his ability to articulate what he called the "new aspects of poli­
tics," the union of social science with the private and public 
sources of power. From his organization of the SSRC and his co-
chairmanship of President Hoover's Recent Social Trends Survey 
to his membership on FDR's National Resources Planning Board 
and his drafting of the Executive Reorganization Act, Merriam 
more than anyone served to institutionalize the expert practice of 
social planning. Although he had his own grandiose ideas on social 
engineering, Merriam concentrated his energies on creating the 
institutional apparatus of social planning.15 It had been his col­
league Robert Park who had created the new urban sociology and 
thus provided the intellectual groundwork for a realistic program 
of social planning. 
THE APPRENTICESHIP OF AN URBAN REALIST 
Robert Park was well prepared to develop a realistic sociology 
of the American city. Born in 1864 Park grew up with the new 
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urban society. He came to know the metropolis intimately in the 
1890s as a reporter in Minneapolis, Detroit, Denver, New York, 
and Chicago. As a police reporter he covered the violence and 
disorder of the city. Feature writing for the Sunday editions al­
lowed him to indulge his fascination with the city's obscure cor­
ners. Although he was, in his own words, "one of the first and 
humbler of the muckrakers," Park became disillusioned with the 
moral bombast of that genre. His extensive fund of observations, 
taste for tramping through the city, and skepticism about the ef­
fectiveness of moral reform helped him to create the new disci­
pline of urban sociology. He also brought to the discipline his iron 
determination to see things as they are, not as they might be. It is 
difficult to believe that Park knew nothing of the spate of urban 
Utopias written around the turn of the century, or the reformist 
hopes attached to the single tax, rapid transit, and the garden city 
movement, or the example of German city planning that stirred 
so many of his contemporaries; but none of those factors figure 
prominently in Park's writing or his thought. It was the under­
lying reality of the city, not romantic dreams of its transformation, 
that fired his imagination.16 
Park's education, with John Dewey at the University of Michi­
gan and later with William James at Harvard, reinforced his prag­
matic orientation and his conviction that knowledge came from 
experience. In 1892 Park, Dewey, and Franklin Ford (a financial 
reporter) launched a newspaper called Thought News based on 
their belief that experiential knowledge could be used to promote 
social progress. Ford conceived of the paper as "a union between 
the newspaper and the increasing knowledge of the university 
scholar."17 Park recalled his hope that "with more accurate and 
adequate reporting of current events the historical process could be 
appreciably stepped up^ and progress would go forward steadily, 
without the interruption and disorder of depression or violence, 
and at a rapid pace." Characteristically, Park believed that Thought 
News would not alter the direction of change; by removing ob­
stacles it would simply speed the natural evolution of society.18 
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Added to his disillusionment with muckraking, the short-lived 
project convinced Park "that the reporter performed a more im­
portant function than the editorial writer in bringing about needed 
reforms, that facts were more important in the long run than opin-
ions."19 Skeptical of the power of reform-minded journalism but 
still fascinated by the role of news in shaping public opinion and 
social change, Park returned to academia in 1898. As other urban 
realists experimented with municipal reform, Park would com­
plete his apprenticeship in a quest for a science of social change. 
Although Park's graduate studies were formally pursued within 
the disciplines of psychology and philosophy, his dissertation, The 
Crowd and the Public, was essentially a contribution to the emerg­
ing discipline of sociology. After a year at Harvard that included 
James's courses in psychology, Park went to Germany where he 
completed his dissertation under the philosopher William Windel­
band at the University of Heidelberg. His study of the urban social 
order, with the elements that held it together and even more with 
how it changed, led him to the founders of sociology. 
The early sociologists, particularly Auguste Comte, had inher­
ited from the era of the French Revolution a concern with the sta­
bility of society. The development of commerce and industry, the 
spread of market relations and libertarian and individualistic ide­
ologies, and the aggregation of strangers in cities all seemed to 
threaten social stability. Those concerns underlay Comte's em­
brace of an organic theory of society, his insistence that society 
was something greater than a mere collection of discrete individ­
uals. Adopting that organic view of society, Park came to believe 
that there was a moral order, a set of commonly held beliefs and 
opinions, that held society together. Park also shared Comte's 
faith in sociology as a predictive and ameliorative science. Social 
progress, in that view, depended on the development of a science 
that would uncover the essential facts of society and the laws that 
governed its development. Efforts to reform society that did not 
recognize its underlying moral order, and therefore ran roughshod 
over it, were destined to fail.20 
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IN QUEST OF A SCIENCE OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
Comte's emphasis on the scientific discovery of the laws of so­
cial development and the importance of opinion and belief in the 
social order complemented Park's pragmatism and his interest in 
the newspaper and public opinion. But in certain matters he dif­
fered sharply with Comte, especially with Comte's emphasis on 
consensus as the basis of social order. The same liberalism, indi­
vidualism, industrialism, and urbanism that Comte feared were 
undercutting the social order, Park accepted as fundamental ele­
ments of the social order. Like Spencer and Durkheim, Park be­
lieved that the functional interdependence characteristic of modern 
society added the weight of mutual utility to the consensual bonds 
of society. Denying the fundamental threat to the social order that 
Comte saw in modern urban society, Park was free to explore 
his interest in the sources of social change as opposed to social 
stability.21 
But Park did not uncritically endorse the views of Spencer and 
Durkheim anymore than those of Comte. Whereas Spencer saw 
social progress as the result of the pursuit of individual, rational 
self-interest, Park's familiarity with both the volatile urban crowd 
and the malleability of public opinion led him to emphasize the 
role of group interaction, of sociability, in social change. Like 
Simmel, whose work he admired, Park would show how the 
forms of social interaction, as distinct from the interests of social 
actors, shaped individual and group action. The study of socia­
bility would help to clarify the limits of the rational theory of in­
dividual action without totally abandoning it. An examination of 
the crowd and the public, specific and particularly dynamic forms 
of sociability, might even reveal the secrets of social change in the 
urban environment.22 
Park began The Crowd and the Public with a review of the work 
of an Italian criminologist, Sighele, and challenged Sighele's view 
of the crowd as a purely lawless and destructive phenomenon. 
Park observed that people were subject to suggestion in every so­
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cial situation; what made the crowd distinctive was simply that the 
attention of its members was focused on a single situation and its 
action aimed at a common goal.23 Thus the crowd was only a spe­
cial form of the social group. Factoring out its distinctive ele­
ments, the crowd could be studied as a guide to the dynamics of 
all social groups. On the basis of those initial observations, Park 
developed a scientific definition of society. The actual physical ba­
sis of the social group and of society itself, he asserted, was to be 
found "in the brain and the physiology of the nervous system." 
Thus sociology "necessarily becomes social psychology" and its 
basic units are "volitional attitudes . . . of individuals interacting 
in a group situation." A study of those attitudes and how they 
were formed would uncover the moral order that underlay society 
and the laws that governed social relations. It would reveal the 
secret of what Park would later call social control, the process 
whereby groups regulated the behavior of their members.24 
Social control and moral order were not alien restraints imposed 
upon the individual or the social group; they were derived from 
a spontaneous "natural social instinct," Park argued. The instinct 
consisted of a capacity for sympathy and imitation whereby indi­
viduals placed themselves in the position of another and thus re­
produced in themselves the other's feelings. Sympathy and imita­
tion not only facilitated the transmission of tradition between 
generations, but they also facilitated social control within genera­
tions. Through sympathy, imitation, and mutual suggestion, Park 
concluded, "the group as a whole exerts coercion upon the indi-
vidual."25 Having identified the primary sources of social stability, 
Park shifted his attention to his main interest, the processes of so­
cial change. 
THE CROWD AND THE PUBLIC AS AGENCIES OF CHANGE 
From the sociological perspective the forces of social stability, 
especially tradition and social control, formed the general will. 
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The general will, the mentality of the social group, established a 
stable relationship among individual wills. It represented "what is 
morally valid for the collectivity." The forces for social change, 
on the other hand, were centered around what Park called collec­
tive attention, "a process in which the group acts upon itself; that 
is, the group takes a stand on something in its environment." Par­
liaments, courts of law, political parties, and sects directed collec­
tive attention to specific situations in order to change the dispo­
sition of their members or the other members of society. Such 
formal and established groups defined themselves in terms of the 
general will, in support of or in opposition to some element of it. 
But the crowd and the public were different, Park explained: 
They serve to bring individuals out of old ties and into new 
ones. . . . The historical element which plays such an important 
role for the other groups is partially or completely absent for the 
crowd as well as for the public. Instead, the crowd and the public 
reveal the processes through which new groups are formed, al­
though they are not yet conscious of themselves as groups. 
The crowd and the public, in which communication took a par­
ticularly open-ended and volatile form, were the most dynamic 
forces for social change.26 
Through collective attention, which interrupted normal social 
activity and focused the group on some problem, the crowd and 
the public came into being. The crowd was a form of collective 
attention in which legal as well as traditional and customary limits 
might collapse. Great crowd movements played a double role: 
"they were the forces which dealt the final blow to old existing 
institutions, and they introduced the spirit of the new ones." A 
strike in the industrial city, where the old ties of master to jour­
neyman had dissolved, provided just such conditions. The strike 
served "to draw the public's attention to a condition considered 
unjust and unbearable by the workers. It is an appeal to the judge­
ment of the whole because no existing court had jurisdiction."27 
New institutions such as collective bargaining and the regulatory 
state, Park seemed to anticipate, would emerge from the wreckage 
of the old. 
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Notwithstanding its creative elements, the crowd had a ten­
dency to degenerate into a mob. In a highly charged gathering of 
people whose attention was directed to the same object, such as 
a political meeting, emotions were contagious. Individuals un­
consciously imitated the emotions of others in a circular process 
of extreme suggestibility. However, such behavior was not con­
fined to strikes and political meetings. The various techniques of 
modern advertising, Park noted, were designed precisely to take 
advantage of the suggestibility and impulsiveness of the urban 
crowd.28 Even what passed for public opinion was "generally 
nothing more than a naive collective impulse which can be ma­
nipulated by catchwords." Modern journalism, the former news­
man warned, excelled in controlling the attention of urban crowds 
and encouraging simplistic and unreflective responses.29 
In Park's definition, however, the public and public opinion dif­
fered sharply from the crowd and crowd behavior. In the crowd 
individual impulses were inhibited in favor of a collective drive; 
in the public individual impulses remained salient and developed 
through reciprocal interaction. Out of the competition between 
individuals within the public, Park concluded, came a rational pub­
lic opinion similar to market prices.30 Despite Park's caveat that his 
distinction between the crowd and the public was "purely logical 
and cannot be viewed as a value difference," there was no mistak­
ing his preference for the public as a vehicle of social change. 
While "instincts dominated" the crowd, "reason prevailed" in the 
public. No norm other than the ability to feel and empathize gov­
erned the crowd; within the public "people are at least controlled 
by the norms of logic." Guided "by prudence and rational reflec­
tion," the public offered the high road to social change.31 Park's 
public resembled what Zorbaugh later termed social politics, the 
realistic program of urban reform. The Crowd and the Public thus 
anticipated the contributions of the Chicago school and suggested 
some of its weaknesses. 
Park's study of the crowd and the public illuminated the formal 
dynamics of social interaction and social change in the urban en­
vironment. But in his exclusive emphasis on the forms of social 
interaction, he neglected the content and the substance of those 
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interactions. Whereas Simmel, whose work provided an impor­
tant basis for Park's, had warned that the study of the forms of 
interaction must be supplemented by the study of economic and 
political interests and of power, Park developed a science of social 
change that focused exclusively on formal interaction. Although 
Park acknowledged that individual and group interests influenced 
social interaction, he did not make those interests a part of his 
analysis. He thus obscured the extent to which the exercise and 
unequal distribution of political and economic power influenced 
all social life and social change.32 While Park's apparent preference 
for the public as a vehicle for social change is understandable, his 
analysis only hinted at the function of the crowd as a means for 
the relatively powerless to draw attention to their problems and 
to demand social change. Nor did Park's analysis suggest that the 
success of the public as a vehicle for social change might depend 
on the willingness of the powerful shapers of public opinion to 
orchestrate change from above. 
REALISM AND RACE RELATIONS 
When Park completed The Crowd and the Public in 1904 at the 
age of forty, he was already impatient with the limitations of the 
scholarly life and with his self-perceived failure to find a proper 
outlet for his energies and ambitions. During the next decade he 
developed sociological interests in the black American and the 
evolution of race relations. In association with Booker T. Wash­
ington and the Tuskegee Institute, Park enlisted in the cause of 
practical education for blacks as a means of adjustment to modern 
life. He saw Washington as a man "engaged in a fundamental task 
who has a sense of reality . . . who knows what should be done 
and how to do it."33 
Checking Park's own genuine capacity for moral outrage at ra­
cist excesses, Washington encouraged him to see that "beneath the 
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superficial pattern and external aspect of southern life was the 
working of a great historical process, a process which was slowly 
but inexorably changing . . . the traditional relations between the 
races." As more and more southern blacks flocked to northern 
industrial cities, Park, like Washington, came to see them as peas­
ants unprepared for urban life. But unlike Washington, Park be­
lieved the urbanization of southern blacks to be inevitable, and he 
was fascinated by and concerned to alleviate the consequent prob­
lems of adjustment. In 1912 at Tuskegee's International Confer­
ence on the Negro, Park met William I. Thomas, a University 
of Chicago sociologist and student of the immigration of Polish 
peasants to the American city. The two quickly recognized com­
mon interests. It was Thomas who convinced Park to come to 
Chicago and arranged for him to teach a graduate course, "The 
Negro in Chicago," in the fall of 1913.34 
The move to Chicago was a fortuitous one for Park. A city of 
more than two million when he arrived, Chicago was in the pro­
cess of nearly doubling its population between 1900 and 1930. In 
Park's first six years in the city, its black population more than 
doubled to 110,000.35 Park was able to witness firsthand the large-
scale migration of southern blacks and to study the problem of ad­
justment. Moreover, Chicago boasted an active and civic-minded 
leadership, flush with the success of The Plan of Chicago, eager to 
advance the city's interests. The lavishly financed University of 
Chicago was becoming the center of a confident and scientific so­
ciology. With the city as his laboratory, Park was able to explore 
his interest in the crowd and the public as vehicles for social 
change and in the problems of race relations and to extend his 
scientific search for the keys to social progress. 
In 1916 Park published his most influential essay, "The City: 
Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Ur­
ban Environment," which outlined an ambitious program of re­
search. The organizing theme of the wide-ranging essay was the 
concept of human ecology. Impersonal forces within the urban 
environment, Park explained, "tend to bring about an orderly 
and typical grouping of its population and institutions." Human 
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ecology was the scientific study of those forces, of the natural areas 
(distinctive, unplanned districts) they produced, and of the forms 
of human interaction found within those natural areas.36 The cen­
tral focus of Park's essay was on that last issue and especially on 
the distinction between primary, face-to-face, and intimate as op­
posed to secondary, impersonal, and indirect relations. 
In an urban environment secondary relations normally pro­
vided the basis for order. The ease of communication and transpor­
tation meant that most urbanites moved freely through a variety 
of natural areas. Thus the moral order of the city emerged less 
from primary relations in local communities than from a variety 
of secondary relations on a city wide and metropolitan basis. 
Similarly, the social order relied less on the intimate and personal 
forms of social control associated with the family, the church, and 
the neighborhood than on impersonal forms of social control pro­
vided by metropolitan agencies including the legal system, the 
schools, and social welfare agencies, as well as by publicity and 
advertising.37 
The segregated residential area and the ghetto, however, repre­
sented important exceptions to the dominance of secondary rela­
tions in the urban environment. To a great extent those insulated 
neighborhoods preserved and even intensified the primary rela­
tionships, the moral order, and the forms of social control typical 
of simple societies. But they were also areas in which the social 
scientist could examine the inevitable breakdown, under the im­
pact of the ecological processes of invasion, competition, and suc­
cession, of those simpler social forms and the creation of new 
forms of social control that facilitated the adjustment to urban 
life.38 Thus the segregated ethnic neighborhoods and the black 
ghetto of Chicago's south side, where racial and ethnic tensions 
would erupt into racial violence in 1919, offered Park a laboratory 
for the study of human ecology and the problems of adjustment 
in an expanding metropolis. Park's analysis of those problems 
would focus on the forms of social interaction rather than its eco­
nomic and political determinants. 
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHICAGO'S SOUTH SIDE 
A generation before the great black migrations of the twentieth 
century, Chicago's south side neighborhoods housed thousands 
of working-class families who found employment in the nearby 
stockyards, steel mills, and agricultural processing plants. At least 
since the 1880s, ethnic tensions had exacerbated labor conflicts and 
created a bitterly competitive social order. Hundreds of southern 
and eastern European immigrants, who had been brought in to 
break the eight-hour-day movement in 1886, crowded into the 
contested neighborhoods surrounding the stockyards, driving the 
less recent German and Irish immigrants further south. Employers 
first used blacks as strikebreakers in the stockyards in 1894 when 
workers there struck in support of the Pullman strikers. In the first 
years of the twentieth century, Chicago steel manufacturers and 
the University of Chicago also employed black strikebreakers.39 
The use of black strikebreakers added racial antagonisms to an 
already volatile situation. 
The racist attitudes of many white unionists, reinforced by the 
use of blacks as strikebreakers, extended the color line into orga­
nized labor. Blacks had their own reasons for resisting union­
ization, including the exclusionary principle of the whites-only 
unions, their experiences with Jim Crow unions that afforded no 
protection from dismissal, the unfamiliarity with union ideals of 
many rural migrants, and the legacy of paternalism many brought 
with them from the South. Regardless of the reasons, however, 
the resistance exacerbated the antagonism of white unionists.40 But 
at least one union, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher 
Workmen (AMCBW), endeavored to organize across racial lines 
and succeeded in enlisting many of the five hundred black workers 
employed in the stockyards in the early 1900s. For a time racial 
antagonism eased. In 1904 when negotiations with the packers 
broke down and the AMCBW called a strike, however, the pack­
ers imported trainloads of southern black strikebreakers. Muted 
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racial antagonisms quickly revived and racial violence erupted. In 
a 1905 teamsters strike, blacks were again used as strikebreakers 
and again found themselves the victims of racial violence. 
During World War I, with European orders flooding in and 
immigrant sources of labor cut off, union leaders saw a unique 
opportunity to organize the stockyards. The various stockyard 
unions created the Stockyard Labor Council in 1917 and launched 
a concerted organization drive in September. A central goal of the 
council was to unionize the ten to twelve thousand black workers 
in the yards, about 25 percent of the total labor force. The ap­
pointment of a federal labor arbitrator, Judge Samual Alschuler, 
and his award of an eight-hour day and other benefits encouraged 
the effort. But the history of racial tensions within the work force 
contributed to a lag in black union membership even as the black 
percentage of the work force increased.42 On the eve of the 1919 
race riot, nine thousand of the twelve thousand black workers in 
the yards were still nonunion and racial tensions were high. On 
the Monday following the riot's outbreak (Sunday, July 27) several 
black workers were assaulted in and around the yards, three of 
whom died of their wounds. On Tuesday few blacks reported for 
work. When troops arrived in the city on Thursday, the violence 
subsided throughout much of the South Side, but not in the yards 
where the bloodshed continued. Yet on Saturday the packers an­
nounced plans to bring twelve to fifteen thousand blacks to work 
despite the bitter complaints of white workers and unionists. After 
rejecting the union's offer to take responsibility for peace under 
a closed shop agreement, the packers brought twelve thousand 
black workers, nine thousand of them nonunion, into the yards 
under armed guard, while ten thousand white unionists walked 
out in protest.43 
Labor conflict was not the only arena of racial tension. As Chi-
cago's black population increased during the early years of the cen­
tury, the competition for housing contributed another dimension. 
In 1904 the packers had housed thousands of black strikebreakers 
in the lard houses, killing halls, and canning rooms of the stock­
yards in deplorable conditions. Once the strike was broken, most 
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blacks were discharged to make their way in the already crowded 
ghetto along nearby Wentworth Avenue.44 During World War I, 
explained Sears, Roebuck president and philanthropist Julius Ro­
senwald, Chicago employers were forced "to seek another source 
of labor supply. This exists in the colored population."45 The 
packers' "placarded warehouses, set close by the railroads, dotted 
every sizeable town of the South, calling for men," while Chicago 
railroads and the federal Department of Labor (until challenged by 
southern congressmen) facilitated the migration of an estimated 
fifty thousand blacks in an eighteen-month period between 1917 
and 1918.46 The migrants flocked to Chicago "because we have 
asked them to come," Rosenwald admitted, but no provision had 
been made for their housing. The "large employers . . . who lured 
my people to . .  . Chicago have been derelict in providing hous­
ing," complained one black teacher. The black community, Carl 
Sandburg reported in 1919, faced the "biggest overcrowding prob­
lem" in Chicago.47 
Despised by union men as scabs and their housing needs ig­
nored by their employers, the migrants also found themselves 
hemmed in by organized white property owners, exploited by 
realtors, and shunned by bankers. The Hyde Park Property Own­
ers Association typified the aggressive response of white property 
owners to the expansion of the ghetto. Hyde Park had been an 
unstable neighborhood long before blacks moved into it. As early 
as the World's Columbian Exposition in 1893, which stimulated 
the speculative construction of hotels and cheap apartments to ac­
commodate visitors and construction workers, the character of 
fashionable Hyde Park had begun to change. In the early twentieth 
century, the proximity of the stockyards, the noise and filth of 
the lakefront railroads, and the invasion of the automobile indus­
try along Michigan Avenue drove the wealthiest residents to the 
North Side or the suburbs. By 1916 the glut of apartments and the 
exodus of residents had left an estimated 25 percent of the build­
ings vacant, especially the older single-family residences.48 
Hyde Park realty values were at best unstable as the black mi­
grants' demand for housing began to intensify. Realtors and prop­
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erty owners consented to sell to the migrants, many of whom 
arrived in Chicago with the proceeds of the sale of their property 
in the South, in order to stabilize realty values. But by 1918 the 
wartime slump in housing construction and the announcement of 
plans for revitalizing the lakefront revived the demand for Hyde 
Park housing among affluent whites and prompted the organiza­
tion of a Hyde Park Property Owners Association (HPPOA).49 
Fearful that prospective white residents would not wish to live 
near blacks and that the rise in property values would be reversed, 
the HPPOA pledged to use all lawful means to force blacks back 
into "their own neighborhoods."50 The HPPOA's argument that 
an influx of black residents inevitably led to the decline of both 
neighborhoods and realty values proved to be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Exclusion and segregation forced migrants to pay in­
flated prices for large, deteriorating residences within the ghetto 
or on its edges and to overcrowd the buildings with lodgers to 
meet expenses. When black owners sought loans to maintain and 
rehabilitate the structures, they found that "most large real estate 
firms and loan companies decline to make loans on property 
owned or occupied by Negroes."51 
Those developments led to great anxieties and bitter tensions in 
the neighborhoods surrounding the ghetto. What would later be 
called "non-adjusted" or "contested" neighborhoods and the eco­
logical processes of "invasion" and "succession" were largely the 
results of a speculative market in real estate. "The colored man," 
one Hyde Park resident explained, "would have never been in this 
district had not our real estate men in their ambition to acquire 
wealth and commissions, which is perfectly legitimate, put them 
here, although this action on their part has been very shortsighted, 
as some of them now admit." Speculative realtors had made hand­
some profits, as the black leader Charles S. Duke complained, in 
the "business of commercializing racial antagonisms."52 Realtors, 
Carl Sandburg reported, frightened white property owners into 
selling at a loss then resold the properties to blacks at an inflated 
price. It was a scam, Sandburg charged, based on the illogical 
premise that "the larger the number of colored persons ready to 
pay higher rentals, the lower the realty values slump."53 When 
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realtors saw the possibility of making even higher profits through 
the revival of the fashionable neighborhood and were threatened 
with reprisals from white property owners, however, they shifted 
their tactics. The HPPOA boasted that all but five or six realtors 
had pledged not to show, rent, or sell any property "within our 
locality that we claim jurisdiction of in the future to colored 
people."54 The entire campaign, in both public meetings and the 
HPPOA's journal, was conducted in a spirit of severe racial ani­
mosity. The racial tensions exploded between 1917 and 1921 in a 
series of bombings of black-owned and -occupied buildings and 
the residences and offices of offending realtors and bankers.55 
Blacks and whites clashed not only over jobs and housing, but 
also over the use of public space. The segregation of Chicago's vice 
trade in the ghetto cast a pall over the area. Overcrowding also 
took its toll. Migrants from the South felt "the town too large for 
much friendliness" and complained that "people do not visit each 
other."56 Black children especially suffered from a lack of public 
facilities. Most public schools in the ghetto lacked playgrounds, 
gymnasiums, and assembly halls. Chicago's celebrated system of 
neighborhood parks provided little benefit to black youth because 
of intimidation and violence from white children and because park 
officials and reformers discouraged the integrated use of facilities. 
Black youth had few options but to loiter around the catchpenny 
amusements of the city; a study of "retarded" black students 
revealed their recreation to be centered around the commercial 
movie house. At the segregated black beach at Twenty-fifth Street, 
crowded between railroad tracks and a high embankment, "the 
atmosphere of wholesome, recreative outdoor life [was] entirely 
lacking."57 It was around that beach, the one beach open to blacks, 
and the nearby whites-only beach at Twenty-ninth Street that the 
race riot of July 1919 began. 
THE CROWD . .  . 
The riot began on a hot Sunday afternoon, July 27, when a clash 
of black and white bathers resulted in the death of a young black 
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man. A small group of black men and women, frustrated with seg­
regated and inferior facilities, had determined to use the whites-
only beach at Twenty-ninth Street. Driven away by curses, threats, 
and rocks, they returned in greater numbers to force the whites 
from the beach. When a larger group of whites assembled, a vio­
lent struggle ensued. Meanwhile a group of five young black men, 
unaware of the events on the beach, had appeared offshore. A 
white man began hurling rocks at the boys hitting one, Eugene 
Williams, who subsequently drowned. The black crowd sum­
moned a black policeman from the Twenty-fifth Street beach, 
pointed out the man they believed to be guilty, and demanded that 
the white officer on duty arrest him. The white officer refused 
to do so and also prevented the black officer from making the ar­
rest. While the crowd swelled and wild rumors began to spread, 
the white officer arrested a black man on the complaint of a 
white man. An enraged black man fired into a group of white 
policemen, wounding one. The black officer shot and killed 
the assailant, and soon other shots were fired. Angry crowds began 
to leave the beach to spread the news, touching off five days of 
rioting.58 
The beach incident ignited a race riot that had been waiting to 
happen. The presence of thousands of immigrants and migrants, 
the pressure of population on its neighborhoods, and the intensity 
of labor conflict had all made the social order of Chicago's south 
side both extremely competitive and unstable. Well before the 
riot's outbreak, numerous groups had emerged which displayed 
what could be called crowd behavior in an effort to call attention 
to what they saw as intolerable conditions and to provide their 
members with protection. Much of that crowd behavior, like the 
angry meetings of the Hyde Park Association, exacerbated racial 
tensions. 
The youth gangs that blanketed the immigrant neighborhoods 
typified the role of crowds in the riot. Located in the "broad 
twilight zone of railroads and factories, of deteriorating neighbor­
hoods and shifting populations" the gangs, as the Chicago soci­
ologist Frederic Thrasher later explained, represented "the spon­
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taneous effort of boys to create a society where none adequate to 
their needs exists." In the face of disorganized families, corrupt 
and indifferent politicians, poor housing and sanitation, and fre­
quent unemployment, membership in a gang gave its members a 
sense of security. Its code focused on "the group rather than the 
welfare of its individual members." The gang often stole "for the 
family larder" and the "loyalty of the members to each other" in­
creased "in times of unemployment."59 But towards those outside 
the gang its behavior was predatory, and blacks were decidedly 
outside the gang. 
The central role of crowds in both the events leading up to and 
during the riot revealed the concerted and purposeful action of 
social groups (as opposed to the criminality of the isolated indi­
vidual) as the major cause of the riot. In an incident typical of 
many others during the riot, swarms of white children, as young 
as four and five, blocked a trolley while whites pulled blacks off 
the car and beat them. The social order of the South Side had not 
suddenly collapsed; the riot had illuminated in a particularly lurid 
way the bitterly competitive aspects of that order. On both sides 
there were many who believed their actions to have been justified. 
The white policeman who had refused to arrest the rock-thrower 
on the beach where the riot had started later said that it "wouldn't 
take much to start another riot, and most of the white people of 
this district are resolved to make a clean-up this time." A black 
veteran countered, "I done my part and I'm going to fight right 
here till Uncle Sam does his. I can shoot as good as the next one, 
and nobody better start anything."60 
Not all of the crowd behavior on Chicago's south side was vio­
lent and destructive. There was at least one example of the positive 
and creative aspect of crowd behavior to which Park had alluded. 
Just weeks before the race riot a group of black and white stock­
yard workers paraded through the black ghetto to call attention to 
what they saw as the packers' cynical effort to exacerbate racial 
tensions. "The bosses think because we are of different colors and 
different nationalities that we should fight each other. We're going 
to fool them and fight for a common cause—a square deal for all," 
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read one placard. "You notice there ain't no Jim Crow cars here 
today," a black organizer announcer. "That's what organization 
does."61 Similar efforts were made among the milling crowds out­
side the stockyards, crowds that the packers endeavored to dis­
62perse.  The union-sponsored crowds reflected the assumption 
that the race problem, as one federal labor official suggested, was 
"at rock bottom a labor question" and served to lessen rather than 
to heighten racial tensions. "The one place in this town where I 
feel safest is over at the yard, with my union button on," explained 
another black organizer.63 That was the creative element of crowd 
behavior, the ability to bring people out of old relationships and 
attitudes and into new ones. 
Crowd behavior also suggested the role that political and eco­
nomic interests played in shaping social interaction, the issue Park 
tended to ignore. During the riot the New Majority, organ of the 
Chicago Federation of Labor, called on union members to end 
the violence. "This responsibility rests particularly heavy upon the 
white men and women of organized labor," the paper editorial­
ized, "not because they had anything to do with starting the pres­
ent trouble, but because of their advantageous position to help end 
it."64 Union organizers believed racial amity to be in their interest, 
and they used crowds to promote it. Recognizing the importance 
of their efforts, Herbert Seligmann wrote after the riot that "it will 
be largely on the job and in the labor union that the identity of in­
terest of the colored worker and the white will be demonstrated." 65 
Unfortunately, the interests of other groups, most notably anti­
union employers, cynical realtors, and demagogic politicians, but 
also many ordinary, relatively powerless, and frightened citizens, 
seemed to demand greater racial tensions. 
While the riot was still raging, a group of prominent Chica­
goans, representing major industrial and social welfare institu­
tions, called on Illinois governor Lowden to appoint a commission 
on race relations. Financed by the city's elite but possessing neither 
official authority nor a broadly representative character, the Illi­
nois Commission on Race Relations (ICRR) was not in a position 
to manage or mediate racial conflicts. Rather, it chose to undertake 
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a scholarly study of the causes of the riot and to make a series of 
policy recommendations, both of which were published in 1922 as 
The Negro in Chicago.66 
An impressive interracial group of Chicago's leaders, the ICRR 
amassed an imposing array of facts in an effort to move public 
opinion toward greater amity in race relations. Adopting the Na­
tional Urban League's program of industrial employment and so­
cial welfare programs as the route to black progress and racial jus­
tice, the ICRR represented Park's public in action. Indeed, his 
work in urban sociology and race relations and his presidency of 
the Chicago Urban League had placed Park in a position of con­
siderable influence, and The Negro in Chicago bore his unmistak­
able imprint.67 
In the ICRR's analysis of the race riots, crowds and the interests 
that motivated them were not an important factor. Examining 
crowds in only a four-page section of a nearly seven-hundred-page 
report, the ICRR discussed only the formal aspects of crowd be­
havior. In introducing the Crowds and Mobs section, the ICRR 
was careful to distinguish between the two: "It may be observed 
that a crowd is merely a gathering of people while a mob is a 
crowd with its attention so strongly fixed upon some lawless pur­
pose that other purposes are inhibited."68 
Crowds turned into mobs, the ICRR report explained, "when 
exciting rumors circulated and the suggestion of vengeance was 
made by leaders." Divided "in performance into a small active 
nucleus and a large proportion of spectators," the mob turned to 
violence "by having the direct suggestion put to them by one of 
the leaders." Yet the entire mob "must share the moral responsi­
bility" for violence since without "the spectators mob violence 
would probably have stopped short of murder in many cases."69 
Mobs formed most easily at transfer corners on the trolley system, 
in parks, and at beaches and vice resorts; many of the deaths and 
the most serious injuries occurred at these points. In making its 
recommendations the ICRR urged the authorities to close vice re­
sorts and to police transfer corners, parks, and beaches in greater 
numbers. "Precision and promptness of movement" had enabled 
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the militia to prevent the formation of mobs. Thus the ICRR 
urged that "the police and militia work out, at the earliest possible 
date, a detailed plan for joint action in the control of race riots."70 
Laudable as such precautions were, they reflected the ICRR's over­
riding conviction that the average citizens who made up both 
crowds and mobs had little positive role to play in improving race 
relations. 
. . . AND THE PUBLIC 
As a vehicle for change the ICRR preferred the public. The 150­
page section on public opinion was by far the largest part of the 
ICRR's report. It was also the basis for its most important policy 
recommendations. Even the ICRR's definition of the public re­
flected its elitist assumptions. In investigating the causes of the 
riot, the ICRR collected information from the public through a 
series of conferences. The character of those conferences, Arthur 
Waskow argues, "was a silent endorsement of the value of testi­
mony from a number of different leadership groups rather than 
from randomly selected residents of Chicago, or from a represen­
tative sample of the entire population." The public opinion of the 
powerless carried relatively little weight with the ICRR.71 
In investigating housing conditions, for example, the ICRR 
turned to builders and real estate managers. Although the housing 
conference did include interviews with some black families, the 
white families with whom they competed for housing were not 
consulted. In surveying employment conditions, the ICRR inter­
viewed black workers but not the white workers with whom they 
so often and tragically clashed. The study of public opinion in­
cluded a considerable number of statements taken from unexcep­
tional white residents of the South Side, but even here greater 
emphasis was placed on the opinions of an exceptional group of 
well-educated business and professional men and women from 
both races. The ICRR's study of crime relied on the opinion of 
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judges, police officials, and social workers rather than that of 
criminals or their victims.72 The ICRR thus anticipated what Ir­
ving Horowitz has argued "was to become the dominant 'policy­
making style,' i.e., an unconcern with politics, or at least a strict 
division between politics as a mass activity (with which the policy-
making social scientists were unconcerned) and policy as an elite ac­
tivity (with which they were intimately concerned)." It was to the 
development of a rational and progressive public opinion among 
Chicago's educated and powerful elite rather than to a direct as­
sault upon the problems and the attitudes of the ordinary citizen 
that the ICRR looked for an improvement in race relations.73 
The ICRR's recommendations faithfully reflected those elitist 
assumptions and were designed to implement that strategy. Al­
though the commissioners had interviewed many black Chica­
goans and undoubtedly sympathized with their plight, their rec­
ommendations implied that racial justice was something to be 
implemented from above rather than demanded from below.74 In­
deed the ICRR discouraged blacks from taking any aggressive ac­
tion in their own behalf. Neither did the ICRR make any recom­
mendations as to what active role the ordinary white citizens who 
had been responsible for so large a part of the violence could play 
in improving race relations. The ICRR did argue that whites too 
often judged blacks from contacts with "servants of families, or 
other Negroes whose general standing and training do not qualify 
them to be spokesmen of the group." It recommended that whites 
seek information on blacks from "responsible and representative 
Negroes," presumably not the ones with whom they competed 
for jobs and housing.75 Those who had borne the brunt of racial 
injustice and precipitated the worst violence had, in the view of 
the ICRR, at best only a limited role in alleviating racial tensions. 
With greater confidence the ICRR looked to elites for an im­
provement in the climate of racial opinion. The information col­
lected on public opinion, the commissioners reported, could "be 
used to reduce, if not to prevent, racial unfriendliness and misun-
derstanding."76 The "strict enforcement" of compulsory educa­
tion would anchor an effort to impose a more enlightened public 
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opinion. The ICRR urged elite organizations such as the Woman's 
City Club, the Union League Club, and the Urban League to ex­
tend their efforts to improve race relations and recommended that 
"the appropriate social agencies give needed attention to dealing 
extra-judicially with cases of Negroes." The ICRR called for the 
creation of a permanent race-relations body charged with the re­
sponsibility of "bringing sound public sentiment to bear upon the 
settlement of racial disputes, and with promoting the spirit of in­
terracial tolerance and co-operation." The ICRR argued that the 
newspapers, as the linchpin of public opinion, were crucial to the 
effort. Having compiled considerable evidence to suggest that 
newspapers sensationalized racial incidents to boost circulation, 
the ICRR pleaded with them to prevent racial antagonisms by 
publishing "such matters as shall in their character tend to dispel 
prejudice and promote mutual respect and good will."77 
Arguing that the city's powerful elite had an important part to 
play in improving race relations was justified. In the wake of riot, 
a number of commentators recognized that racial tensions were an 
integral part of the city's political structure and of the ways in 
which power was exercised. The race problem and the recent ri­
ots, Walter Lippmann argued, were "really a by-product of our 
planless, disordered, bedraggled, drifting democracy." Unless we 
"learn to house everybody, employ everybody at decent wages in 
a self-respecting status," he concluded, race relations would con­
tinue to deteriorate. "Insufficient and unsuitable housing . . . for 
the industrial classes," concurred the settlement leader Graham 
Taylor, lay behind the riot. Seligmann more pointedly blamed the 
"contest between organized labor and employer" and the "plot­
ting and counter-plotting of factions in city government."78 Al­
though the ICRR's report lacked a critical analysis of the ways in 
which racial tensions shaped and reinforced the city's political 
structure, it contained considerable evidence to support such an 
analysis.79 
The ICRR did make a series of recommendations aimed at the 
problems to which Lippmann, Taylor, Seligmann, and others had 
pointed. Condemning those who "arbitrarily advance rents merely 
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because Negroes become tenants," the ICRR urged whites to "en­
ergetically discourage" all "methods tending toward forcible seg­
regation or exclusion of Negroes." The commissioners disputed 
the equation of black occupancy with the depreciation of property 
values and urged lenders to treat blacks fairly. The ICRR asked 
unions and employers to treat workers of both races equally and, 
without encouraging blacks either to join or not to join unions, 
discouraged the creation of segregated unions. Citing "gross in­
equalities of [police] protection," discrimination in arrests and 
prosecution, and the inferior schools, playgrounds, and public 
utilities found in the ghetto, the ICRR called on municipal officials 
to end legal discrimination and to improve facilities for blacks.80 
All were laudable recommendations; yet they were ones which, by 
all accounts, had little positive effect on race relations. For at least 
another generation, the color line remained hard and fast in resi­
dential areas, skilled employment, union membership, civic af­
fairs, and even in public opinion.81 
The failure of the ICRR's recommendations to improve race 
relations suggested the weakness of the public as a vehicle for so­
cial change. What the ICRR had failed to explain was how indus­
trial employers, real estate dealers, machine politicians, municipal 
officials, and others who benefited in one way or another from 
racial tensions could be made to change their behavior. Despite 
abundant evidence of the integral role of racial tensions in both the 
city's social and political order, the ICRR proposed no significant 
changes in that order. Instead, and paradoxically, the commission­
ers looked to elites with vested interests in the status quo for an 
improvement in race relations. The ICRR's strategy seemed to re­
flect a belief that racism was a purely irrational aberration that 
could be removed by an appeal to reason. 
Or perhaps the ICRR believed, as Waskow suggests, that a "fear 
of future violence in the pattern of the 1919 race riot" alone would 
encourage elite Chicagoans to work toward improved race rela­
tions. But if this was the thinking of the commissioners, it con­
ceded the preeminent role of crowd behavior in bringing about 
change. It was, after all, the violence that had brought the ICRR 
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into existence. In his foreword to The Negro in Chicago, Governor 
Lowden had argued that a key purpose of the commission was to 
prevent a reoccurrance of "the appalling tragedy which brought 
disgrace to Chicago in July of 1919." One of the ICRR's few rec­
ommendations that met with success, the creation of a permanent 
race-relations commission, was enacted only in the 1940s in re­
sponse to a growing fear over the possibility of another riot. 
Whatever the thinking of the commissioners, both the origins of 
the ICRR and the fate of its recommendations pointed to pressure 
from below, and the crowd as one form of such pressure, as the 
most important engine of change.82 
Of course pressure from below in any form was the last thing the 
ICRR was interested in promoting. Nor was it something in which 
Robert Park placed much faith. Skeptical of the ICRR's strategy, 
Mary White Ovington, chairman of the national NAACP, warned 
that "Robert Park . . . has never been aggressive . . . would dally 
and fail," was a "slow going conservative, the astute political 
kind."83 Although that judgment may be too harsh, in the absence 
of a popular demand there was little incentive for elites to push for 
change and little possibility that race relations would improve. 
The critical problems on the South Side to which the rioting had 
called attention, the competition for employment, housing, and 
public facilities, and the cynical manipulation of racial tensions, 
demanded significant changes in Chicago's social and political or­
der, changes that threatened powerful interests and could only be 
secured at the hands of an equally powerful political movement. 
The ICRR had no intention and little chance of organizing a 
mass political movement and would have found the suggestion 
that it do so outrageous. However, the ICRR's claim to be devel­
oping a systematic and effective policy may have preempted other, 
approaches. In any event unless the social, economic, and political 
problems that exacerbated racial tensions were addressed in some 
positive and effective manner, the ICRR could not even ensure 
that further violence would be avoided, much less that a new and 
enlightened period of race relations would ensue. Indeed, after 
roughly twenty years of relative quiet and continued racial injus­
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tice, racial tensions again erupted violently during and after World 
War II. Although a dramatic upheaval such as had occurred in 1919 
was avoided, a decade of racial violence dashed the hopes and the 
best intentions of liberal public opinion. Racial prejudice and racial 
tension so distorted the emerging public policies of urban redevel­
opment and urban renewal that those ostensibly liberal policies 
played a major role in the making of Chicago's second, much en­
larged if little improved, ghetto.84 The realistic approach to race 
relations that Park promoted and that the ICRR embodied would 
prove unrealistic in its expectations of positive change. 
A less charitable interpretation would suggest that the ICRR's 
desire for change was itself rather limited. In introducing the sec­
tion of its report on public opinion, which the commissioners and 
their staff touted as the most important, the commissioners ob­
served that "men are tormented by the opinions they have of 
things rather than by the things themselves." Focusing less on the 
role of interests than on the social psychology of race relations, the 
commission implied that racial tension was a problem of "moods 
and antagonisms expressed in words and shown in manners" 
rather than of overcrowding housing, job discrimination, and 
physical violence.85 In that context "racial adjustment" becomes a 
paltry thing, an accommodation to the status quo. 
In the area of residential integration, the ICRR's commitment 
to change was indeed limited. In January 1921 W. E. B. Dubois 
charged that the commissioners "under the guise of impartiality 
and good will are pushing insidiously but unswervingly a pro­
gram of racial segregation."86 As Thomas Philpott has shown, 
even the most sincere friends of the Negro on the ICRR supported 
a program of voluntary segregation and the rebuilding of the black 
ghetto. The ICRR's recommendations closely paralleled the plan 
announced in the riot's aftermath by the powerful interests within 
the Chicago Real Estate Board and the Association of Commerce, 
a plan that promised to transform the ghetto into "a housing sec­
tion for colored people that cannot be equaled in any part of the 
country."87 If realism meant, as Zorbaugh would later define it, 
"recognizing the trends of city growth and evolving new tech­
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niques to utilize them," this was certainly a realistic approach to 
race relations. But it was also one that left the city saddled with 
the worst aspects of racism, including a large and growing ghetto. 
From the perspective of the nascent profession of city planning, 
however, Park had outlined a realistic approach to social problems 
and a new urban sociology. Park shared the city planners' assump­
tions about the necessity of working with and through elites, the 
incompetence of the average citizen, and the inevitability of certain 
patterns of urban development. Moreover, human ecology offered 
a way to unravel the complex relationships between the physical 
environment and social behavior. A sociological theory that both 
explained social disorganization and offered solutions to it in terms 
of location and mobility could help city planners address the social 
implications of their work. In concert with urban sociologists in 
the 1920s, they would begin to work out new approaches to the 
problems of social disorganization and to seek a new metropolitan 
basis for the urban community. On the eve of the New Deal, after 
a decade of diverse investigation and experimentation, they had 
developed the foundations for an ambitious policy of urban plan­
ning that sought to rationalize not only the physical order of the 
metropolis but its social order as well. 
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The Chicago Sociologists and the 
Origins of Urban Planning 
Chicago in the 1920s was a city 
of striking contrasts, of the Gold Coast and the slum. Nowhere 
was the contrast more pronounced than at the lakefront where the 
astounding work of man abutted the majesty of nature. "Chicago 
comes howling to a standstill on the edge of eternity," observed a 
foreign visitor with a mixture of fascination and horror, as he 
watched a constant stream of automobiles along Lake Shore Drive 
pass before the endless blue of Lake Michigan.1 Lake Shore 
Drive and the string of landfill parks through which it ran, parks 
created from the city's inexhaustible supply of garbage, repre­
sented one of city planning's greatest triumphs. For the University 
of Chicago social scientist Donald Slesinger, however, the city's 
headlong expansion into the lake suggested a desire to disown the 
uglier city to the west. The "stunning lake shore is a movie-set 
creating the illusion of a non-existent depth," he charged; its plan­
ning had been based on a "denial of the existence of the western 
slums." He concluded, "Chicago had flourished on a free, and 
therefore miserable, labor market, and a fancy showroom for its 
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customers.''2 The failure of city planners to challenge existing eco­
nomic conditions, he implied, undermined even their best efforts. 
The sociologist and pioneer of human ecology Robert Park, 
Slesinger's colleague at the University of Chicago, was well aware 
of both the triumphs and the limitations of city planning. He pro­
posed to overcome those limitations through a wider application 
of the city planners' own methods. The city, he wrote in 1925, 
was "full of junk, much of it human, . . . men and women who, 
for some reason or other, have fallen out of line in the march of 
industrial progress and have been scrapped by the industrial orga­
nization of which they were once a part."3 The ecologist's deter­
mination to recycle the human junk back into the economic order 
complemented the city planners' commitment to economic effi­
ciency. The Illinois Commission on Race Relations (ICRR) had an­
ticipated that approach in its determination to eliminate discrimi­
nation so that, in Arthur Waskow's words, "an indigestible mass 
of irrationally excluded persons would not clog the efficient pro­
cesses of economic enterprise." In that view once discrimination 
was eliminated it was up to blacks to change whichever of their 
own values and behavior prevented them from fitting into the 
dominant society.4 Park's faith in a rationalized, private-enterprise 
society, reflected in his association with the ICRR, underlay his 
work in the 1920s and particularly his association with profes­
sional city planners.5 He helped shape a form of social planning 
that would facilitate individual and group adjustment to an un­
challenged social reality. 
The origins of urban planning are to be found, at least in part, 
in a series of exchanges between planners and urban sociologists 
in the 1920s and early 1930s. It was at the 1925 meeting of the 
American Sociological Society on "The City," which Park and his 
colleagues organized and planners from the Russell Sage Founda-
tion's Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs attended, that 
those exchanges began. There the sociologists articulated a theory 
of urban life that helped planners unravel the social implications of 
physical planning. At the core of the theory, which had both 
shaped and been shaped by an ongoing series of practical reform 
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efforts in which Park and his students had been involved, was a 
fascination with social control (the means by which groups regu­
lated the behavior of their members). Adopting a strategy best 
described as the alienation of social control, Park and his students 
offered new and artificial forms of social control as the means to 
eliminate the wasteful aspects of metropolitan life that were out of 
step with the urban-industrial order. City planners thus found in 
the work of the Chicago sociologists not only a reassuring com­
plement to their own realistic view of the city but what seemed a 
promising approach to the persistent social problems of the me­
tropolis. Following the 1925 meeting planners and sociologists 
began to develop a program of urban planning, a program for 
rationalizing not only the physical and economic structure of the 
metropolis but its social order as well. 
THE SCIENCE OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
The period of Park's greatest influence began in 1916 when 
Ernest Burgess, the son of a minister eager to give social work a 
"scientific basis," joined him at the University of Chicago.6 Park 
and Burgess first collaborated on the textbook Introduction to the 
Science ofSociology (1921), the "green bible" that profoundly influ­
enced the American discipline of sociology.7 Park and Burgess saw 
sociology as an ameliorative and pragmatic science designed "to 
give man control over himself."8 They explored how social con­
trol worked, how "a mere collection of individuals succeed in act­
ing in a corporate and consistent way." Earlier sociologists, Park 
and Burgess explained, had attributed all group activity to confor­
mity, like-mindedness, or imitation.9 But Park and Burgess under­
stood the social group as something more than a mere collection 
of like-minded individuals. Through communication the social 
group took on a life and a purpose of its own. Public sentiments 
and opinions were derived from the "fermentation which associa­
tion breeds." While those sentiments and opinions often rein­
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forced the existing order, they were also "constantly recreating the 
old order, making new heroes, overthrowing old gods, creating 
new myths and imposing new ideals."10 An understanding of that 
process would enable mankind to control social change more 
effectively. 
The new science of social control had more immediate impli­
cations for practical reformers. Park and Burgess argued that "all 
social problems turn out finally to be problems of social con-
trol."11 More specifically they suggested: 
Many, if not most, of our present social problems have their 
source and origin in the transition of great masses of popula-
tion—the immigrants, for example—out of a society based on 
primary group relationships into the looser, freer, and less con­
trolled existence of life in great cities. . . . All the problems of 
social life are thus problems of the individual; and all problems 
of the individual are at the same time problems of the group. 
This was "not yet adequately recognized," they lamented, "in the 
technique of social case work."12 
The early sociologists had provided an intellectual rationale for 
the efforts of those moral reformers who sought to remove the de­
viant individual from the group and subject him or her to uplifting 
influences within an institutional setting.13 As early as the 1850s 
Charles Loring Brace had articulated an alternative strategy in his 
dispute with those reformers enamored of the institutional asy­
lum. Critical of the "artificial and unnatural" methods of the asylum 
which treated the individual "as a little machine," Brace organized 
the Children's Aid Society, which placed wayward children in 
family settings. The voluntary kindness and "personal influence" 
of the family, Brace argued, would spontaneously bring out "the 
great natural impulses which train the character most vigor­
ously." 14 By the 1920s, shorn of Brace's interest in spontaneity and 
wedded to a manipulative urge, the group approach had become 
dominant. The science of social control suggested the importance 
of understanding the group itself and of reshaping it as a means of 
controlling individual behavior. Park and Burgess joined a grow­
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ing number of intellectuals interested not only in studying social 
groups but in discovering techniques for controlling them through 
the benevolent manipulation of their environment.15 
TH E SOCIOLOGY OF SMALL GROUPS 
A number of sociological studies written under Park's direction 
in the 1920s reflected his interest in the small group as a convenient 
laboratory for the investigation of social control. Clarence Rain­
water, who served as director of the Hamilton Park Recreation 
Center in Chicago's South Park system from 1910 to 1917, com­
pleted his dissertation, The Play Movement in the United States, in 
1922. The play movement (the effort to use recreation as a vehicle 
for urban reform), Rainwater explained, had gone through a num­
ber of stages. Between 1912 and 1914 a variety of cities, under 
such reform mayors as Newton Baker in Cleveland and Carter 
Harrison in Chicago, had promoted municipal dances and other 
large-scale, citywide activities "open to promiscuous attendance, 
but inspected and chaperoned by public officials." The leaders of 
the play movement had abandoned such activities, however, be­
cause they were unable to control the atmosphere or the behavior 
of the patrons at those events.16 
The play movement thus entered a new stage based on the con­
viction that "a reorganization of the method of administering the 
local recreation centers, instead of a city-wide attack upon the rec­
reation problem independent of them, was necessary."17 The small 
play groups commonly found in local neighborhood parks af­
forded a better opportunity for studying group behavior and de­
veloping the means to control it. Through the close supervision 
of neighborhood play groups and team sports, Rainwater argued, 
the play director could "harmonize personal ideals with social wel­
fare, and thus bring to pass an automatic regulation of the behav­
ior of the persons engaged in playground or recreation center ac­
tivities." The intelligent development of small groups, "the 'little 
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democracy,' the 'face to face' association small enough to permit 
personal acquaintance and full communication," Rainwater ex­
plained, was an important factor in "the perpetuity and efficiency 
of self-government." But as the ambitions of the play movement 
grew, the play group, which had once arisen spontaneously and 
had thus taught important lessons in self-government, became the 
artificial creation of the reformers.18 
As the play movement made what Rainwater called the "tran­
sition from Tree' to 'directed' play" and moved "towards institu­
tionalization," it increasingly imposed its agenda and values upon 
the play group. A group of delegates to the Playground Associa­
tion of America's 1910 conference, for example, marveled at a 
model playground where "at the sound of the gong" the children 
began to play, the youngest ones fabricating identical and sym­
metrical sand pies in a manner reminiscent of the assembly line. 
Directed play, with its "efficiency tests," "correlated schedules, 
trained play leaders, and the classification of patrons," was well 
designed to prepare children for life in industrial society. But such 
exercises had little to do with self-government. They reflected a 
confusion of means and ends that beset many of the experiments 
with which the sociologists became involved.19 
Frederic Thrasher's study of the gangs that proliferated in Chi-
cago's slums similarly explored the process of social control within 
the small group. The gangs, Thrasher understood, were not simply 
the expression of the boys' anarchic and criminal instincts. In the 
harsh and competitive atmosphere of the slum, the gang repre­
sented "the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society where 
none adequate to their needs exists." Regulated by its own code 
of ethics which served as an internal means of social control, the 
gang was "capable of deliberation, planning, and co-operation in 
a highly complex undertaking."20 
The gangs, Thrasher learned, reflected both the disorganization 
and the values of the larger society around them. Their absorption 
in "movement and change without much purpose or direction" 
reflected the city's own disorganization and its citizens' "flight 
from monotony and the pursuit of a thrill." The gang's in-group 
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morality faithfully recreated the larger society's "failure to recog­
nize obligations to other groups." Like the corrupt politicians, 
greedy industrialists, racists, and imperialists of the larger society, 
the gang's credo was "they are all Greeks and the barbarians must 
suffer."21 For both Thrasher and Park the relationship to the larger 
society was the key not only to understanding the gang but to 
reforming it. The gangs sprang up "spontaneously, but only un­
der favoring conditions and in a definite milieu," Park wrote in 
his introduction to Thrasher's study; "it is this that assures us that 
they are not incorrigible and that they can be controlled."22 Either 
the gang's larger environment could be transformed or its re­
sponse to that environment could be redirected. What was needed 
were "leaders who could organize the play of the boys," redirect 
their energies, and to lead each boy "to see the meaning of what 
society wants him to do and its relation to some rational scheme 
of life."23 Thrasher pointed to the success of the Union League's 
Boys' Club which was based on "the notion of making the boys, 
many of whom were at that time wasted economic material, [into] 
valuable workers." Notwithstanding his own view of the inade­
quacies and rapacious ethics of the larger society out of which 
the gangs arose, Thrasher would channel the boys' energies and 
their loyalties back into that same society. It was through such 
efforts, Thrasher explained, that "order is established and habits 
are formed that are wholesome, or at least, harmless."24 
The work of another of Park's students, E. T. Hiller's The 
Strike, revealed more directly the political implications of treating 
urban conflicts as problems of social control. Hiller's work clarifies 
what was involved in the alienation of social control. As a form of 
social interaction, the strike resembled the sort of crowd move­
ments that were endemic to the urban environment and that had 
long fascinated Park. Through an examination of "the behavior 
characteristic of the striking group and the techniques used to di­
rect and control it," wrote Hiller in explaining the purpose of his 
study, "reliable policies of social control" could be formulated.25 
The strike, Hiller understood, was the result of the "emergence 
of a social group which is capable of collective action."26 It was 
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the "divergence of interests between employer and employees," he 
wrote, which gave rise to "self-conscious, or even mutually exclu­
sive and hostile, classes." Corporate forms of organization and 
intrusive managerial control created a feeling among workers that 
they were " 'working under someone' rather than that they are par­
ticipating in a joint enterprise."27 With the centralized control of 
production and an increase in the size of firms, he explained, per­
sonal interaction between employer and employee had decreased 
and the old ties of mutualism had eroded. Physical segregation in 
"places of residence and in institutional life" and the anonymity of 
metropolitan life exacerbated the impersonality of the workplace, 
which made it more difficult to amiably resolve disputes.28 
Each new conflict widened the gap between employer and em­
ployee and solidified class lines. Encouraging workers to act in 
concert, the trade union further undermined the personal relations 
between employer and employee. By capturing the imagination of 
workers and forcing them to choose sides, the trade union forged 
new and stronger bonds. The result was "class-consciousness," 
which Hiller believed to be irrational.29 Class-conscious workers 
harbored "a deferred goal, in a social change which will put an end 
to labor as a slave function, and establish in place of the wage or 
capitalist system an industrial commonwealth of co-operatives/" 
Hiller wrote. He could see the desire for a different political order 
only as an irrational and hopeless dream.30 The hope for a general 
strike and the creation of a dictatorship of the proletariat was simi­
larly irrational. "Such a strike has never occurred, and moreover 
is impossible of achievement," Hiller insisted, primarily because 
of workers' dependence on employers and their fears of social 
chaos. Without sufficient numbers workers could never overcome 
governmental power and the opposition of the other classes that 
"exercise the decisive influence in the control of political decisions 
and economic functions." Disastrous failure was the "inevitable 
outcome" of the general strike. "Forcible methods," Hiller con­
cluded, "when brought to bear against strikes, have always proved 
decisive."31 Standing the logic of the revolutionary vanguard on 
its head, Hiller decried the false consciousness of the militant 
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worker and went on to suggest ways of supplanting that false con­
sciousness with a new consciousness and a new system of social 
control. What Hiller had unwittingly made clear was that the 
strength of class consciousness, the contemporary factors that en­
couraged its development, and the techniques used to reinforce it 
meant that the new consciousness would have to be imposed from 
outside the work group as an alienated force of social control. 
T H  E ALIENATION OF SOCIAL CONTRO L 
Consequently, it was to groups outside the workplace that Hiller 
looked first for the rational solution to the social problems of an 
industrial civilization. Key among those groups was the enlight­
ened public. The public represented the "social medium in which 
the economic pursuits and conflicts of the disputants function," 
Hiller wrote. In a variety of ways employers and employees ap­
pealed to the public for support. Social disruption, the arousal of 
sympathy and pity, and appeals to patriotism were all methods of 
involving the public in the dispute. The public intervened in the 
strike either as a neutral arbiter, usually in the form of expert ne­
gotiators, or as a partisan force for one side or the other. "It ap­
pears, therefore, that the public, whether in the capacity of neutral 
or partisan, may be the decisive factor in the industrial warfare," 
Hiller concluded.32 
In his introduction to Hiller's work, Park had also noted the 
importance of the public in determining the outcome of strikes. 
But in relation to industrial disputes, he cautioned, public opinion 
had not yet reached a high level of sophistication. The "public has 
been, on the whole, in the position of an innocent bystander," he 
argued, "uncertain of its own interest and divided in its senti-
ments."33 Park's interest in these questions of consciousness and 
social control in the industrial setting and his concern that the pub­
lic develop a more sophisticated approach to the problem of in­
dustrial conflict explain his interest in the Hawthorne experiments 
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at the Western Electric plant in Cicero south of Chicago. The 
Western Electric Corporation, with assistance from the academic 
leaders of an enlightened public, was exploring similar questions 
of consciousness and social control and opening up the new field 
of industrial psychology. The techniques of industrial psychology 
would promote the development of what Hiller described as "shop 
loyalty" or "factory solidarity" and what Park would call "indus­
trial folkways."34 
The purpose of shop loyalty was to close the rift between em­
ployer and employee upon which class consciousness and the strike 
were built. As "long as attention is centered upon their joint out­
put," Hiller wrote, employer and employee "constitute a social 
unit." A consistent emphasis on the "fact that both live from the 
joint product of their specialized and co-operating functions may 
compel adjustments of differences," Hiller argued. "When these 
common interests regulate behavior, 'factory solidarity,' as op­
posed to 'class solidarity,' exists." Combined with a lingering 
"personal attachment, traditional leanings, practical advantages, 
or controls manipulated by the employer," an emphasis on the 
joint product promoted shop loyalty. That strategy must be sup­
plemented, he added, "by a favorable social situation, such as per­
sonal contacts between superiors and employees, or participation 
by the workmen in the regulation of the working conditions."35 
With the significant exception of labor's participation in the regu­
lation of working conditions and with a decided emphasis on 
"controls manipulated by the employer," Western Electric's Haw­
thorne experiments employed that strategy.36 
Elton Mayo, a professor of industrial research at Harvard Uni­
versity, began to study the experiments at the Hawthorne plant in 
1928. Mayo had first become interested in experiments on indus­
trial fatigue begun during World War I. He learned that fatigue 
was less a disease than a symptom of monotony and poor morale. 
Impressed with studies on delinquency and suicide by two of 
Park's students, studies which pointed to community disorgani­
zation as a source of individual maladjustment, Mayo argued that 
the "obsessive response" of workers in an industrial setting was 
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"a symptom, in the individual, of disequilibrium in the group." 
Work groups suffered from low morale because the factory lacked 
"a non-logical social code, which regulates relations between per­
sons and their attitudes to one another," Mayo wrote. The rise of 
scientific management and a umerely economic logic of produc­
tion" had interfered "with the development of a [non-logical] code 
and consequently gives rise in the group to a sense of human de-
feat."37 What Mayo confronted in his study of industrial morale 
was the problem of alienated labor, a problem exacerbated by sci­
entific management. 
In the late nineteenth century, industrial work groups had de­
veloped their own quite logical production codes as a means of 
regulating the behavior of their members and resisting the dictates 
of management. Establishing stints or quotas and adhering to an 
ethic of manliness (which demanded an unselfishness towards 
one's fellow workers and a dignified if not defiant bearing towards 
the boss), skilled workers maintained a high degree of autonomy 
even within the factory setting. In an effort to wrest control of pro­
duction from workers, scientific management controlled the de­
cisions made in the labor process and thereby determined the pace 
and character of work. As management appropriated the know­
ledge of production and imposed it upon labor in the form of an 
elaborate technology and routinized drudgery, workers lost the 
sense of a common purpose on which morale was based.38 
It is "the essential nature of the human," Mayo understood, 
"that, with all the will to co-operate, he finds it difficult to persist 
in action for an end he can but dimly see." The logic of scientific 
management, which Mayo had no intention of challenging, was a 
major source of this problem. Instead Mayo prescribed the devel­
opment of a "non-logical" code for industry, one which would 
not interfere with the scientific manager's "merely economic logic 
of production," as a means of raising the morale and the produc­
tivity of the work group. Without changing the structure of in­
dustry or the nature of the work itself, industrial psychologists 
would create and manipulate work groups, encouraging competi­
tion among them, in an effort to control the social order of the 
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factory. On an individual basis the logic of industrial psychology, 
in which personnel counselors were instructed to deal (as one re­
called), "with attitudes towards problems, not the problems them­
selves," allowed management to vent workers' frustration in ways 
that reinforced the status quo. Thus workers' complaints about the 
Hawthorne plant's intrusive supervision were channeled through 
personal interviews with industrial psychologists that, in effect, 
intensified that supervision. In short the Hawthorne experiments 
substituted an alienated form of social control, a body of mores 
and a morale imposed from above, for the spontaneous code of 
the work group itself which had encouraged resistance to the dic­
tates of management.39 
In his review of Mayo's The Human Problems of an Industrial 
Civilization, Park discounted the political dimension of those is­
sues. The experiments had not convinced Mayo, Park reported, of 
"the necessity for any species of political remedy." Park endorsed 
both Mayo's expressed conviction that "as ever in human affairs, 
we are struggling against our own ignorance and not against the 
machinations of a political adversary" and his assertion that the 
most pressing needs in industrial society were "better methods for 
the discovery of an administrative elite [and] better methods of 
maintaining working morale." For his own part Park concluded 
that the experiments demonstrated that the "ills from which an 
industrial civilization is suffering are not fundamentally political; 
they are cultural."40 
Characteristically, Park looked to the development of new 
forms of social control for solutions. The factory lacked "a body 
of industrial folkways," he argued, "a body of mores, and a code 
which represent at once the consensus and common understand­
ing as well as the accumulated wisdom and common sense of the 
group." At the end of his review Park vented his frustration with 
reformers who "formulate and impose upon the community leg­
islation which cannot be enforced because it is not understood, 
accepted, and adequately embodied in the mores of the commu­
nity." The most effective form of social control, he understood, 
was that which spontaneously arose from the group itself. But 
200 
THE ALIENATION OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
Park did not recognize or would not acknowledge that the peculiar 
organization of work within modern industry and especially the 
principles of scientific management had been specifically designed 
to prevent the spontaneous emergence of folkways, codes, or 
mores among the workers. At best the Hawthorne experiments 
had sought, as Park put it, "some sort of consensus between those 
who direct operations and those who work under this direction." 
At worst industrial psychologists had imposed an alien set of con­
trols on the work group.41 
SOCIAL PLANNING AND THE NE W MEANS 
OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
Park saw that in many respects the Hawthorne experiments par­
alleled the work he and his associates had been engaged in for 
more than a decade. "The problems that arise in industry are in 
the last analysis identical with the problems of industrial civiliza­
tion generally," Park wrote in his review. Mayo's work had im­
mediate practical application to urban problems. "If any group, 
such as a clan or an in-group, has to fight opposition, it tends to 
build up solidarity and moral discipline. . .  . If in America . .  . we 
can keep up the rivalries between groups instead of Americanizing 
and demoralizing our immigrants, we can hope for morale. This 
is the problem to which Mr. Elton Mayo . . . has called attention," 
Park wrote. The problem of establishing effective mechanisms of 
social control and combating the social disorganization of the mod­
ern metropolis had been a central theme of the famous collection 
of essays, The City, which Park and his colleagues had published 
in 1925.42 In those essays they outlined an urban sociology that 
would help planners use the science of social control. 
The size, heterogeneity, and density of urban populations, the 
Chicago sociologists argued, made human behavior fundamen­
tally different in the great city as compared to the village or small 
town. The diverse stimulations of urban life, Park wrote, allowed 
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the individual to "bring his innate dispositions to full and free ex­
pression." While that freedom gave city life its attractiveness and 
creativity, Park explained, its reverse side was instability. "Strikes 
and minor revolutionary movements are endemic in the urban en­
vironment," he wrote. Cities were in "unstable equilibrium"; the 
"vast casual and mobile" urban populations were subject to "per­
petual agitation"; the community was "in a chronic condition of 
crisis." The "easy means of communication and of transportation, 
which enable individuals to distribute their attention and to live at 
the same time in different social worlds, tend to destroy the per­
manency and intimacy of the neighborhood." Both the freedom 
and the instability of urban life, Park concluded, resulted from the 
relative ineffectiveness of traditional agencies of social control: the 
neighborhood, the family, and the church.43 
The problem of social control in a large city, Park explained, 
was a function of the difference between primary and secondary 
relationships. A small, stable community created lifelong, inti­
mate, and face-to-face relationships, what Park and others called 
primary relationships. Under such conditions, Park explained, so­
cial control was based upon spatial proximity and local association 
and arose "for the most part spontaneously, in direct response to 
personal influences and public sentiment." But in a large city re­
lationships tended to be more transitory, less intimate, and indirect 
or secondary. The "intimate relationships of the primary group 
are weakened and the moral order which rested upon them gradu­
ally dissolved." As a result the "control that was formerly based 
on mores was replaced by control based on positive law," such as 
laws governing prostitution and liquor. A variety of organizations 
based on secondary relationships, such as bureaus of municipal 
research, social surveys, and foundations of various sorts, had be­
gun to agitate for and secure public acceptance of remedial legis­
lation. Thus "publicity" or "social advertising" was becoming "a 
recognized form of social control" that worked in concert with 
legislation. In that form social control arose not from spatial prox­
imity but from a community of interest established through men­
tal life and communication.44 
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Although legislation and an orchestrated public opinion became 
crucial instruments of social control, those relatively artificial 
forms of social control, Park warned, had to be based upon some 
"sort of instinctive and spontaneous control . .  . in order to be 
effective." A system of social control might be orchestrated from 
above and through secondary relationships. "The practical meth­
ods which practical men like the political boss, the labor agitator, 
the stock-exchange speculator, and others have worked out for the 
control and manipulation of the public and the crowd," Park un­
derstood, demonstrated as much. But such large-scale manipula­
tors still depended on their mastery of face-to-face primary rela­
tionships. The dynamics of collective behavior at the level of the 
small group remained the crucial factor.45 
Drawing on the work of his students, Park suggested how so­
cial planning agencies might use the primary relationships of the 
small group in establishing social control. A bevy of new agencies, 
Park explained, including juvenile courts, the Boy Scouts, and 
playground associations "have taken over to some extent the work 
which neither the home, the neighborhood, nor the older com­
munal institutions were able to carry out adequately." Those ex­
periments illustrated that any "effort to re-educate and reform the 
delinquent individual will consist very largely in finding him an 
environment, a group in which he can live." Thrasher's work on 
the youth gang, for example, had suggested ways of rehabilitating 
the delinquent. Rainwater's study of the playground movement 
had illustrated the possibilities of preventing delinquency in the 
first place. The playground, Park argued, "should be a place 
where children form permanent associations." If associated with 
other "character-forming agencies like the school, the church, and 
other local institutions," the supervised playground could become 
an important and positive factor "in the defining of the wishes and 
the forming of the character of the average individual." Moreover 
such experiments would help develop "a rational technique for 
dealing with social problems, based not on sentiment and tradi­
tion, but on science."46 A science of social control that combined 
the primary relationships of the small group with the secondary 
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relationships of a reform-minded public, Park suggested, formed 
the basis for an effective policy of social planning. 
Soon after the publication of The City, planners from the Russell 
Sage Foundation's Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs 
(RPNYE) attended the December 1925 meeting of the American 
Sociological Society, on "The City," organized by the Chicago 
sociologists. The sociological director of the RPNYE, Shelby Har­
rison, explained the planners' interest in urban sociology. "While 
city planning, viewed broadly, has always been aimed at the cre­
ation of an environment which would not only exert a corrective, 
but also a preventive, influence in dealing with the causes of social 
wrong and social maladjustment," the time had come for "special 
study from that angle," he argued.47 Pioneer planners and espe­
cially the proponents of the city beautiful had hoped to create a 
unifying civic ideal that would overawe the individual and, as Paul 
Boyer argues, help to "mold a morally cohesive, homogeneous 
urban populace." But Harrison recognized that the Chicago soci­
ologists had shifted the terms of the debate. The Chicago sociolo­
gists took the heterogeneity of urban life as a given and argued that 
social control efforts should be directed not at individuals but at 
the multifarious groups that populated the urban environment.48 
Accepting urban diversity as an essential and even beneficial ele­
ment in the social order, the Chicago sociologists suggested the 
restructuring of social and physical environments as a means to 
managing urban diversity. 
THE SPATIAL PATTERN AND NATURAL ORDER 
OF THE URBAN COMMUNITY 
In his presidential address to the 1925 conference, "The Urban 
Community as a Spatial Pattern and a Moral Order," Park sug­
gested that space was a common concern of city planners and ur­
ban sociologists. "Human relations can always be reckoned, with 
more or less accuracy, in terms of distance," Park argued. Such 
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URBAN AREAS 
Ernest Burgess's view of the new metropolitan form. The Chicago sociolo­
gist encouraged city planners to think about the connections between the 
social and physical environment and between social and physical planning. 
From Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, The 
City, 1925. Courtesy of the University of Chicago Press. 
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elements of city planning as transportation and congestion, the 
heights of buildings, and the costs of real estate all had specific 
social implications. The speculative ring of real estate outside the 
central business district, for example, gave rise to peculiar social 
environments: "These neglected and sometimes abandoned re­
gions become the points of first settlement of immigrants. Here 
are located our ghettos, and sometimes our bohemias, our Green­
wich Villages, where artists and radicals seek refuge." Thus Park 
underscored "the importance of location, position, and mobility 
as indexes for measuring, describing, and eventually explaining, 
social phenomena."49 
Park cautioned, however, against any simplistic equations. "Re­
duce all social relations to relations of space and it would be pos­
sible to apply to human relations the fundamental logic of the 
physical sciences," he speculated. But such a "happy solution" was 
probably impossible, Park warned, because unlike the elements of 
physical science humans were subject to change. Self-consciousness 
and personality complicated social planning. Still the physical and 
social order were closely intertwined, Park concluded, "because so­
cial relations are so frequently and so inevitably correlated with 
spatial relations; because physical distances, so frequently are, or 
seem to be, the indexes of social distances."50 The successful 
urban planner would have to be alert to the subtleties of those 
interconnections. 
While encouraging city planners to think about the connections 
between the social and physical environment and between social 
and physical planning, the Chicago sociologists also warned them 
that the city possessed a natural order that set strict limits on the 
possibilities of planning. In his address to the convention on "The 
Natural Areas of the City," Zorbaugh argued that the city was less 
a product of human design than was generally recognized. Zor­
baugh employed Park's concept of natural areas, resistant to con­
scious human intervention, in his analysis of urban structure. The 
physical structure of the city, "the framework of transportation, 
business organization and industry, park and boulevard systems, 
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and topographical features," divided the city into small units. So­
ciologists termed those units "natural areas, in that they are the 
unplanned, natural product of the city's growth," Zorbaugh ex­
plained. Such areas were the result of competition among the city's 
inhabitants for position and therefore "each natural area of the city 
tends to collect the particular individuals predestined to it." The 
ghettos and Chinatowns, the rooming-house districts and the Gold 
Coasts were "the 'atoms' of city growth, the units we try to con­
trol in administering and planning for the city."51 
Urban institutions neglected the existence of natural areas at 
their peril. The ward system of municipal government, Zorbaugh 
argued, ignored "the existence of distinct areas within the city, 
each with an individuality, and unequally adapted to function po­
litically under our present system." Chicago's transient rooming-
house district, for example, had few competent voters and was 
"administered by the social agencies and the police. . . . Such an 
area should be disfranchised and administered from the city hall." 
Community organizers too had ignored the existence of natural 
areas and had attempted to recreate the village order in neighbor­
hoods composed of incompatible natural areas. A more promising 
approach, Zorbaugh suggested, would require "political recog­
nition" of natural areas and a "geographical pluralism in city 
government."52 
Planners, Zorbaugh continued, also needed to be aware of natu­
ral areas. Ghettos and slums, rooming-house districts, and Gold 
Coasts were all the inevitable results of urban growth. Even in a 
metropolis such as Berlin, which had grown from a small city 
according to a carefully directed plan, natural areas emerged. 
Those natural areas and the processes of speculation, competition, 
segregation, and succession that created them "are facts that must 
be taken into account by those who would control the city's 
growth as well as by those who would administer the city's gov­
ernment," Zorbaugh explained. Chicago's zoning ordinance was a 
case in point. "Where use districts cut across natural areas of the 
city," Zorbaugh reported, "there is a constant pressure upon the 
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board of appeals, which invariably necessitates revision." The zon­
ing ordinance, like other planning and administrative devices, "can 
neither control this organization of the city nor the inevitable suc­
cession of the city. It can, however, taking this organization and 
succession into account, stabilize the processes of city growth and 
prevent the waste involved in scattering and uncontrolled specu­
lation." Social planners would face similar problems and might 
achieve similar results. The biggest obstacle to the development of 
effective social planning, Zorbaugh concluded, was the failure to 
compile social statistics on the basis of natural areas. Only when 
social statistics reflected the real divisions within the city would it 
be "possible to apply numerical measurement to that collective 
human behavior in the urban environment which is the growth of 
the city."53 Within the limits established by the spatial pattern and 
natural order of the city, physical and social planners could elimi­
nate the irrational and wasteful aspects of urban development. 
TH E ORIGINS OF URBAN PLANNING 
Those arguments complemented the RPNYE planners' ap­
proach to social planning. In his address to the 1925 convention, 
Harrison suggested that regional, metropolitan, and local agencies 
should cooperate in creating a plan that "far from setting up bar­
riers and difficulties for the various neighborhood entities, should 
conserve and promote such groupings."54 By the time the RPNYE 
issued its volume Neighborhood and Community Planning (1929), 
Harrison clarified his position in a way that revealed the influence 
of the Chicago sociologists. Urban neighborhoods emerged "due 
to continual shiftings and relocations of individuals and groups in 
response to economic, cultural or racial considerations," Harrison 
explained. "Like seeks like," he added, and therefore each neigh­
borhood acquired "a more or less distinct group consciousness." 
Yet neighborhoods generally lacked "any real community life." 
Rapid urban growth and new technologies of communication and 
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transportation created disruptions whereby "old social relation­
ships are destroyed."55 
City planners had begun to recognize the impact of their own 
actions on community life. City planning, Harrison explained, 
could prevent "the destruction of neighborhood values already es­
tablished" and encourage "the creation and the conservation of 
these neighborhood interests." The purpose of the RPNYE's study 
of community planning, he added, was "to discover the physical 
basis for that kind of face-to-face association which characterized 
the old village community and which the large city finds it so 
difficult to re-create."56 While the Chicago sociologists might have 
questioned the wisdom of trying to recreate the village commu­
nity in the large city, they would have agreed with (and recog­
nized) Harrison's analysis of the problem. The most important re­
sult of the cross-fertilization between the RPNYE planners and the 
Chicago sociologists was Clarence Perry's "neighborhood unit" 
plan.57 
Clarence Perry, a social planner hired by the RPNYE to deter­
mine the most desirable distribution of playgrounds throughout 
the region, also attended the 1925 conference. In the course of his 
study, he had recognized, as he explained to the conferees, that the 
proper distribution of playgrounds involved much more than an 
analysis of population densities and the proper mathematical equa­
tions. It involved traffic and safety as well as a recognition that "a 
certain degree of racial and social homogeneity must be assured 
among playground patrons or healthy play-life will not occur." 
Consequently, he had enlarged his inquiry to include the question 
of "what arrangement of streets, open spaces, and public sites 
would best serve and promote a normal neighborhood life." He 
had already settled on a neighborhood unit of five thousand people 
covering one-half square mile bounded by arterial streets; only 
local traffic would be permitted within the unit. A civic center 
with a school and a central commons would provide a "physical 
stimulus for a definite local community consciousness." Impressed 
with "current real estate tendencies," Perry optimistically predicted 
that "commercial effort. . . will of itself bring about the develop­
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rnent" of such units with minimal help from municipal planning 
agencies.58 
The conference had reinforced Perry's conviction and served as 
a stimulus for the further development of his plan. In 1929 the 
RPNYE published Perry's description and defense of the neigh­
borhood unit, replete with supporting evidence gleaned from the 
latest research in urban sociology. The residential neighborhood 
was essential to urban life, Perry explained, because families "wish 
to live away from the noise of trains, and out of sight of the smoke 
and ugliness of industrial plants." But contemporary neighbor­
hoods lacked both cohesiveness and community spirit because of 
the disruptive effect of heavily traveled streets and because they 
"usually have no visible boundaries." Citing Burgess's contribu­
tion to The City, "Can Neighborhood Work Have a Scientific Ba­
sis," Perry argued that arterial streets divided urban areas up into 
natural areas. In the hands of an intelligent planner, the arterial 
street could be an important factor in promoting neighborhood 
consciousness instead of disrupting community life. Moreover, if 
residential areas were carefully planned and constructed as part of 
large-scale developments that took into account the relationship 
between the physical environment and the creation of natural areas, 
then stable and cohesive neighborhoods could be created.59 
A variety of factors including the growing popularity of city 
planning, the development of mass production, and the desire 
among American consumers for luxury items boded well for the 
success of large-scale developments using the neighborhood unit 
plan, Perry argued. On the eve of the Great Depression, the un­
suspecting planner wrote, "The United States is today so wealthy 
that most of her citizens have stopped worrying about mere food 
or shelter." They were willing to pay a higher price for something 
fine, and planners were eager to give it to them. The problem had 
been, Perry argued in a sharp attack on the contemporary use of 
zoning, "the lack of positive residential standards." Without such 
standards the zoning resolution satisfied business priorities first 
and polluted residential districts with unnecessary commercial 
streets. The neighborhood unit plan and especially its segregation 
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The most important result of the collaboration between the Chi­
cago sociologists and city planners was Clarence Perry's neigh­
borhood plan. Instead of disrupting community life, the arterial 
street would define the boundaries of the cohesive neighbor­
hood. From the Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs, 
Vol. 1', Neighborhood and Community Planning, 1929. Courtesy of 
the New York Regional Plan Association. 
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of commerce on the unit's boundaries provided the missing posi­
tive standards.60 
Still, certain obstacles to the widespread adoption of the neigh­
borhood unit plan remained. "Since only large subdividers and 
strong corporations will be able to plan and construct complete 
neighborhood units," Perry conceded, "it is evident that the spread 
of such developments through unaided private enterprise will be 
slow." Public support was needed. Rejecting an outright public 
housing program, Perry discussed a number of options that fore­
shadowed the urban redevelopment strategies of the New Deal and 
postwar periods. Referring to experiments with the use of excess 
condemnation in slum clearance, Perry urged the passage of leg­
islation that would allow the "pooling of private properties and 
their development in accordance with a comprehensive plan pro­
moting the public welfare." He also endorsed state aid to devel­
opers meeting specified standards. Such legislation, he acknowl­
edged in a passage that suggests Park's influence, "must have the 
sanction of public opinion and the backing of powerful social mo-
tives."61 Consequently, the rest of Perry's monograph consisted of 
a series of arguments in favor of public support for the neighbor­
hood unit plan. 
The neighborhood unit would not only enhance safety, im­
prove living conditions, and promote neighborhood conscious­
ness, Perry argued, but it would improve the health of the body 
politic. He suggested that the decay of civic virtue and political 
responsibility was the result of "sections where widely different 
classes and races live side by side and yet never touch each other 
in informal neighborly relations." The "vertical cleavages which 
notably characterize the social life of great cities," he added, dis­
couraged the development of social movements; those that did de­
velop were stigmatized as "labor" or "capitalist" or "silk-stocking" 
and quickly died for want of a broader appeal. The problem was 
that "if the people who have a common interest in a specific sec­
tion are not in face-to-face contact with each other, the natural 
method of protecting or improving that interest through sponta­
neous concerted effort is not available." In a passage that combined 
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the realistic language of urban sociology with a concern for the 
decay of the republic, Perry argued: 
[The city] is a vast accretion of business, industry and dwellings 
around the original civic nucleus which has become diseased 
through the effort of functioning in the midst of a mass of po­
litically inert tissue. What urban growth has needed is a process 
whereby the village civic cell would be repeated at a rate corre­
sponding with the expansion of the population. 
While the key to the village community was a juxtaposition of 
work and residence that was no longer possible, the neighborhood 
unit would recreate village conditions in the modern city by bring­
ing a homogeneous group of people together and uniting them 
around a set of neighborhood services. Those cohesive neighbor­
hoods would then breathe new life into the moribund civic life of 
the city.62 
Reviving civic virtue and political responsibility in the stable 
middle class, the neighborhood unit plan also had a role to play in 
promoting moral values among the less stable classes. Quoting 
Park on the proliferation of crime and other forms of deviance 
when group organizations decayed, Perry noted that the "healthy 
life of a society always depends more on the spontaneous organi­
zation of its members than on formal legal and political regula­
tions." That was particularly a problem among the poor and the 
young. "The gang may be properly regarded as one symptom of 
the type of community disorganization found in our cities," Perry 
quoted Thrasher in a passage intended to highlight the danger of 
the slum to respectable society. Yet the cost of housing in Perry's 
neighborhood unit would place it out of the reach of the poor. 
The business creed, which dictated that housing could be provided 
only at market prices and which Perry was hesitant to challenge, 
continued to hold firm. Thus the "chief claim for public support" 
of the neighborhood unit, Perry concluded, was not that it would 
eliminate the problems of the slums but "that it will improve the 
environment of the great mass who can afford better residential 
conditions" and thus "prevent the increase of the classes that are 
213 
THE ALIENATION OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
beyond the reach of housing reform because of either social or 
economic reasons."63 Perry's plan would not only reinvigorate the 
city's politics, but it would also slow the growth of the property­
less and demoralized poor who posed a threat to the republic. 
GEMEINSCHAFT END S AND GESELLSCHAFT MEANS 
In 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression, Perry took his 
neighborhood unit idea to President Hoover's Conference on Home 
Building and Home Ownership, where he served on the Com­
mittee on Housing and the Community. Citing the work of Park's 
students, Perry's committee reiterated the connection between the 
slum and crime as well as between the slum and the political ma­
chine. Slum residents lacked "respect for government or belief in 
its beneficent functions" because in their neighborhoods "igno­
rance flourishes and civic vision is crushed by virtue of the hard 
circumstances of daily life." Current economic conditions had 
closed all avenues out of the slum and not only threatened to "cre­
ate a permanent slum population but a slum-minded population 
as well." The lack of proper community amenities in the city's 
poorer neighborhoods thus was more pressing than ever and dan­
gerous to ignore. It was now imperative, the committee argued, 
that the principles of the neighborhood unit plan be extended to 
low-income housing, even to apartment and tenement housing.64 
In promoting that idea Perry had to overcome a widespread 
attachment to single-family housing and the ritual invocations of 
American individualism with which it was associated. In his ad­
dress to the conference, President Hoover waxed sentimentally on 
the "individual abode, alive with the tender associations of child­
hood, the family life at the fireside, the free out of doors, the in­
dependence, the security, and the pride in possession of the family's 
own home. . .  . To own one's own home is a physical expression 
of individualism, of enterprise, of independence." But Perry's 
committee insisted that there was nothing sacred about the single­
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family house "if it is too small, ugly in design, and in an area 
where there is no community teamplay—where neighbors are not 
neighbors." Abandoning the commitment to the single-family 
house would allow planners to overcome the economic obstacles 
to extending the benefits of urban planning to the lower classes.65 
The key to building stable low-income neighborhoods was not 
so much improved housing, Perry's committee explained, but the 
creation of the sort of face-to-face, village relationships that one 
occasionally glimpsed even in the most congested districts. Hous­
ing reform "is no longer concerned with the home alone but with 
the home in its neighborhood setting." Under the influence of 
wholesome, primary relationships "delinquency is lessened, char­
acter is strengthened, individual skills are whetted by friendly ri­
valry" and neighbors were encouraged "voluntarily to work to­
gether to promote their own interests and realize their individual 
capacities." The neighborhood unit plan, with its distinct bounda­
ries, its commons, and its homogeneous population, Perry argued, 
would promote that sort of local community life and community 
consciousness even among the multi-story, dense residential ar­
rangements of the poor.66 
Other committees at the president's conference made similar ar­
guments. Warning that the "traditional organization of the neigh­
borhood is weakening under the conditions of modern life," the 
Committee on House Design urged planners to make greater ef­
forts to reverse the trend. The "true unit of design is the group," 
the committee reported, because the "most natural, the most 
stable and the strongest position for the individual in this complex 
world is to become a member of a strong, successful residence 
group." Home ownership gave "the individual a sense of security 
that is a liberating influence." Sharing the enthusiasm for housing 
developments created by large-scale corporations in partnership 
with professional planners and government bureaucracies, the 
Committee on Housing and Citizenship added that "comprehen­
sive real estate developments alone are able to develop a rich com­
munity environment."67 One private developer told the Com­
mittee on Large-Scale Operations that speculative builders "can 
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develop out of this social order something just as fine in the end as 
the skyscraper or the industrial development." He suggested that 
the "same business brains" that built skyscrapers and industrial 
satellites (and saddled American cities with scores of blighted areas 
of speculatively built housing for the lower-middle class) would 
now solve the housing problems of the nation's fifty million wage 
68 earners.
Carrying that logic to its illogical end, one might conclude that 
the same metropolitan agencies (including large-scale corpora­
tions, speculative building, professional planning, and govern­
ment bureaucracy) that had undermined the integrity of the local 
community in the first place could now somehow restore that in­
tegrity. Nevertheless, the arguments had a considerable impact on 
the planning profession. Addressing the national conference on 
city planning in 1933, Frederic Delano acknowledged that the ur­
ban sociologists had "been most useful for their advice on housing 
and community life." The "recognition of the influence of environ­
ment on human behavior," the sociologist Edwin Burdell added 
at the same conference, "is at the bottom of the movement for 
slum eradication."69 But at least a few planners doubted that their 
colleagues really understood the complexity of the problem, es­
pecially as it related to low-income groups, and they questioned 
the efficacy of the proposed solutions. 
Speaking on the "housing program from the community point 
of view" at the 1932 national conference on city planning, John 
Ihdler rehearsed the arguments he had heard expressed at the pres-
ident's conference and urged his fellow planners to recognize the 
necessity of a public housing program. "For the sake of their chil­
dren and because sub-standard living is a community menace," 
Ihdler insisted, the poor "must be provided with decent housing." 
In light of recent discussions of the social dimensions of planning, 
however, Ihdler expressed a certain uneasiness about the direction 
urban planning was taking. He feared that his fellow planners, 
only "dimly recognized" that the "inhabitants of the slums are a 
very real concern in slum reconditioning." He urged his col­
leagues to consider more carefully "the social and human prob­
lems of dealing with these people and aiding them or developing 
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or habilitating them at the same time that we construct and recon­
struct the areas in which they live."70 Considerable confusion ex­
isted about exactly what role the former inhabitants of slums were 
supposed to play in the new developments. Should public housing 
be placed under "strict supervision," Ihdler wondered. Burdell 
recommended the provision of "a suitable resident family whose 
ostensible function may be to collect rent and supervise the build­
ing, but who are really there to act in the capacity of friend and 
counsellor to the families in the unit." Ideally, the family would 
provide "suitable examples of clean and intelligent living, worthy 
of emulation" and "immeasurably hasten the process of accultura-
tion."71 Such discussions raised the larger question of whether 
closely knit, organic communities really could be mass-produced 
in the form of prefabricated large-scale developments that com­
bined the efforts of professional planners, urban sociologists, gov­
ernment bureaucracies, and private corporations. 
Fredrick Bigger doubted the effectiveness of centralized plan­
ning in community building. The slum, he argued, suffered from 
the disappearance of "local leaders whom everyone knew" and 
who "had knowledge of their community problems." Since the ex­
plosion of government bureaucracy and professional planning had 
played a role in the "complete loss of identity," Bigger doubted 
whether similar methods could now restore it. Burdell pointed to 
an equally important problem when he argued that "no amount 
of paternalism, however skillfully administered, can take the place 
of self-sufficiency and economic independence on the part of the 
worker." Ihdler too saw that an "effective distribution of wealth" 
was a key factor in the elimination of slums.72 Perhaps because of 
the tremendous impact of the depression, some planners had be­
gun to recognize that the slum problem was not so much a social 
as an economic and political problem. 
Thus a few dissenters within the profession began to recognize 
the limitations and the confusion of means and ends inherent 
in the emerging discipline of urban planning. Without challenging 
the existing economic order, planners could do relatively little 
to ameliorate the living conditions of the poor. The subsequent 
strategy of manipulating social forms was the logical residue of 
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the planners' and the sociologists' common decision to treat exist­
ing economic conditions as part of the unalterable natural order of 
the city. But in their effort to create stable and cohesive neighbor­
hood communities through a partnership of large corporations 
and centralized public planning, planners sought Gemeinschaji ends 
with Gesellschaft means, that is, to recreate a face-to-face organic 
community through the efforts of impersonal bureaucratic agen-
cies.73 The official tenant codebook for Cincinnati's Laurel Homes, 
a neighborhood unit project, reflected the problem. Full of de­
tailed prescriptions for the creation of a spontaneous, organic 
community ("make friends with your neighbor, avoid gossip or 
acts that may cause people to gossip"), the codebook betrayed a 
bureaucratic and mechanical logic in urging tenants to ''cooperate 
with the management and you will help keep the wheels of this 
community turning smoothly."74 To be sure the early experiments 
in urban planning were crude and confused translations of the 
work of the Chicago sociologists. Despite the sociologists' re­
peated calls for a realistic approach that recognized and utilized 
urban trends, planners were still transfixed by the moral homo­
geneity and face-to-face relations of an idealized village commu­
nity But the confusion, which paralleled the effort to replace 
spontaneous forms of social control with alienated forms, could 
be found in the work of the sociologists themselves, in a lingering 
attachment to the local community that clashed with a growing 
reliance on metropolitan and supermetropolitan agencies. Like 
city planners, urban sociologists struggled to find a new basis for 
the urban community. 
THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNITY REVISITED 
Despite his own fascination with the mobility and fluidity of 
the urban environment, Park recognized the difficulty it presented 
for the development of a sense of community. In a brief but in­
triguing essay, "The Mind of the Hobo," Park argued that the 
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hobo exemplified metropolitan mans difficulty in "carrying on an 
associated existence." Pursuing "locomotion for its own sake," 
the hobo found it impossible to develop lasting relationships or 
even to maintain communication with others. The restless hobo 
suffered through "so many dull days" because all "forms of asso­
ciation among human beings rest finally upon locality and local 
association." If there was to "be permanence and progress in so­
ciety, the individuals who composed it must be located." The 
tragedy of the hobo was that he "sacrificed the human need of 
association and organization to a romantic passion for individual 
freedom."75 That "romantic temper," a restlessness and inordinate 
desire for physical mobility, Park argued elsewhere, afflicted ur­
banites generally and was "but the reflection of a corresponding 
mental instability."76 
Those concerns underlay Park's interest in the small group and 
in agencies that might replace the disintegrating family and neigh­
borhood of the deracinated urbanite. Yet he knew that no agency 
had been found that "has thus far succeeded in providing a wholly 
satisfactory substitute for the home."77 Although Park's focus was 
generally on the disorganized family and neighborhood and the 
associated tangle of social pathology, the more stable families and 
neighborhoods of certain immigrant groups, the Japanese for ex­
ample, also attracted his attention. It was precisely those commu­
nities, Park argued, which had "maintained in this country their 
simple village religions and mutual aid organizations who have 
been most able to withstand the shock of the new environment." 
Park went on to argue that such immigrant neighborhoods "may 
be regarded as models for our own."78 
Neighborhood organization or disorganization did not only af­
fect individual behavior; it was also central to the health of the 
body politic. "If the local community is organized, knows its own 
local interests, and has a mind of its own, democracy prospers," 
Park explained. Unfortunately, we no longer lived in a society 
where "public life was the vocation of every citizen." As a leisure-
time activity, politics suffered from competition with "livelier 
forms of recreation." The busy urbanite lost sight of the local 
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community and fled the "dull routine of life at home" in search of 
excitement and adventure. The problem "is to encourage men to 
seek God in their own village and to see the social problem in their 
own neighborhood."79 Both republican concerns and the idealized 
village community survived in certain elements of Park's thought 
despite his quest for a realistic approach. 
Yet Park wavered in his view of the proper basis for the urban 
community. Simultaneously, and sometimes within the same ar­
guments, Park was developing a critique of the concept of neigh­
borhood community and of the political system based on it. In 
introducing his discussion of the "romantic temper," Park noted 
that it was only "the incompetent people," women, children, ward 
heelers, and political hacks, who maintained "an interest that 
could be called lively in the local communities of our great cities." 
The competent, especially the urban professionals, treated their 
local neighborhoods simply as dormitories; only their work and 
citywide associations engaged their full interest. If "we could or­
ganize our politics, as the Russians have sought to organize theirs, 
on the basis of occupation, that is, in Soviets, it might be possible 
to awaken in our intelligentsia a more than dilettante and sporting 
interest in local politics and the problems of the local community," 
wrote the always unpredictable Park. However, our "political sys­
tem is founded on the presumption that the local community is 
the local political unit." On the basis of his criticism of the roman­
tic temper, developed in the same essay, one might have been 
tempted to conclude that he saw this as right and proper. But else­
where Park made clear his objections to the existing urban political 
system.80 
The disposition to extend the power of the executive at the ex­
pense of the legislative branch, Park wrote, was based on a rec­
ognition "that the form of government which had its origin in the 
town meeting and was well suited to the needs of a small com­
munity based on primary relations is not suitable to the govern­
ment of the changing and heterogeneous populations of cities of 
three or four millions." Highly critical of the incompetence of 
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machine politicians and their inability to deal with metropolitan 
problems, Park saw the machine as an unfortunate "attempt to 
maintain, inside the formal administrative organization of the city, 
the control of a primary group." Much more promising were 
those groups engaged in social politics, including taxpayers' asso­
ciations, good-government organizations, bureaus of municipal 
research, and agencies such as the Russell Sage Foundation, which 
were based on secondary relationships and used the techniques of 
publicity to educate the voter. Fortunately, the politics of "social 
advertising" employed by a "profession with an elaborate tech­
nique supported by a special body of knowledge," Park con­
cluded, was replacing the old-style machine politics based on the 
neighborhood and the political party.81 
THE METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY 
The tension in Park's work between a neighborhood and a met­
ropolitan basis of community would not prevent the younger gen­
eration of sociologists from seizing the opportunities that federal 
planning on a metropolitan basis offered. Those developments 
were foreshadowed in the work of Park's colleague, Roderick 
McKenzie. The most obvious symbol of the collapse of the tradi­
tional neighborhood community, Park had argued, was automo­
bility. By increasing the mobility of the individual, the automo­
bile had "multiplied the difficulties of maintaining a stable social 
order" and had undermined the "primary source of control, 
namely, the vigilance of neighbors and the desire of every indi­
vidual to retain the respect and esteem of his local community."82 
In The Metropolitan Community, a monograph prepared for Presi­
dent Hoover's survey, Recent Social Trends, McKenzie offered a 
more optimistic appraisal of the effects of auto mobility. The met­
ropolitan community, he explained, was "essentially an expanded 
pattern of local community life based upon motor transporta­
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tion."83 More completely than Park, McKenzie translated the so­
ciologists' concern with community from a neighborhood to a 
metropolitan basis. 
Physical proximity, McKenzie argued, no longer played a signi­
ficant role in the metropolitan community. Unlike the traditional 
city, the metropolitan community "obtains its unity through ter­
ritorial differentiation of specialized functions rather than through 
mass participation in centrally located institutions." Neither did 
neighborliness and daily contact on city streets have much to do 
with community- The automobile and the modern means of com­
munication meant that spatial distance no longer correlated with 
social distance. "Physically adjacent population groups may be in­
terrelated in an economic or symbiotic manner and yet live in 
vastly different social worlds," he explained. Rather than destroy­
ing community, however, the "increased mobility of products and 
people," McKenzie argued, had created "a more closely knit com­
munity structure." Speeding automobiles, the telephone call, and, 
most important, the metropolitan agencies of communication, fi­
nance, distribution, and management, McKenzie suggested, pro­
vided the basis for the new community.84 
A recognition of the many problems that beset the metropolitan 
community tempered McKenzie's optimism. Among the prob­
lems was a vigorous competition among metropolitan centers for 
regional dominance. Since superior size invariably won out, he 
reported, "the will to grow, to increase in population, wealth, and 
prestige, dominated the psychology of most American cities." As 
the metropolis grew, its problems of traffic and congestion, sani­
tation and public health, policing and crime, taxation and financ­
ing became not only more complex, but they transcended existing 
political boundaries and outstripped the ability of established gov­
ernments to deal with them. The peculiar distribution of popula­
tion within the metropolitan area further exacerbated the problem: 
It is a matter of common observation that the inner and older 
sections of a city, particularly those lying close to the main busi­
ness center, are usually inhabited by the weaker and less stable 
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elements of the population, while the outer zones and the sub­
urbs tend to have higher proportions of the more substantial 
members of the community. 
Annexation had solved the problems of both administration and 
personnel for some time, but it was no longer practical in light of 
suburban opposition and the extended geographic scope of met­
ropolitan activities.85 
The rise of the metropolitan region and the many problems of 
the metropolitan community demanded new political arrange­
ments. The rise of "the new supercity points, therefore, to the 
need of some sort of supermetropolitan government," McKenzie 
explained. In extending metropolitan influence to surrounding 
communities through various public authorities and in calling for 
official status for the master plan and a suspensive veto for the 
planning commission, city planners had pioneered in the creation 
of metropolitan government. Regional planning, such as that un­
dertaken by the Sage Foundation, promised greater rewards; but 
such efforts were still "thwarted by the large number of politically 
independent communities with which planning bodies have to 
deal." That problem, the political scientist Thomas Reed sug­
gested in a chapter on "Metropolitan Government" in McKenzie's 
The Metropolitan Community, demanded the creation of new po­
litical "units of metropolitan scope possessing sufficient powers to 
deal with those matters which affect the metropolis as a whole." 
Reed's discussion of recent experiments in metropolitan gover­
nance concluded with his and McKenzie's call for "supermetro­
politan government."86 
McKenzie's study culminated in a brief for the perpetuation and 
extension of expert, professional planning. Although the economic 
depression had revived efforts "to revert to a simpler order" and a 
greater reliance on the family and the neighborhood, McKenzie 
warned that "our metropolitan society is too complex a mecha­
nism to be adjusted by such expedients." The interest in planning 
would not only survive the current economic crisis, he concluded, 
but it would be extended to "an increasing range of economic and 
social activities." Pointing to the interdependence of metropolitan 
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areas and their creation by "economic and cultural forces that are 
world-wide in scope," McKenzie's analysis provided a rationale 
for the sort of federal planning on a metropolitan basis that began 
to emerge during the New Deal.87 In alliance with metropolitan 
elites and government officials, McKenzie suggested, physical and 
social planners would play an increasingly important role in shap­
ing and maintaining the metropolitan order. 
After a decade of intellectual exchange and practical experimen­
tation the union of urban sociologists and city planners seemed on 
the verge of realization. Without rejecting the city planners' view 
of the city as primarily a piece of economic machinery, and while 
reinforcing their strategy of working with elites, their skepticism 
about the political competence of the masses, and their realistic 
assumptions about the limits of significant change, the urban so­
ciologists had alerted city planners to the social implications of their 
work. Exploring the connections between physical environment 
and social behavior, the sociologists had helped city planners think 
in new ways about social problems and to devise plans that ap­
peared to promote social adjustment and social stability. While both 
sociologists and planners remained perplexed about the proper 
basis for community in the modern city, they had begun to de­
velop a theory of a metropolitan community that complemented 
both their practical policies and their underlying assumptions. 
What they had failed to do was to analyze critically the economic 
and political forces that had made the ideal of community prob­
lematic in the first place. 
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The Paradox of Professional Planning 
For more than a quarter of a 
century, the ambitions of social scientists and professional planners 
had been steadily expanding. Combining academic social science, 
professional planning, and federal authority, President Hoover's 
Committee on Recent Social Trends seemed to herald the realiza­
tion of those ambitions. The purpose of the Recent Social Trends 
survey, as President Hoover had originally conceived it, was to 
investigate the "elements of instability rather than stability in our 
social structure" and to discover the means of managing them. 
Columbia University economist and chair of the committee Wes­
ley Mitchell explained that the survey would provide "a basis for 
the formulation of large national policies.5'1 But before the survey 
could be completed, indeed before it was well started, the Great 
Depression shook the prestige and the confidence of social scien­
tists and professional planners. 
Ironically, that same economic disaster and the federal response 
to it in the New Deal would afford social scientists and profes­
sional planners significant new opportunities to shape public policy. 
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While a full examination of urban reform and urban thought dur­
ing the New Deal is beyond the scope of this work, this con­
cluding chapter examines two interrelated texts, the National Re­
sources Planning Board's study of Our Cities: Their Role in the 
National Economy (1937) and the Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth's 
famous article "Urbanism as a Way of Life" (1938). Those texts, 
both of which came from the work of the Urbanism Committee of 
the National Resources Planning Board, carry the issues, themes, 
and events examined in previous chapters into the 1930s. They 
illustrate both the persistence of republican ideals and the powerful 
influence of realistic assumptions. An analysis of the texts will ex­
plicate the paradox of professional planning, a paradox that was 
implicit in and central to the development of the realistic tradition. 
A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE 
The expanded governmental role for social scientists and pro­
fessional planners, anticipated in the Hoover administration, would 
become more complex and controversial in the context of the eco­
nomic crisis. A former engineer, Hoover had viewed planning as 
the wider application of the principles of scientific management; 
the idea for the Recent Social Trends survey originated in Hoover's 
own 1921 report on "waste in industry," which he had undertaken 
while serving as the secretary of commerce. The same sort of plan­
ning that had been successful in industry, Hoover believed, could 
also rationalize social organization.2 Even in the best of times, 
however, the logic of social planning would never be as obvious 
as the industrial analogy was meant to suggest. Moreover, Hoover 
had conceived of the survey as a rational blueprint for social man­
agement in a period of unprecedented prosperity; but it was pub­
lished amidst a profound economic crisis that had paralyzed con­
servative leadership and brought into question the efficacy of the 
industrial model upon which the prestige of social science and so­
cial management was based. 
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A debate on the role that social scientists should play in formu­
lating and implementing public policy, which had begun within 
the president's committee, became public with the survey's publi­
cation in 1933. In his review of Recent Social Trends, Charles Beard 
predicted a "coming crisis in the empirical method" of American 
social science. President Hoover, Beard explained, had assumed 
"that when once the 'data' have been assembled important conclu­
sions will flow from observing them" just as in "physics or mathe­
matics." Yet even Hoover had recognized, Beard added in quoting 
him, that the social scientists had set "forth matters of opinion as 
well as strict scientific determination." Many social scientists them­
selves worried about what would become known as the "problem 
of objectivity," that is, the tendency of their own subjective values 
and prejudices to undermine their claim to a disinterested and ob­
jective expertise. Echoing the concerns of some of the members of 
the president's committee, Beard argued that if policy-making was 
to remain democratic in an era of expert planning, then the public 
would have to take a more prominent role in questioning the so­
cial scientists' values and deciding upon their appropriateness.3 
Meanwhile, the Great Depression had also shaken the planning 
profession. 
As the economic boom of the 1920s began to collapse in the 
year before the stock market crash, dissenting voices were already 
surfacing at the national conference on city planning. By May 
1929 Harold Buttenheim, editor of The American City and long­
time planning enthusiast, had come to agree with those "radical" 
critics of the profession who argued that zoning resolutions "are 
devised with tender solicitude for upper economic groups," while 
the poor suffered from congestion "to the financial gain of a few." 
Buttenheim saw much truth in Charles Beard's contention that 
"apart from decorative work, such as boulevards making it easy 
for the Rotary boys to go from their offices to their country clubs, 
or civic plazas—that is, putting diamond crowns upon leprous 
brows—there has been very little achievement in the field of city 
planning." At the same conference Lawrence Veiller bemoaned the 
lack of progress in tenement reform. He described a "benighted" 
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city, full of darkness and disease, and argued that zoning laws 
made "inadequate provision for light." The regional plan of New 
York's standard of "one-half hour's sunshine in each room or its 
equivalent," he insisted, was wholly inadequate.4 This profes­
sional introspection and self-criticism would intensify in the com­
ing years. 
In 1931 Harland Bartholomew, then serving as president of the 
national conference, blamed the planning profession for failing to 
control speculation in real estate and metropolitan aggrandize­
ment. While countless blighted areas infected American cities, he 
charged, planners had continued to promote metropolitan expan­
sion under the guise of a false regionalism. Amending the profes-
sion's earlier fascination with efficient and orderly movement, 
Bartholomew declaimed: 'There is beauty in crowds massed in 
order. Rows upon rows of people in a vast arena, or marching in 
rhythm, are impressive. But when the rhythm is broken, and the 
crowd become a mob, terror seizes us." Economic disaster and 
social disorder had forced a reconsideration of the profession's as­
sumptions. In the following year Bartholomew extended his cri­
tique. He compared the planners' vision of metropolitan grandeur 
to the mistaken "prophecies of some new order" that had col­
lapsed with the stock market. The crucial task now, he insisted, 
was to save the "decaying" urban core from the "speculative de­
bauchery in real estate."5 As the Roosevelt administration took 
office in 1933, self-doubt and internal dissent had reached the 
highest levels of the planning profession. 
THE PRESERVATION OF THE PROFESSIONS 
Harold Ickes, head of a vast new public works program, repre­
sented the Roosevelt administration at the 1933 national confer­
ence on city planning in October. His appearance helped the plan­
ning profession recover its confidence. Lauding the work of the 
Chicago Plan Commission and the regional plan of New York, 
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Ickes supported the conference's resolution describing planning as 
"an essential public work" and urging that planning agencies be 
made "eligible to receive grants and loans" from Ickes's Public 
Works Administration. He also announced the immediate alloca­
tion of $400 million to "join arterial highways."6 Alfred Bettman, 
the current president of the national conference, spoke on the role 
of city and regional planning in the recovery program and noted 
"that the arm and hands of the federal government reach down 
into the localities to an extent which belies or repudiates many a 
boasted principle of local self-government." The "field of federal 
legislation and federal activity," he added with satisfaction, gave 
planners "greater sources of encouragement" than local govern­
ments ever had. The National Recovery Act, he explained, called 
for national planning and required that local projects be consistent 
with federally "coordinated planning." He rejoiced, "Members of 
the planning profession have been given important positions in the 
Public Works Administration" and on the newly created National 
Resources Planning Board.7 
Social scientists, facing their own professional difficulties which 
included a dearth of employment, also found important new allies 
in the Roosevelt administration. Adolf Berle, Wesley Mitchell's 
colleague at Columbia who had just joined the Roosevelt admin­
istration, outlined a new and ambitious governmental role for so­
cial scientists in his review of Recent Social Trends. Like Beard, 
Berle understood that Hoover's "impartial analysis of the facts" 
was a chimera. What was worse, Berle added, was that the social 
scientists themselves had been paralyzed by the unrealizable 
dream. Social scientists should overcome their self-doubts and 
take on a more aggressive role in the current crisis, Berle wrote. 
He urged them to accept a responsibility to "interpret the data" 
for the policymakers and to suggest ways in which recent trends 
were "susceptible of guidance towards real civilization." Berle 
agreed with the vice-chairman of the Committee on Recent Social 
Trends, Charles Merriam, who argued "that central control over 
social and industrial forces is . .  . almost inevitable." Given that 
inevitability, who better to control the central machinery than the 
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social scientist, Berle asked. The Roosevelt administration and its 
celebrated brains trust, Berle concluded, was taking over the "form­
less and chaotic machinery devised during the brilliant decade" 
and preparing to give it "a directive purpose."8 While President 
Roosevelt ignored Hoover's Recent Social Trends, he extended even 
greater authority to its union of social scientists and professional 
planners. 
Charged with the responsibility of coordinating physical and 
social planning, Roosevelt's National Resources Planning Board 
gave urban planning its first institutional base in the federal gov­
ernment. Uniting key figures in the development of city and social 
planning, the three-member National Resources Planning Board 
was composed of Mitchell, Frederic Delano (former chair of the 
American Planning and Civic Association and the National Capi­
tal Park and Planning Commission) and Merriam (the University 
of Chicago's entrepreneur of research). Charles W. Eliot, a land­
scape architect and city planner, served as executive officer of the 
new agency. Delano, Merriam, and Eliot remained the most in­
fluential figures throughout the history of the board.9 Merriam 
and his Chicago colleagues played an especially important role 
in bringing social scientists, professional planners, and the urban 
planning perspective into the federal bureaucracies created during 
the New Deal.10 
Under the prodding of Merriam, the National Resources Plan­
ning Board undertook a study of the role of the city in the national 
economy. Merriam believed that the massive economic problems 
that beset the country provided an opportunity for the develop­
ment of the sort of federal planning on a metropolitan basis that 
he had long advocated. Assembling a research committee on ur­
banism headquartered in Cincinnati, which included city manag­
ers, urban planners, and the Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth, the 
National Resources Planning Board published its report, Our Cit­
ies: Their Role in the National Economy in 1937. Our Cities made an 
impressive and convincing case for a nationwide assault on urban 
problems. As the composition of its research committee might 
suggest, the report reflected in part the realistic approach that had 
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matured in the past decade. Forswearing any Utopian scheme of 
remaking the city or creating garden cities, the report argued that 
"the realistic answer to the question of a desirable urban environ­
ment lies not in wholesale dispersion, but in the judicious reshap­
ing of the urban community and region by systematic develop­
ment in accordance with forward looking and intelligent plans." 
In particular the success of what the report called "urban plan­
ning" depended upon taking advantage of such "natural trends" 
as industrial decentralization and residential suburbanization to 
create "a moderately decentralized and yet integrated urban struc­
ture." Calling for "planned and supervised recreational projects, 
slum eradication, and programs of better housing for the low-
income groups, particularly in areas with high delinquency and 
crime rates," the report also endorsed the urban planners' policy 
of social control.11 
THE ROAD NOT TAKEN 
Yet despite the prominent role played by Merriam and Wirth, 
the urbanism committee went far beyond the orthodoxy of the 
realistic tradition to project a radical alternative to realistic urban 
planning. Explanations for the committee's boldness vary, includ­
ing the dire economic conditions that seemed to demand more 
radical solutions, the political and labor turmoil that beset the na-
tion's cities in the mid-thirties (the report described the metropolis 
as "the dusty and sometimes smoldering and reddened arena of 
industrial conflict" and the "great battleground of the Nation"), 
the more progressive orientation of the national administration 
(reflected in Berle's challenge to guide the nation toward real civi­
lization), and the profession's own recent self-examination. For all 
those reasons, and perhaps for others that remain unclear, the ur­
banism committee drew upon the surviving body of republican 
criticism of the city to outline a far more ambitious program of 
urban reform than had ever been considered.12 
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The work of the urbanism committee signaled the recognition 
among at least a small group of federal planners that America's 
future depended on the creation of an urban civilization worthy of 
the name. "There is democracy in the scattered few," the report 
asserted, "but there is also democracy in the thick crowd with its 
vital impulse and its insistent demand for a just participation in the 
gains of our civilization." Arguing that the spread of sharecrop­
ping and tenantry threatened to create a propertyless rural prole­
tariat just as the factory had stripped urban artisans of their inde­
pendence, the report also reflected the abandonment of a nostalgia 
for a rural order, which if it had ever existed certainly no longer 
did. Calling for the "harmonious adjustment and happy interrela­
tion" of the city and the country, the report recommended the 
"equalization between country and city of as many material and 
cultural opportunities as possible." The most remarkable aspect 
of the report, what set it apart most clearly from the realistic 
tradition, was its sharp criticism of the economic organization of 
American life, which it blamed for the host of problems that beset 
American cities.13 
The economic insecurity of the urban worker, the committee 
charged, was one of the greater obstacles to social progress. Low 
wages meant that "a large proportion of the urban population . . . 
is barred from any of the advantages which urban life can offer." 
The federal government should "formulate the requisites of an ac­
ceptable minimum standard of living" and ensure that industries 
that "are not paying the cost of their existence in terms of the 
human energies they consume" abide by the standard. A federal 
industrial policy was also needed to "combat the present tendency 
of industry to move from urban regions to otherwise often un­
economic areas in order to exploit labor and escape undue taxa­
tion." A "unified taxation policy and a uniform labor policy" 
would further "combat exploitation of labor and inequitable taxa­
tion." Such policies would help create "a better balance between 
the cost to the community of services to its industries and the 
income of the community from its industries."14 Economic plan­
ning, Our Cities suggested, was an essential prerequisite to suc­
cessful urban reform. 
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Our Cities outlined urban taxation, land use, and public works 
policies, which also owed a great deal to the republican critique of 
the American city. State and local authorities, the report sug­
gested, should "consider the reduction of the rate of taxation on 
buildings and the corresponding increase of such rates on land." A 
study of a tax on speculative realty values, it added, should be 
undertaken to determine if it "would make possible the financing 
of public improvements more nearly through tax revenue derived 
from the increased values which these improvements create, and 
whether such a tax would aid in combatting speculation in land." 
The committee also called for a more "liberal" policy of municipal 
land acquisition, a "wider interpretation" of the term "public 
use," and a thorough reconsideration of all constitutional and 
statutory limitations on the general property tax.15 
Such radical changes in fiscal policy, the report continued, 
would facilitate the development of a "Nation-wide, coordinated, 
long-range program of planned public works" involving all levels 
of government with federal assistance. The program would not 
only serve "as one of the means of minimizing the impact of busi­
ness cycles," but would facilitate an attack on the slum, that most 
"visible evidence of our failure in city building." A major focus of 
the public works program would be "the widest program of de­
molition possible," guided by a policy "of not compensating the 
owners of buildings unfit for human use." A commitment to the 
"satisfactory rehousing of displaced families" and a constructive 
national housing policy "for rehousing the low-income groups at 
acceptable minimum standards" would complement the policy of 
slum clearance.16 
Both metropolitan aggrandizement and the belief in the unity 
of private and public interests, two elements of the realistic tradi­
tion, also came under the urbanism committee's scrutiny. A key 
element in an effective urban policy, the report argued, was the 
"substitution in place of the philosophy and aspiration of bigness 
the philosophy and aspiration of quality" and a reexamination of 
the "expectation of continuous and unlimited growth."17 The re­
port also took issue with the "widely held belief that the special 
interests of groups and individuals are identical with the public 
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interest" and called for "a form of economic organization better 
attuned to the public interest," especially in the provision of public 
utilities. Government regulation of privately owned utilities, it 
charged, had "perpetuated and, in some cases, accentuated the 
pattern of economic activity and of urbanization which competi­
tive private enterprise developed with little or no consideration for 
the public interest and under policies and practices which, with 
each advance in the technology, successively supported and stimu­
lated the then prevailing economic and urban pattern." In lan­
guage that the republican proponents of rapid transit would have 
recognized, the committee urged city planners to develop a trans­
portation policy directed toward an "economically effective and 
socially more desirable distribution of economic activities and ur­
ban pattern."18 A sharper riposte to the realistic tradition, espe­
cially in its insistence that planning include the transformation of 
the economic and well as the physical and social environment, is 
difficult to imagine. 
Although at least one commentator greeted the report by inex­
plicably blasting its timidity, the urbanism committee had offered 
an analysis of urban problems that owed much more to the repub­
lican critics of urban America than to the realistic tradition. It out­
lined a reform program that could have led to dramatic improve­
ments in urban life. Far more than the urban planners' policy of 
prefabricating stable and homogeneous neighborhoods, the rec­
ommendations in Our Cities had a chance of creating "a social and 
political coherence which can arouse and hold community loyalty 
and participation, [and] inspire responsible civic loyalty." The 
problem with Our Cities was not, as an editorial in The Nation had 
it, that it remained "well within the safety zone of more and more 
facts, more and more education, more and more cooperation with 
agencies, public and private, hopelessly prevented from taking any 
drastic, long-range action."19 The problem was that Our Cities 
lacked an effective mass constituency committed to its implemen­
tation. Just as the aggressive antitrust policy of the later New Deal 
had died for lack of a mass constituency (even within organized 
labor), so too did the urbanism committee's program of urban 
reform.20 
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The failure to support and implement the program outlined in 
Our Cities cannot be blamed entirely on the urban experts who 
compiled the report. Just as the labor movement had come to ac­
cept the inevitability of corporate capitalism and to moderate its 
goals (exemplified in its lack of enthusiasm for antitrust legisla­
tion), the urban citizenry had come to doubt its ability to effect 
significant change and had embraced realistic assumptions, thus 
"coming to terms" with the metropolitan order. But in the face of 
a profound crisis, the urban citizenry now desperately needed in­
novative and practical proposals for change; and those who had 
such proposals likewise needed a powerful constituency to imple­
ment them. Urban reformers who worked within the republican 
tradition had seen the mobilization of a democratic movement as 
an essential part of their task. In contrast social scientists and pro­
fessional planners worked within the realistic tradition, which 
doubted the political competence of the people and saw little to be 
gained in a dialogue with popular movements. Thus, even as the 
urbanism committee overcame some of the limitations of the re­
alistic tradition and critically examined the role of economic and 
political power in city building, the longer term legacy of the re­
alistic tradition vitiated their efforts. In their failure to cultivate a 
mass constituency, social scientists and professional planners had 
contributed to the atrophy of democratic politics; in their isolation 
from the potential sources of such a constituency, they had left 
themselves powerless to challenge the status quo even when their 
own analysis demanded it. 
URBANISM AS A WAY OF THOUGHT 
Nineteen-thirty-seven was the year of Roosevelt's searing in­
dictment of one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-
nourished and his call for new initiatives to attack those problems. 
The proposals contained in Our Cities would have fit well into 
such a program. Yet for want of an effective constituency, a more 
radical New Deal was never legislated. Soon a revived conserva­
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tive and rural opposition to the New Deal as well as Roosevelt's 
own tendency to pander at least occasionally to the antiurban bias 
of parts of his constituency ("Today many people are beginning to 
realize that there is inherent weakness in cities which become too 
large for their times," he said barely a week after Our Cities ap­
peared) combined to bury the report's recommendations.21 The 
urban sociologists who had done so much to shape the emergence 
of urban planning, however, still had at least one important con­
stituency in other sociologists. It was among that constituency 
that the experience of the urbanism committee would have its 
greatest influence. 
Louis Wirth's classic essay, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," pub­
lished a year after Our Cities and more widely read, was the fruit 
of his participation on the committee and helped to inspire the 
work of the coming generation of urban sociologists. Wirth, of 
course, had a long and distinguished career that bracketed his 
work with the urbanism committee. Moreover, he was generally 
a more subtle and generous thinker than "Urbanism as a Way of 
Life" might suggest. That particular essay, however, illustrates the 
powerful and deleterious influence of realistic assumptions on ur­
ban thought. Unfortunately, in "Urbanism as a Way of Life," 
Wirth's most famous and influential essay, the recognition of the 
role of economic and political interests in urban development that 
characterized Our Cities gave way to the sociological emphasis on 
natural and impersonal urban processes and the forms of social 
interaction. 
In "Urbanism as a Way of Life," Wirth offered a sociological 
definition of city life. His emphasis thus was on "the peculiar char­
acteristics of the city as a particular form of human association" 
and as "a distinctive mode of human group life." He argued that a 
combination of three overlapping factors (size, density, and het­
erogeneity) gave urban populations their distinctive character. In­
deed, Wirth warned against confusing urbanism with any specific 
historical influences and in particular with capitalism or industri­
alism. Having removed industrial capitalism as a factor in his 
analysis, Wirth went on to describe with remarkable equanimity 
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the exploitation, competitiveness, and anomie which, along with 
individual freedom, characterized life in the modern American 
city.22 
It was the sheer number of people in the city, Wirth explained, 
that had given rise to "segmental relations." Since urbanites were 
both more dependent on people in general and less dependent on 
individual persons, the multiplication of contacts prevented them 
from having a thorough knowledge of or acquaintance with one 
another. As a result urbanites tended to regard others principally 
"as a means for the achievement of our own ends." In combination 
with the "pecuniary nexus," such an attitude gave rise to "preda­
tory relationships." The corporation had proved so adaptable to 
urban conditions, Wirth observed, precisely because it had "no 
soul." There were, of course, compensating factors. The "super­
ficiality, the anonymity, and the transitory character of urban-
social relations" gave the urbanite greater individual freedom, 
Wirth explained, even as it robbed him or her of "the spontaneous 
self-expression, the morale, and the sense of participation that 
comes with living in an integrated society."23 
The density and heterogeneity of population reinforced those 
characteristics of urban life. Population density gave rise to a com­
petition for space that resulted in segregation and the creation of 
"a mosaic of social worlds." The "close living together and work­
ing together of individuals who have no sentimental and emo­
tional ties fosters a spirit of competition, aggrandizement, and 
mutual exploitation" and created a need for a variety of formal 
controls. The heterogeneity of urban life, its incessant physical 
and social mobility, Wirth argued, also undermined neighborli­
ness and created a situation where the "task of holding organiza­
tions together and maintaining and promoting intimate and lasting 
acquaintanceship between the members is difficult." Heteroge­
neity gave rise to a complex division of labor and eventually to 
modern mass production; as a result the "pecuniary nexus which 
implies the purchaseability of services and things has displaced 
personal relations as the basis of association." In the great city, 
Wirth added, "there is virtually no human need which has re­
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mained unexploited by commercialism."24 Wirth thus described 
urbanism in terms similar to those the harshest critics of the 
American city might have used. But whereas the radical might 
have traced such a culture to industrial capitalism, land specula­
tion, or the exploitation of public utilities and the conservative 
might have traced it to the anarchic excesses of democracy and 
unrestrained individualism or the collapse of traditional forms of 
authority, Wirth treated it as an inevitable result of the size, den­
sity, and heterogeneity of urban population. 
Although Wirth discussed the pathological aspects of urban life 
with what might be described as an excess of detachment, he was 
certainly not content with the status quo. He had just completed 
an intensive study of urban problems and helped to author a blue­
print for radical change in urban policy. In some ways that expe­
rience still shaped his approach to the study of urbanism. For even 
in the guise of the dispassionate sociologist Wirth placed much less 
emphasis on the factors that compensated for the exploitation, 
competitiveness, and anomie of urban life (the freedom, diversity, 
and liberality of urban life, the critical and sophisticated outlook) 
than did Simmel in his classic essay "The Metropolis and Mental 
Life," on which Wirth's was based.25 But in other ways Wirth's so­
ciological approach to urbanism differed sharply from that found 
in Our Cities. 
In the final pages of his essay, Wirth looked to the probable 
future of urbanism as a way of life. In the city, Wirth argued, the 
isolated individual was "reduced to a stage of virtual impotence" 
and it was "only through the organizations to which men belong 
that their interests and resources can be enlisted for a collective 
cause." It was to the "emerging trends in the communication sys­
tem and to the production and distribution technology that has 
come into existence with modern civilization that we must look 
for the symptoms which will indicate the probable future devel­
opment of urbanism as a mode of social life." He warned that 
those social organizations were often "subject to manipulation by 
symbols and stereotypes managed by individuals working from 
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afar or operating invisibly behind the scenes through their control 
of the instruments of communication." Wirth was not entirely 
comfortable with pinning the future development of the urban 
community to modern technology and to the "soulless" corpora­
tions that controlled it (as Wirth well knew) for private rather than 
public ends.26 But it was the only logical conclusion to which his 
analysis could lead. 
Based on the factors of size, density, and heterogeneity, Wirth's 
definition and analysis of urbanism ensured that the problems of 
urban life, at least from a sociological perspective, would be de­
fined in terms of the forms of social interaction rather than the 
political and economic interests that shaped social interaction. 
Notwithstanding the often bleak picture of urban life that he of­
fered, Wirth still insisted that social progress depended less on 
changes within the economic, political, and physical structure of 
the city, or on any mass political movement, than on the evolution 
of the forms of social interaction. The forms of social interaction, 
Wirth argued, followed their own natural evolutionary course in­
dependent of the political aspirations of the average citizen or the 
best intentions of the urban planner. Thus in Wirth's thought the 
two most salient elements of the realistic tradition, a skepticism 
about the role that the urban citizenry could play in shaping urban 
development and the assertion of a set of natural factors that set 
strict limits on the discretion of professional planners, reinforced 
one another. 
In complementary ways Our Cities and "Urbanism as a Way of 
Life" serve to remind us that the new metropolitan form (or any 
urban form) involves something more than mere landscapes and 
streetscapes. Our Cities argued that underlying the new metro­
politan form was a specific configuration and exercise of economic 
and political power and that a redistribution or redirection of that 
power would produce a different urban form. "Urbanism as a Way 
of Life" illustrates the role of thought in the creation and devel­
opment of an urban form, for even a body of thought that mini­
mized the role of choice and of power in urban development had 
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its impact on urban form, if only to discourage innovation and 
popular participation and to reinforce the status quo. As an alter­
native to social theories that made the distribution of political and 
economic power primary, the concept of urbanism reinforced re­
alistic assumptions.27 
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Since 1937 the realistic tradition 
has become enmeshed and codified in the terms urban and urban­
ism. In warning against the "danger of confusing urbanism with 
industrialism and modern capitalism," the Chicago sociologist 
Louis Wirth urged urban experts to avoid "identifying urbanism 
as a way of life with any specific locally or historically cultural in­
fluences which . . . are not the essential determinants of its character 
as a city."1 Wirth's admonition influenced not only planners and 
social scientists, but even historians who should have been most 
interested in "specific locally or historically cultural influences." 
In an oft-quoted call for a "new urban history" in 1961, Eric 
Lampard wrote: 
If the urban historian is to be more than a historian who happens 
to do his research and writing on the subject of cities, it will be 
necessary to show that the term "urban" explains something in 
history that cannot be better explained by recourse to other 
frames of reference. In short, "urban" must signify not subject 
matter alone but a scheme of conceptualization in much the same 
manner as "economic" or "cultural" history. 
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In searching for impersonal urban processes, the new urban his­
torians have added to our understanding of urban life; but they 
have often done so at the cost of obscuring the politically con­
scious agents of urbanization.2 That task has even been slighted by 
the most talented historians on the left. Sam Bass Warner, Jr., for 
example, has argued that from "a particular technological climate, 
a particular configuration of transportation . . . the form of our 
cities . . . inevitably takes shape."3 Ironically, just as the realists' 
growing enthusiasm for public planning had been linked to a skep­
ticism about the potential for change, so too as Americans have 
come to understand more fully the character of their urban society, 
they have despaired of shaping it to their own ideals. 
THE INTELLECTUAL AS SOCIAL TYPE 
That irony is in part the result of the changing position of the 
intellectual in American society. The development of social theory 
has often been enriched by and in turn has enriched political ac­
tivity. When conscious social groups, guided at least in part by 
the practical implications of social theory, confront new problems 
and search for new solutions they, in turn, force theorists to rein­
terpret the meaning and reexamine the context of social conflicts. 
In that way a body of social criticism and a tradition of political 
action are developed upon which future theorists and reformers 
can build.4 In the Gilded Age, for example, Henry George, Henry 
Demarest Lloyd, Edward Bellamy, and other members of what 
John L. Thomas has called the adversary tradition, tested their so­
cial theories in the political arena.5 If they did not always learn as 
much from their failures as they might have, they at least provided 
lessons for other theorists and other activists. By the 1920s, how­
ever, American intellectuals carried on their work in almost com­
plete isolation from mass political activity. With little or no con­
nection to a mass political constituency, social critics cultivated 
their alienation from society in the form of idiosyncratic theories 
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while realistic urban reformers managed existing trends even when 
their own analyses demanded fundamental change.6 
The isolation of the intellectual in the twentieth century was 
associated with the political and social transformation that oc­
curred during the sixty years examined here. The collapse of such 
mass political movements as the Knights of Labor and the Populist 
party and the decline of the ideal of a republic of self-reliant, in­
dependent citizens weakened the American faith in and commit­
ment to democracy. By the 1920s the democratic impulse that had 
inspired the Populist movement had given way to the interest-
group politics of the Farm Bureau Federation that excluded share­
croppers, tenants, and migratory workers. Similarly, the Knights 
of Labor gave way to the American Federation of Labor, whose 
strategy was to organize the "aristocracy" of skilled labor and es­
chew political struggle in favor of more immediate economic 
goals. Black leaders turned away from the militant demand for 
equality and towards accommodation in the South and promotion 
of the "talented tenth" in the North. Even the Socialist party, 
which had championed the cause of democratic change through 
the 1920s, succumbed to the sectarian infighting initiated by its 
would-be Leninist vanguard.7 By the 1920s critics of American 
society could not engage in a dialogue with a mass movement even 
if they had so desired. 
The atrophy of American democracy and the political isolation 
of the intellectuals it engendered was linked to the changing social 
structure of urban-industrial America. The growing rift between 
the new middle class of managers and professional servants of the 
corporate order, on the one hand, and the industrial working class, 
on the other, discouraged popular coalitions and hampered the rise 
of democratic movements. The prohibition movement, for ex­
ample, which in the late-nineteenth century had united both mar­
ginal and aspiring small producers across class lines in opposition 
to the liquor trade and the growth of monopoly, had become by 
the twentieth century a movement of middle-class professionals 
and business leaders committed to transforming the "pathologi­
cal" culture of the working class.8 
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Many intellectuals of George's generation had been part of or 
aspired to the traditional middle class of small producers and 
shared its concern over the rise of the new industrial elite and the 
corporate order. Adopting an adversarial position, they forged 
links with those elements of the working class that shared their 
attachment to the values of republican and free labor America. In 
contrast intellectuals of Park's generation were more often associ­
ated with the new middle class of managers and professionals who 
provided a variety of services to the corporate order. Even when 
they criticized the corporate order, as did those reformers whom 
Christopher Lasch has described as "the new radicals," they gen­
erally shared such corporate values as efficiency and treated poli­
tics as a problem of social control. In the name of progress, they 
embraced the material promise of the corporate order and rejected 
the cultural conservatism of the working-class opponents of cor­
porate development.9 While maintaining a rhetorical allegiance to 
democracy, they spoke for rather than to or with the average citizen 
and thus preempted a democratic critique of corporate capitalism. 
During the same period many members of the working class 
abandoned as Utopian their own hopes for fundamental change 
and pursued more immediate and realistic goals. Like the new rad­
icals the new organizations of the labor movement adopted the 
realistic perspective of the corporate order. "The trade unions," 
AF of L leader Samuel Gompers explained, "are the business or­
ganizations of the wage-earners, to attend to the business of the 
wage-earners." Looking back, Gompers recalled "the danger of 
entangling alliances with intellectuals. . .  . I saw that the better­
ment of workingmen must come primarily through working-
men."10 In such a movement there was no room for intellectuals 
or their theories. Of course the labor movement and the intellec­
tuals achieved a rapprochement of sorts in the 1930s, in the mar­
riage of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the 
New Deal and the establishment of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB). But by then realistic assumptions dominated both 
partners. Labor leaders and New Deal intellectuals each saw the 
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CIO and the NLRB as components in a scientifically managed, 
mass-consumption economy overseen by a national welfare state.11 
The long period of political and social isolation contributed to 
the intellectuals' growing consciousness of themselves as a peculiar 
social type. While some intellectuals may have cynically calculated 
their interests and decided to serve the corporate order, the origins 
and the logic of the social thought of the reform-minded intellec­
tuals are to be found in their group consciousness. Living through 
a period of intense social change and political conflict, intellectuals 
felt the precariousness of their position. Lacking both economic 
power and the power of numbers, they had everything to lose and 
nothing to gain from political strife. Simultaneously, their aca­
demic disciplines convinced them that new forms of social con­
trol, from education to eugenics, could replace the role of physical 
force in stabilizing the social order.12 The concept of social control 
moved to the center of the reform agenda and political ambitions of 
the intellectuals. In 1901 the sociologist and theorist of social con­
trol Edward Ross put it this way: " As the enlightenment of the pub­
lic wanes relatively to the superior enlightenment of the learned 
castes and professions, the mandarinate will infallibly draw to it­
self a greater and greater share of social power."13 If a new science 
of social control was to replace traditional political conflict over 
the distribution of resources, however, intellectuals would have to 
increase their power relative to both the short-sighted corporate 
elite and the ignorant masses. 
THE LEGACY OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM 
Historians have argued endlessly over the character of the Pro­
gressive Era and particularly over whether any specific social group 
or class dominated the progressive movement. It now seems clear 
that no monolithic progressive movement ever existed and that a 
variety of social groups and political philosophies were active in 
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the Progressive Era. There is little point in rehearsing or reopen­
ing the debate.14 But the story told here suggests that the growing 
confidence, ambition, and class consciousness of the intellectuals 
was one of the more important legacies of the period of progres­
sive reform. At the center of that legacy was the science of social 
control. 
As Ross and other theorists first articulated the concept of social 
control it signified, Morris Janowitz explains, a "spontaneously 
emergent and spontaneously accepted consensus." Indeed, as a 
means of controlling the actions of both groups and the individ­
uals that composed them, social control had traditionally arisen 
spontaneously from within the group. Industrial work groups, for 
example, established stints or quotas and developed an ethic of 
manliness to regulate their members and as a way to control the 
process of production. The pattern of "soldiering" (the practice of 
skilled craftsmen who collectively refused to work at the pace de­
manded by management), which so maddened the scientific man­
ager Frederick Taylor, was actually a spontaneous form of social 
control. For the craftsmen soldiering was part of an ethic of man­
liness through which they sought to control production and resist 
the dictates of management. In that form social control was, as 
Janowitz argues in reference to the ideals of the early sociologists, 
an important part of the "efforts of men to realize their collective 
goals."15 But as intellectuals lost faith in the competence of the 
public, they looked to new techniques, from scientific manage­
ment to publicity, in order to impose a new form of social control 
from above. 
"The passiveness of the average mind will make it safe to weave 
into . . . moral instruction certain convenient illusions and fallacies 
which it is nobody's interest to denounce," Ross explained. That 
this was a process fraught with the danger of totalitarian manipu­
lation even Ross recognized. He wrote: 
The coalescence of physical and spiritual forces in the modern 
state may well inspire certain misgivings. When we note the 
enormous resources and high centralization of afirst-class edu­
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cational system; when we consider that it takes forcible posses­
sion of the child for half the time during its best years, and sub­
mits the little creature to a curriculum devised more and more 
with reference to its own aims . . . we may well be apprehensive 
of future developments. 
Yet Ross went on to urge society, working through an "ethical 
elite" with high-minded motives, to "impose upon the individual 
its own valuations of life's activities and experiences." In that alien­
ated form social control had much less to do with the realization 
of collective goals than with the adjustment of the individual to an 
unchallenged social reality.16 
Many of the reforms of the Progressive Era, notwithstanding 
the democratic rhetoric that pervaded the era, owed a great deal 
to the view of politics as essentially a process of social control. 
With the growing sophistication of the rational approach to social 
problems, the sociologists W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki 
explained at the end of the Progressive Era, "We are less and less 
ready to let any social processes go on without our active interfer­
ence and we feel more and more dissatisfied with any active inter­
ference based upon the mere whim of an individual or a social 
body; or upon preconceived philosophical, religious, or moral gen­
eralization." The pace of change, the complexity of urban life, and 
its recurrent crises, they added, meant that the "substitution of a 
conscious technique for a half-conscious routine has become . . . 
a social necessity."17 Many Progressive Era reformers had already 
embraced that logic. But it was the American experience in World 
War I and its immediate aftermath that brought not only the sci­
ence of social control but the realistic tradition to maturity. 
The wartime propaganda campaigns in which many intellec­
tuals participated seemed to confirm the political incompetence of 
the general public. Walter Lippmann, who served as a propagan­
dist in the Military Intelligence Branch, argued in 1922 that mod­
ern society had become too complex for the average citizen to 
understand. Propagandists succeeded in duping the public by of­
fering an oversimplified and distorted picture of society. Tradi­
tional democratic principles were no longer appropriate to a soci­
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ety, Lippmann argued, that was composed of so many people 
"whose experience has comprehended no factor of the problem 
under discussion." Instead, Lippmann recommended the estab­
lishment of an intelligence bureau, "managed only by a special­
ized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality," 
that would define and pursue the public interest.18 Such attitudes 
contributed to the development of a political culture that placed 
greater emphasis on scientific knowledge, technical expertise, and 
managerial skill than on virtue, individual competence, and demo­
cratic debate. 
In the 1920s, the decade of the Hawthorne experiments in indus­
trial psychology, President Hoover's survey, Recent Social Trends, 
the Russell Sage Foundation's Regional Plan of New York and Its En­
virons, and a generally expanded role for the intellectual in public 
affairs, the realistic tradition and the science of social control domi­
nated the reform agenda. In his 1925 study, The New Aspects of 
Politics, the political scientist Charles Merriam unwittingly revealed 
the antidemocratic and even totalitarian attitudes that sometimes 
underlay the science of social control and the realistic tradition: 
[Social scientists possess] two great mechanisms of control that 
have never before existed in the same form or with the same 
possibilities of effective use. These are education and eugenics, 
which are likely to play a greater role in the government of man­
kind than have force and tradition in the past. . . . We are very 
rapidly approaching a time when it may be necessary and pos­
sible to decide not merely what types of law we wish to enact, 
but what types of person we wish to develop. 
Merriam went on to argue that although education and eugenics 
were rapidly approaching the point "where by scientific process 
we can breed and train what types of men we would, it does not 
seem that we should breed and train 3 per cent of genius and 97 
per cent of morons. We should probably contrive a more balanced 
society . . . leaving the mass of human beings on something like a 
democratic basis." Social engineering might "cause restlessness" 
or "revolution" among those designed for "toil," Merriam admit­
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ted, "but that is a part of the chance that the governing group 
would have to take in such a world."19 
Few were as forthright as Merriam in taking the logic of scien­
tific social control to its stark conclusion, and his grandiose vision 
of social engineering was unusual among realists. But his argument 
serves as a reminder of how different the political assumptions and 
attitudes of the realists were from the republicans. Although re­
publican attitudes and democratic aspirations never completely 
disappeared, it was the realists' skeptical view of popular abilities, 
their embrace of the values of the corporate order, and their quest 
for a science of social control that most profoundly shaped urban 
life and the urban landscape in the twentieth century. 
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Huggins quoted in "Why the Negro Appeal to Violence," Literary Digest 62 (Au­
gust 9, 1919), 11; The Negro in Chicago, 165; Sandburg, Chicago Race Riots, 8. 
48. The Negro in Chicago, 205-11. 
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the report on public opinion. 
68. The Negro in Chicago, 22-25. 
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86. W. E. B. Dubois, "Chicago," The Crisis 21 (January 1921), 102; quoted 
in Philpott, The Slum and the Ghetto, 209. 
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47. Shelby Harrison, "Community Participation in City and Regional Plan­
ning," in Ernest W. Burgess, ed., The Urban Community (Chicago, 1926), 
209-10. 
48. Thus the Chicago sociologists reflected what Boyer described as "a fun­
damental shift of interest away from the individual to the group" in the early 
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59. Clarence Arthur Perry, "The Neighborhood Unit," in Regional Survey of 
New York and Its Environs, vol. 7, Neighborhood and Community Planning, 25-30; 
Perry quotes Burgess, "Can Neighborhood Work Have a Scientific Basis," on 
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60. Perry, "The Neighborhood Unit," factors, 31-33, criticism of zoning, 
114-17. 
61. Perry, "The Neighborhood Unit," 123. 
62. Perry, "The Neighborhood Unit," 123-26. 
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more, 1933), 63; Edwin Burdell, "The Social Problem Involved in Securing the 
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Urban Masses and Moral Order, 282-83. 
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85. McKenzie, The Metropolitan Community, "the will to grow," 160; on met­
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2. Barry Dean Karl argues that for Hoover the "transference of the industrial 
model to social organization seemed as obvious as it was urgent." Barry Dean 
Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study ofPolitics (Chicago, 1974), 209. 
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12. NRPB, Our Cities, vi-vii. On the more progressive orientation of the 
national administration, see William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
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